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PART I:  Introduction & Theoretical Background 
1 Introduction 
“I think Big Pharma likes the high cost of drug development because it is a barrier to entry 
against smaller firms, particularly against biotechnology companies.  Smaller firms get the 
drug in Phase I, maybe into Phase II, and because of the high cost of R&D must seek a 
partner to continue the development process.  Big Pharma, if they really were against the high 
cost of drug development, would be on the Hill trying to get FDA to modify its drug approval 
standards.” - Robert Oldham, CEO Cancer Therapeutics1. 
This quote concisely summarizes one of the key challenges young companies in the 
biotechnology industry are facing in the marketplace today.  The high cost related to 
developing a new drug in combination with a lack of financial resources often prevents these 
companies from developing their own drug discoveries to a point where they can be launched 
on the market.  Although various types of financing are available, they do not seem to be 
accessible to an extent that enables the young companies to pursue their projects 
independently over the long timeframe from base research to final drug approval.  This 
ongoing problematic situation raises three key questions. 
1. Does an innovative financing approach, such as selling option rights on ongoing drug 
development projects theoretically represent an appealing concept for young 
biotechnology companies to raise money to support their operations? 
2. How receptive would the market be to such a concept and would it also be sufficiently 
attractive for big pharmaceutical companies to act as buyers of these option rights? 
3. How much money can a young biotechnology company expect to raise if the concept 
proves theoretically attractive? 
Despite the fact that financing has always been a critical issue in the biotechnology industry 
and option theory has now found its way into the valuation of drug development projects, the 
ideas have not merged yet.  Until today, no comprehensive study for the practitioner can be 
found among scientific publications that directly deals with the questions stated above and 
therefore they are covered in this study. 
1.1 Objective and Scope 
With the underlying questions raised in the introduction section above being relatively broad, 
this first section frames the objective and scope of this work in more detail. 
Objective 
The objective of this study is to investigate the idea of selling option rights on ongoing drug 
development projects as a potential tool for young biotechnology companies to raise funds to 
                                                 




finance their operations.  These option rights are referred to as the R&D option or the 
research option during the course of this study.  The R&D option in this context grants the 
owner the right to acquire the unlimited, exclusive and royalty free rights on an ongoing drug 
development project at the time of final drug approval for a predetermined lump sum 
payment2.  To frame the discussion about this broad topic, three aspects represent the main 
objectives of this study: 
1. An investigation of the practical demand for an innovative financing tool like a R&D 
option for the biotechnology industry including an assessment of the receptiveness of 
big pharmaceutical companies for this concept as potential buyers of R&D options. 
2. A description of the characteristics of a R&D option deal and how the underlying 
drug development project compares to financial and to other types of real options. 
3. The development of a subjective valuation model to “ex ante” estimate the financing 
potential of a R&D option deal over the expected duration of a drug development 
project and to identify the key parameters that represent its main value drivers. 
Each of these key objectives is related to an innovative aspect not to be found in scientific 
literature.  Although there is a vast number of studies and reports describing the state of the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry, none of these investigates whether a specific 
financing concept represents an appealing fund raising tool within the current environment.  
While reaching the second main objective the study extends an existing theoretical real 
option classification into a more pragmatic one and assesses for the first time the applicability 
of existing option valuation models on the specific problem of valuing an option on an 
ongoing drug development project.  During the process of reaching the third major objective 
it is not only the entire subjective valuation approach itself, which builds on a double jump 
diffusion process, that is not described in this way in any other source.  In addition, this study 
also intends to model technical failure risk of drug development projects in an innovative way 
as a time continuous default function not to be found in any other publication. 
Because of the type of topic discussed, this study is mainly intended for the industry 
practitioner.  To take the special requirements of this target audience into account the 
following points are considered when structuring this work. 
• The industry environment is described in detail to demonstrate the practical relevance 
of this work. 
• Key concepts around financing and option theory are summarized to an extent 
necessary to clarify the scientific context. 
• All formulas are developed step-by-step with detailed explanations to gradually 
increase modeling complexity. 
                                                 




• The various steps when building the valuation model are demonstrated using an 
exemplary drug development project for illustration purposes. 
• Different alternatives are presented as to how a valuation step can be conducted 
although some are not pursued further (e.g. different types of distribution functions) to 
present advantages and drawbacks of each approach. 
• Highly sophisticated mathematical concepts, such as complex partial differential 
equations, are avoided whenever possible. 
• The final model and its preceding valuation steps can be evaluated using standard 
spreadsheet software. 
The objective of this study is not to develop a closed form valuation formula that creates the 
opportunity to assign the one and only correct price to any R&D option.  Instead, a subjective 
valuation approach is developed forcing management of companies evaluating a potential 
R&D option deal to discuss and think about the true value drivers of such a transaction.  The 
knowledge gained from the discussion of these key value drivers can be considered as 
valuable from a managerial standpoint for negotiation purposes as the price range resulting 
from the model itself. 
This study does not delve into the optimization of individual input parameters for the model 
because this issue is specific to every individual case and requires a comprehensive study on 
its own.  However, the intent is to present a framework that enables the practitioner to assess 
the magnitude of the financing potential related to a R&D option and to be aware of the 
major risk factors when preparing or negotiating such a financing deal. 
Scope 
When discussing issues of the biotechnology industry one has to consider that the situation of 
a company in the global context not only depends on its own strategy, achievements, and 
development projects.  It also depends on the regional environment in which a company 
operates.  Generally, differentiation is made between the three regions North America, 
Europe and Asia-Pacific are distinguished from each other.  Although these three regions are 
interlinked, they nevertheless reveal individual dynamics and trends for the developments in 
the biotechnology industry. 
For the purpose of this study only the regions North America and Europe are considered and 
within these two regions the major markets USA and Germany.  While the study’s conceptual 
conclusions can be transferred to other countries and regions3, industry trends and the current 
market environment are only discussed for these two countries because they represent good 
examples of a highly advanced market on one hand and a market in an early development 
                                                 
3 There may be country specific laws or accounting standards that do prevent the use of a R&D option 




stage on the other hand.  This market discussion is necessary to determine market 
receptiveness for the R&D option as a financing tool. 
After determining the regional scope of this work, a closer look is taken at the companies 
operating in the broad field of biotechnology.  The term biotechnology itself can be explained 
as solving problems by using biological processes4 but this can be done in various ways.  A 
widely accepted classification of the biotechnology industry is the one that separates 
activities into four distinct fields.  These fields are referred to as red, green, grey and white5 
biotechnology6. 
Red Biotechnology: Medical Applications 
Red biotechnology includes all biotechnological activities applied to medical processes.  Red 
biotechnology focuses on the human being with the main goal of finding innovative solutions 
to medical questions and problems.  The most important objective is the development of 
innovative drugs to treat medical conditions or genetic defects affecting the human being, 
especially in cases where traditional pharmaceutical products do not exist or have proven 
inefficient. 
Besides the main area of therapeutic drug development there are three other areas that fall 
under the definition of red biotechnology.  These are diagnostic, drug delivery systems and 
tissue engineering. 
Green  Biotechnology: Agricultural and Food Applications 
The term green biotechnology includes all biotechnological activities applied to agricultural 
plants and processes.  This type of biotechnology mainly focuses on altering plants to adapt 
their individual characteristics in a targeted way.  This can include an increasing resistance 
against fungi, bugs and other crop pests as well as against severe weather conditions.  
Another objective is to accelerate plant growth and the related reduction in crop cycle 
durations.  Although biotechnologically altered plants are designed to require only a 
minimum of external pest- and fungicides, therefore reducing the amount of chemicals in the 
agricultural industry, green biotechnology is the most controversially discussed form of 
biotechnology. 
                                                 
4 The OECD defines biotechnology as “the application of science and technology to living organisms, 
as well as parts, products and models thereof, to alter living or non-living materials for the 
production of knowledge, goods, and services”, Massey (2004, p. 1). 
5 In very specific cases the term blue biotechnology is used to describe the marine and aquatic 
applications of biotechnology.  The use of this term is relatively rare and therefore it is not 
considered at this point. 
6 For a more detailed description of activities related to each of the biotechnology segments refer to 




Grey Biotechnology: Environmental Applications 
The area of grey biotechnology is not as clearly defined as the areas described above 
especially when it comes to the separation from the field of white biotechnology.  Under the 
main definition of this part of the industry, grey biotechnology includes all activities that use 
biotechnological processes in environmental applications.  This can include the alteration of 
microorganisms and plants to filter toxic substances from air, soil or water.7  Another 
application often discussed in public media is the substitution of traditional fossil fuels with 
more environmentally friendly fuels based on biological, renewable energy sources8. 
White Biotechnology: Chemicals, Industrial Products and Cosmetics 
Under white biotechnology one understands biotechnological approaches applied to 
industrial processes leading to more efficient products and less resource consuming 
production.  Examples include organisms designed to produce certain chemicals, the 
alteration of enzymes for more efficient detergents, or the alteration of chemicals in 
cosmetics for an improved tolerance by the human skin. White biotechnology also allows the 
large scale production of biological products like vitamins or pulp for further processing. 
From the four areas of biotechnology described, the red sector aggregates over 80% of all 
existing biotechnology companies and is therefore the largest segment.  While the green 
biotechnology sector currently represents the second largest segment, white biotechnology is 
considered the one with the largest growth rates in the near future.  Some sources predict that 
one third of the industrial production in certain areas could be produced using 
biotechnological processes in the future.9 
This study focuses on the pharmaceutical relevance of biotechnological processes and 
therefore on the field of red biotechnology.  Within this market segment of red 
biotechnology, the study focuses on the problems of “young research conducting 
biotechnology companies” or simply referred to as “young biotechnology companies”.  This 
type of company represents young companies that currently conduct research on one or more 
biotechnological drug development projects.  At the same time these companies do not have 
an approved product to be sold in the marketplace and therefore neither report any notable 
profits nor do they generate a stable stream of revenues. 
To complete the scoping of this work it needs to be added that contractual and legal issues 
related to the implementation of a R&D option deal are not discussed within the scope of this 
study.  The same is true for the topic of agency theory10, which is not discussed at this point 
                                                 
7 For a good overview on applications of the grey area of biotechnology one can refer to Reiß et al. 
(1995, p. 7). 
8 See also Heilmann (2005) 
9 Compare to Ernst&Young (2004b, p. 47) 
10 For a general discussion on agency theory see Ross (1973) and in the context of information flow 




but represents a valuable topic for further research because of the asymmetric information11 
distribution between a research conducting company and potential buyers of a R&D option.  
Other fields of interest entail questions regarding the treatment of a R&D option deal from an 
accounting12 standpoint.  In order to limit the scope of this study, these topics are left for 
future research. 
1.2 Structure of the Study 
The scope of this work requires the coverage of multiple fields of discussion and therefore 
the main body of this study is organized in three parts.  Part one includes the first four 
chapters and contains the background information representing the theoretical base for this 
study.  In an introductory chapter, the current situation of the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnological industry is described to create an understanding of the economical 
environment that builds the framework for this study.  In this context the main problems of 
major players of the pharmaceutical industry are discussed.  These major players can be 
considered potential partners of young biotechnology companies for the presented financing 
approach.  For the biotechnology industry the chapter describes the historical development of 
the market approach and future perspectives of the industry.  In addition, the requirements 
that have to be fulfilled for the industry to develop to its full potential are discussed.  The 
findings of chapter one are referenced at a later stage when the general need for new 
financing strategies and market receptiveness towards the specific financing concept 
presented in this study are assessed. 
The second chapter describes how the standard drug development process is structured.  
Besides a description of the individual process steps the entire drug development process is 
discussed along two dimensions, namely a time and a cost dimension.  For the time 
component it is investigated how long it takes to complete the individual process steps for an 
average industry project.  The defined standard development times serve as a reference for 
the quantitative part of the study.  In addition, the cost structure of an average project is 
investigated relative to the identified standard development times to estimate the financing 
need of a company without stable cash inflows over the course of a standard project. 
The third chapter introduces selected main concepts of financial option theory and the 
practical application of options as financial instruments.  In addition, the main factors 
influencing the value of a basic financial call option are described.  The remainder of this 
chapter deals with real options and how they are generally classified in scientific literature 
before a more practical real option classification scheme is introduced.  This alternative 
concept separates different types of real options based on characteristics of real life business 
                                                 
11 For a general discussion on asymmetric information, corporate finance and investment refer to 
Hubbard (1990). 





transactions.  The alternative approach is used to compare the characteristics of real options 
in general and a drug development project in particular to basic financial options.  This is 
done with the objective of assessing the applicability of existing option valuation methods on 
the valuation of real option problems. 
The subsequent chapter four discusses the availability of different financing strategies for 
young biotechnology companies.  In this context internal, external and additional industry 
specific financing methods are discussed with respect to availability and desirability in the 
specific business situation of these companies.  This chapter concludes the first part of the 
study and serves as an assessment of the industry’s need for new financing approaches. 
Part two, containing chapters five and six, is related to the conceptual idea of a R&D option 
and the scientific context to which it refers.  Chapter five is dedicated to the core idea of 
financing operations of young biotechnology companies by selling option rights on ongoing 
drug development projects.  For this purpose the risk factors involved in drug development 
are discussed before introducing the actual financing concept.  These main risk factors 
include the technological risk of project failure, uncertain market entry timing, unknown 
product lifetime, general market uncertainty and competition from substitute products.  In this 
chapter assumptions are also made to define and frame the presented financing concept.  In 
addition, theoretical advantages and disadvantages are described that the selling and buying 
side of a R&D option deal expose themselves to under this fund raising concept. 
The following chapter six describes the scientific context relevant for this study.  In this 
chapter option based valuation approaches for drug development projects are introduced and 
it is discussed to which extent they can be transferred to estimate the financing potential of an 
option with a drug development project as the underlying asset.  The four main approaches 
are the tree based methods used at Shockley et al. (2003), Black-Scholes variations used by 
Banerjee (2003), compound option approaches as used at Gamba et al. (1999), Schäfer and 
Schässburger (2001) or at Cassimon et al. (2002, 2004) and simulation techniques used at 
Bratic et al. (1997) and Bode-Greuel and Greuel (2005). 
At the end of part two the key question remains as to how much money can be raised through 
the introduced financing approach during the various stages of the drug development process.  
To answer this key question part three of the study, which contains the remaining chapters 
seven to ten, is dedicated to quantitatively assessing of the fund raising idea introduced.  This 
part leads the practitioner through a step-by-step discussion with increasing conceptual 
complexity.  This allows him to more easily follow the logic of the final valuation model and 
also to understand some of the challenges and problems that potentially become relevant 
when evaluating a R&D option. 
As a first step of this assessment chapter seven discusses the financing potential of the R&D 
option in a simplified, idealistic market environment to introduce some of the price 
influencing factors that need to be considered.  The simplified market environment is 
characterized by a known and constant market potential of a new drug and by an absence of 
competitive forces.  The main innovation of this chapter is the consideration of technical 




function over the entire R&D process.  In addition, different distribution functions are 
discussed to model the risk of uncertain project duration.  At the end of this chapter a pricing 
range is derived, which is dependent on the subjective price expectations of extreme types of 
investors.  These extreme expectations set an upper and a lower limit to the potential price of 
a R&D option.  To demonstrate the developed valuation approach an illustrative drug 
development project is defined and evaluated step by step during this chapter. 
In chapter eight the approach is expanded into a more realistic view by considering price 
relevant input factors, which are neglected in the idealistic market view of chapter seven.  
Additional factors in this model are general market trends, unexpected variations in market 
trends, potential market expansions through new products and applications, influences from 
competitive forces and a general uncertainty in the initial market estimate for a new drug.  To 
consider these additional factors, the previous assumption of a constant market potential is 
relaxed and the market potential of a new drug under development is modeled using a 
stochastic double-jump-diffusion process.  During the second part of the chapter a valuation 
model is built around the stochastic market potential to determine the R&D option’s pricing 
range.  To demonstrate this approach the illustrative case example is expanded by additional 
factors and the model is solved using Monte-Carlo simulation techniques. 
In the following chapter nine investigations are conducted to analyze the sensitivity of the 
developed valuation model in a realistic market environment to changes in its input 
parameters.  The results of this sensitivity analysis are incorporated into an option sensitivity 
space.  With the valuation approach being a subjective model with multiple estimated input 
parameters, this sensitivity space gives indications on the relative importance of precise 
estimations for these parameters.  Based on the derived sensitivity space, comparisons are 
made for price changes caused by input parameter changes between the R&D option and a 
standard European call option. 
Chapter ten concludes the study by summarizing the main results derived during the previous 
chapters.  In addition, certain interesting topics related to this study are highlighted, which 
cannot be covered within the scope of this work but are recommended for future research 
activities.  At this point it has to be noted that the simulations of the stochastic processes 
determining the market potential development of a new drug are completed using standard 
spreadsheet calculation software13.  The discrete approximations of continuous valuation 
problems as well as the Monte Carlo simulations conducted in part III of this work are all 
solved using the same standard software tool.  A detailed presentation of the programming 
efforts necessary to solve the valuation equations derived in this study would result in a 
technical manual not manageable within the scope of this work.  To avoid an overload with 
technical details, readers interested in the structure and the detailed programming of the 
valuation file are kindly asked to contact the author directly. 
                                                 




1.3 Industry Background and Current Situation 
To prepare the groundwork for this study on an innovative financing concept for young 
biotechnology companies, it is essential to create a general understanding of the industry 
environment these companies operate in.  At the same time it is also necessary to take a 
closer look at the situation of large, research conducting pharmaceutical companies because 
these companies represent potential buyers of the R&D options investigated. 
1.3.1 Situation of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
After decades of scientific discoveries the pharmaceutical industry can look back on a period 
of corporate success stories.  Since the end of the 1980s, the industry was able to develop a 
multitude of breakthrough products creating wealth and prosperity for the key industry 
players.  This development has raised the expectations of the financial community and the 
general public on the future development of this industry.  Today’s industry finds itself in an 
environment that has significantly changed leaving the main industry players with a set of 
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Increasing number of products fail to 
reach profitability
• Patent protection period essential 
to recover development cost
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Figure 1.1: Main problem areas of the pharmaceutical industry 
The problems for this industry can be reduced to a set of five main problems, namely the 
expiration of patents for successful products, the competition arising from the generic drug 
industry, price pressure from health care organizations, an urgent need for new blockbuster 




discoveries.  Figure 1.1 summarizes these five main challenges large pharmaceutical 
companies face in the marketplace.14 
Patent expirations 
For research intensive industries it is essential to own patents on new discoveries because 
they protect them from direct competition15 for a specific period of time.  During the 
protection period the patent owner can use the absence of direct competition to recoup his 
R&D investment and also earn a profit exceeding the initial investment.  Patents are therefore 
a necessary tool to initiate research activities.16 
The problem the pharmaceutical industry is facing in this context is an increasing number of 
drugs losing their patent protection status in the near future.  During the two-year period 
1998/1999 the annual sales volume of products going off-patent in the US was worth around 
US$4.4 billion and tripled until 2001/2002 when over US$13.2 billion in annual sales went 
off-patent according to Mullins et al. (2003).  Although these numbers appear large, the 
situation is expected to become worse.  As shown in Figure 1.2, patent expirations in the US 
are going to increase to peak levels of over US$8 billion in sales volume per year.  For the 
upcoming period from 2005 to 2008 a total of over US$31 billion in annual sales is expected 
to go off-patent.  Hisey (2004) estimates the corresponding worldwide numbers are expected 
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Figure 1.2: Pharmaceutical patent expirations US (2003-2008 in US$ bil.)17 
                                                 
14 Compare also to Ruess and Salz (2002) 
15 It does not protect them from indirect competition where other companies sell different products 
with similar characteristics for the same medical indication. 
16 Chapter 5.1.3 discusses the importance of patents for the industry in more detail. 




There are ways to renew or extend the patent protection period if the patent for a product 
reaches the point of expiry and a company wants to further be protected against direct 
competition.  Examples of how the initial patent protection period can be extended include 
the discovery of additional therapeutic uses or new application formats.  However, in cases 
where this is not successful, the patent owner can apply for a Supplementary Protection 
Certificate (SPC) that officially extends the initial patent protection period.  In cases where 
these two options are not given the company finds itself in a situation where investors expect 
them to find new products or business opportunities to make up for the resulting loss of 
revenues and profits.  Patent protection terms, potential extensions and effective patent 
protection periods are discussed in more detail in section 5.1.3. 
Generic Drug Competition 
The second major problem for established pharmaceutical companies, which is closely 
related to the previously described one, is the increasing competition from generic drug 
manufacturers.  This issue of increasing generic drug competition has two aspects to it, 
namely a time and a price component.  In the past, generic drug competitors entered the 
market slowly over time after a brand name drug had gone off-patent.  This gradual market 
entry allowed brand name drug manufacturers to generate sales after the end of the patent 
protection period that were only gradually reduced over time.  This type of market entry has 
changed towards a “more rapid sales erosion by brand name products with recent patent 
expirations”18. 
There is a trend towards generic drugs entering the market faster and more successfully after 
patent expiration of a branded drug.  In certain extreme cases, brand name products can lose 
the majority of their market share literally over night.  Frank and Seiguer (2003) show that it 
took selected generic drugs about 60 months to acquire 80% market share ten years ago while 
this time period is reduced to only nine months for recent generic market entries.  An 
example of this development is Eli Lilly’s former blockbuster drug Prozac®, which generated 
revenues of more than US$2 billion in 1999.  When its patent protection status expired in 
2001, it lost 80% of its market share within two months19.  Over the following months, this 
loss increased and stabilized at 94%20.  Teitelbaum et al. (2003) show several more examples 
where generic drugs were able to gain over 80% market share within two months after patent 
expiration and over 90% after a six month period.  Boles (2004) supports this trend by 
finding that sales volumes of drugs that have lost patent protection status can drop to 5% of 
the levels before the arrival of generic drug competitors. 
The reason why manufacturers of generic drugs are quickly able to capture market share 
resides in their significant price advantage.  During the patent protection period, large 
                                                 
18 According to Grabowski and Vernon (2000b, p. 106) 
19 Compare to Harris (2002) 




pharmaceutical companies have sufficient market power to price some selected products well 
above production cost due to the absence of direct competition.  Since generic drug 
manufacturers do not have to finance expensive base research activities, they are able to price 
their products below their direct brand name competition.  This cost advantage can range 
from 30% to 80%21 and as more generic competitors enter the market, the more the price of a 
drug converges against actual production cost22. 
With the described rapid market entry and their price advantage, generic drug manufacturers 
were able to capture a large share of the total drug market.  Danzon and Furukawa (2003) 
found that already back in 1999, 58% of all prescriptions in the US and 61% in Germany 
were filled with generic drugs.  As a result from their lower prices compared to branded 
products, their share of the total sales volume was lower with 18% and 34% respectively.  
Other sources like Motheral et al. (2003) confirm this trend of increasing generic drug usage 
and expect it to continue.23 
External lndustry Interventions 
Financial problems in governmental healthcare budgets and at large health care organizations 
promote the use of generic drugs.  These entities expect savings from the faster availability of 
cheaper generic drug versions of branded products. 24  While this squeeze on price occurs 
after patent expiration, there is a second type of price pressure, which already takes place 
while a drug is still patent protected.  Healthcare organizations in the US require 
pharmaceutical companies to enter drug rebate programs in order for their prescription drugs 
to be covered.  Under the Medicaid program manufacturers of brand name drugs have to pay 
a rebate of either 15.1% of the average manufacturer price (AMP) or the difference between 
the AMP and the lowest price offered to non-federal purchasers, whichever amount is 
greater25.  Additionally, more complex price reduction schemes have been introduced under 
the Medicare program.  Although US companies often consider this a threat to profitability, 
Scherer (2004, p. 929) concludes in his study on price control that “the United States […] are 
considered to be the least aggressive among industrialized nations in imposing governmental 
price controls”. 
A similar development with tighter regulations can be observed in Germany where the 
federal health care system either establishes fixed prices for prescription drugs or requires 
rebates from the drug manufacturers to reduce cost.  These rebates have recently been 
                                                 
21 Compare to Handelsblatt (2002a) or Frank and Seiguer (2003) 
22 According to Grabowski and Vernon (2000b, p. 106) 
23 Another form of competition not discussed here are alliances between small pharmaceutical 
companies attacking specific indications currently covered by large pharmaceutical companies.  For 
recent trends on this topic see Hofmann (2003). 
24 See Handelsblatt (2002a) 




increased for patent protected prescription drugs from 6% to 16% with a significant negative 
impact on the revenues and profits of large pharmaceutical companies.26 
An alternative way for health care organizations to reduce cost is the delisting of certain 
drugs or the switching of drugs from prescription drug status to over-the-counter (OTC) 
status.  Whereas delisting negatively impacts total sales volume, switching increases 
competition between products and marketing cost for the manufacturer.  Such actions can 
result in a delayed break-even of up to six years according to Giesecke (2001, p. 65). 
For the pharmaceutical industry in Germany, increasing governmental interactions resulted in 
limited opportunities to increase prices and therefore, the average price development for 
pharmaceutical products is lagging behind overall increases in consumer prices27.  In the US, 
big pharmaceutical companies are still able to enforce more aggressive pricing strategies that 
make drug prices increase faster than the general cost of living.28 
Need for New Blockbuster Products 
The pharmaceutical industry owes a large portion of its wealth and historical growth to large 
blockbuster drugs.  BCG (2004b) found that industry growth over the last decade can almost 
exclusively be attributed to the market introduction of large blockbuster29 drugs or to sales 
increases of existing blockbuster products.  Historically, large pharmaceutical players focused 
on treatments for indications affecting a large number of patients to maximize the return on 
their R&D investment.  This strategy proved very successful, especially during the 1990s.  At 
that time the penetration of several high potential therapeutic areas like antibiotics, 
depression medications, cardiologic medications, gastrointestinal drugs, respiratory drugs or 
diabetes treatments led to an introduction rate of eight to ten new blockbuster products per 
year.  These historical successes in combination with the previously described problem of 
expiring patents put pressure on the entire industry.  To keep growing at a rate of 10% a year, 
the big industry players would need to introduce at least two to three new blockbuster drugs30 
a year, which is far from reality today. 
With an increasing number of drugs for high potential therapeutic areas being introduced, 
there is less room for new blockbuster products because more competing products are sharing 
the same markets.  As a result, big pharmaceutical companies are forced to either penetrate 
                                                 
26 See BPI (2004b, p. 48) and Fischer, Manfred (2004) 
27 Compare to BPI (2003b, p. 48) 
28 The extent to which general inflation is exceeded strongly depends on the research study 
considered.  According to Dorschner (2005), the AARP reports drug prices increases twice as high 
as inflation while a PhRMA study shows that price increases are only slightly above overall 
inflation in the US. 
29 In this context blockbuster drugs are defined as drugs with an annual sales volume exceeding 
US$500 mil. in 2001 US$. 




new therapeutic areas with less competition31 or to develop new drugs that are effective and 
competitive enough to replace blockbuster products in an established market.  Both strategies 
are extremely resource intensive to pursue32. 
In their search for new blockbuster drugs the industry started increasing their spending on 
research and development as shown in Figure 1.3.  Between 1992 and 2003, R&D 
expenditures increased at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.2%.  Based on the 
latest PAREXEL (2003) industry outlook this trend is expected to continue and global R&D 
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Figure 1.3: Global pharmaceutical R&D expenditures (1992-2006 in US$ bil.) 33 
This trend makes the pharmaceutical industry the most research intensive one compared to 
other manufacturing industries.  Figure 1.4 shows the research intensity of the pharmaceutical 
industry in comparison to other manufacturing industries.  Compared to its total sales, the 
pharmaceutical industry spends over 12% on research and development activities.  This is far 
more than the electronics industry, which spends with about 7% significantly less on research 
activities.  Other major manufacturing industries like chemicals, automotive or general 
machine building spend an even lower percentage of their revenues on R&D activities. 
                                                 
31 Pfizer followed this approach when it successfully entered the rather undeveloped market for sexual 
dysfunctions with its blockbuster drug Viagra®. 
32 One of the reasons why some therapeutic areas can be considered underdeveloped is the fact that 
they are more complex and therefore more resource intensive in terms of time and money to 
penetrate.  Various forms of cancer and AIDS treatments can be considered such underdeveloped 
markets, which were shielded by high barriers of entry in the past. 






















Figure 1.4: Research intensity of selected manufacturing industries (% of revenues)34 
One effect of the increasing R&D expenditures is, according to Grabowski et al. (2002), that 
only a limited number of products are able to recoup their full research investment.  
According to their study, only three out of ten drugs are ever able to earn their total R&D 
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Figure 1.5: Return of new drugs by decile (1990-94 in US$ mil. after-tax NPV) 35 
They conclude that “in the long run, the firm also must have its share of winners for its R&D 
program to be profitable and remain viable”36 and are supported by Mauerer (2002) who 
                                                 
34 Source: VFA (2005) 
35 Source: Grabowski et al. (2002) 




states that “the larger the company, the larger the expected revenue needs to be to justify 
production and marketing”. 
One of the results of this development is that some companies start focusing even more on 
the discovery of blockbuster drugs37 by selling products that generate minor revenues and by 
divesting non-growing business units to fund their search for blockbusters38.  This 
development created a large dependency of the pharmaceutical players on a small number of 
promising projects with the potential to result in true blockbuster products.  How some of the 
big pharmaceutical players depend on a few large key projects can be seen in the severe stock 
market reactions in cases where one of these main projects is delayed or even fails39. 
Weak Product Development Pipelines 
As shown above, the pharmaceutical industry is spending more on R&D than ever before to 
discover those large promising products required for sufficient growth.  At the same time the 
number of substances that can potentially result in a blockbuster drug is decreasing.  This 
widening gap between R&D investments and the number of projects in the pipeline 
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Figure 1.6: Global NME approvals vs. global R&D spending (1992-2002)40 
                                                 
37 Another result was a wave of mergers and acquisitions that went through the industry with the 
objective of collecting a multitude of promising projects under one roof (e.g. Hofmann (2005b)).  
For an overview for mergers in the pharmaceutical industry refer to Neukirchen (2005, p. 127).  
Dzinkowski (2003) concludes that although large mergers are a tool to increase corporate 
efficiency, they are not a suitable way to solve the problem of the expected upcoming product 
shortage. 
38 Compare to Hofmann (2002) 
39 Compare to Crolly (2005) or Fischer, Manfred (2005) 




Figure 1.6 illustrates how global R&D spending of the industry constantly increased since 
1992 while the number of approved NMEs dropped by about one third over the same time 
period.  The problem of weak drug development pipelines is well recognized and investigated 
in recent publications.  White et al. (2004) found that the ten leading pharmaceutical 
companies will not be able to meet investors’ expectations if this current trend continues.  
They estimate that growth with current products and the market introduction of products 
currently in the pipeline will not be sufficient to make up for patent expiries and price 
pressure on existing products.  With current trends ongoing and investors continuing to 
expect a ten percent annual growth rate, these ten major pharmaceutical companies41 will fall 
US$40 billion short of expectations by 2007. 
Potential solutions to fill the corporate development pipeline include the acquisition of small 
innovative companies as indicated by Handelsblatt (2003b) or the in-licensing of innovative 
products and technologies. 
Conclusion 
As Reiß et al. (1997) already concluded in their study there is no single correct strategy for 
pharmaceutical companies to master these challenges.  Based on their work, companies 
should focus on generating know-how, reducing development times and on improving the 
efficiency of R&D processes in order to stay competitive. 
In line with this conclusion, some key players in the pharmaceutical industry are about to 
shift their strategic direction from a pure blockbuster approach.  The three new trends in the 
industry are a focus on a few therapeutic areas42, the penetration of niche markets43 with 
limited competition and the offering of more individualized treatments for a limited number 
of patients44.  Until this strategic change shows an impact on industry performance, the main 
problem of successor products for expiring patents will remain unresolved, be it in the form 
of high-volume blockbuster drugs or in the form of profitable niche products. 
1.3.2 Situation of the Biotechnology Industry 
Compared to the pharmaceutical industry’s situation, prospectives for the biotechnology 
industry appear more favorable from a product standpoint.  While the drug development 
pipelines of most pharmaceutical players are weak, those of the biotechnology industry are 
filled.  After 2005, Carius (2002) expects that more than 50% of all new drug approvals will 
be of biotechnological origin.  Out of the products under development at least ten have true 
blockbuster potential.  This upcoming wave of new biotech products is expected to increase 
the revenues of the industry to over US$38 billion in 2005.  With industry revenues 
                                                 
41 Although companies are affected to a different extent as shown by DiMasi (2000). 
42 See Arnst et al. (2004) 
43 See R&M (2005) 




accounting for US$16 billion in 2000, this is equivalent to a CAGR of 19% and therefore the 
industry is growing at about twice the rate of the traditional pharmaceutical industry.45 
From a business model perspective, the industry went through different phases in the past, 
each with its own strategic focus.  These trends are the result of market forces and the general 
economic environment with the main influencing factor being the availability of financial 
resources according to Ernst&Young (2003, p. 52). 
The members of the first wave of biotechnology companies during the 1970s and 1980s 
focused on developing products and bringing them to the market.  Some of the largest 
biotechnology companies today laid the foundation for their success during that time.  Since 
developing a drug is a capital intensive46 and risky endeavor, the main focus of the industry 
shifted to a technology focused approach during the mid 1980s. 
This stage was followed by phases where the industry’s main focus was put on the 
development of new platform technologies and the offering of biotechnology based services.  
Despite the large capital requirements, the trend shifted back to developing new products 
with the boom of the stock markets at the end of the 1990s because this approach is 
considered the most profitable one in the long term.  Figure 1.7 illustrates the sequence of 








Figure 1.7: Preferred biotechnology business models (1975-2005)47 
The latest trend that more companies are trying to cover the entire value chain and are 
attempting to develop their own products exists in the US48 and in the German49 market with 
                                                 
45 A few companies in the biotech industry have already reached a more mature stage of corporate 
development than most players in the industry and they cannot expect continuous growth rates of 
this magnitude.  Examples of these more mature, integrated biotech players include Amgen, 
Genentech, Genzyme, Chiron, Biogen Idec, etc. 
46 Three of the largest and most successful biotech companies today are Amgen, Genentech, and 
Genzyme.  According to BIO (1995), these companies required an equity base of US$264 million, 
US$1.6 billion, and US$328 million respectively to introduce their first products to the market. 
47 Source: Ernst&Young (2003, p. 52) 
48 Compare BCG (2002, p. 31) 
49 The BPI (2002) study confirms this latest business model shift for Germany.  For a recent example 




one major difference.  The average US company has a time advantage of about 8-10 years50 
related to the earlier establishment of the industry in the US.  In Germany, around 80% of all 
biotechnology companies belong to the category of young biotechnology companies without 
any or with only minor revenues51 that are within the scope of this work.  This percentage is 
lower in the US, where companies of the biotechnology industry are on average more mature.  
The German industry had to wait until 2003 for its first drug to be approved52 while at the 
same time, US companies got approval for 25 new drugs in 2003 and 20 in 2002 according to 
Ernst&Young (2004d).  Another indicator for a more mature US biotechnology industry is a 
direct revenue comparison.  In 2003, 350 German biotechnology companies generated total 
revenues of €960 million whereas 1,473 US companies were able to generate €20.9 billion53.  
On a company level, these numbers show that the average US company generates with €14.2 
million more than five times the revenues of the average German company, which generated 
only €2.7 million in 2003. 
As indicated, the main challenge with a full product approach is that it is risky54, time 
consuming55 and expensive56 to pursue.  Eichener et al. (2001) conducted a study among 
German biotechnology companies and found that 70% of all companies named financing as 
the industry’s biggest problem.  This situation already started to improve in the US where 
only 15% of the companies had less than one year of cash available in 2003 compared to 32% 
in 200257.  In Germany the situation remains unchanged on a critical level especially for 
venture capital financed firms where 68% have less than one year of cash available to run 
their operations58.  Although the strategic focus of most companies is on independent drug 
development, the indicated challenge of large capital requirements forces multiple firms to 
follow alternative approaches.  Ernst&Young (2004b) present two of these alternative 
business models in their study. 
One approach is to sell products under development before they enter the most expensive 
clinical trial phase III.  Giesecke (2001) confirms that only a few companies are able to take 
full advantage of their discoveries and have the potential to bring their own products to 
                                                 
50 See Giesecke (2001, p. 45) 
51 See Ernst&Young (2004b, p. 91) 
52 The Munich based company MediGene received approval for its cancer drug Eligard® in 2003. 
53 US$28.4 billion based on Ernst&Young (2004d, p. 26) 
54 Only an small portion of research projects result in a marketable product as shown in chapter 5.1.1. 
55 Depending on the referenced source - as shown in Table 2.1 - it takes between 11 and 15 years to 
fully develop a drug from base research all the way until final market introduction. 
56 Recent studies summarized at PAREXEL (2003, p. 75) estimate the total cost of bringing one 
product to market including failed projects to be between US$800 and US$900 million. 
57 Compare to Ernst&Young (2004a, p. 4) 




market.  Most biotechnology companies do not have the resources or capabilities to achieve 
this and are therefore selling their discoveries at some stage to established pharmaceutical 
companies.  These companies complete the remaining capital intensive steps of the value 
chain and bring the product to market. 
The other alternative dedicates some corporate resources to cash generating activities like 
providing services to other industry players59 in the form of contract research.  While this 
improves the short-term cash position, the redirection of resources negatively impacts 
development times and delays market introductions.  Primary objective of this business 
model is still the completion of the entire R&D process for at least one product.  Contract 
research represents a second priority area.  This type of work is not of strategic importance 
and serves as a tool to generate cash flows to close the financing gap evolving from the 
attempt to become a Fully Integrated Pharmaceutical Company (FIPCO).60 
How important the generation of additional cash flows is can be seen by the fact that only 5% 
of the German biotechnology companies61 are able to finance operations out of their own 
cash flows.  It becomes even more important if one considers that it is difficult within the 
current situation to raise funds from external sources especially for companies without stable 
cash flows or products at a very late development stage. 
Besides the two presented business models, an increasing number of young biotechnology 
companies are entering licensing deals to generate cash flows.  In Germany an increasing 
number of licensed products can be observed especially at later stages of the value chain.  
While 73% of all products undergoing pre-clinical trials are self-developed products, this 
percentage decreases to 50% for products in phase II clinical trials.62  This supports the 
impression that multiple companies do not have sufficient funds to complete the development 
process on their own and have to out-license their discoveries.  On the other hand, it supports 
the discussed trends of the pharmaceutical industry, whose companies are often partners in 
those deals and in-license products at advanced project stages.  These products strengthen 
development pipelines and represent candidates for future revenue generators. 
For the few mature biotech companies there is also a threat from generic competition 
according to Wilde Mathews and Hamilton (2004) and Kuchenbuch (2004a).  Generic drug 
manufacturers are starting to target the first biotechnology products losing patent protection 
although this is generally a problem of established pharmaceutical companies.  Since this 
problem only arises for mature companies it is not relevant in the context of this study that 
focuses on issues of young companies.  Other problems of young companies like insufficient 
                                                 
59 Compare to Ernst&Young (2004b, p. 49) 
60 See Mahler and Martens (2002) 
61 Based on BPI (2002).  The topic of financing within the biotech industry is discussed in detail in 
chapter 4. 




management capabilities, unfocused business models or lacking exclusivity of products under 
development are not subject of this study and are therefore not discussed. 
Conclusion 
A small number of mature US biotechnology companies already find themselves in a similar 
situation as large pharmaceutical players who primarily have to deal with increasing generic 
competition and the need for replacement products.  However, the majority of the young 
biotechnology companies are facing a shortage in financial resources that prevents them from 
bringing their own products to market.  Although the situation of US based companies 
improved in that respect and German based companies significantly reduced their burn rates63 
to extend the lifetime of their cash positions, financing issues remain the most critical 
problem of the industry. 
If the industry is not able to open up new sources of financing, Knop (2004) and Kuchenbuch 
(2004b) expect a growing trend towards consolidation with a large number of insolvencies 
and merger and acquisition deals.  Handelsblatt (2002d) also expects an increasing number of 
bankruptcies in the German market related to a shortage of financial resources or as Solt 
(1993, p. 180) states, “if conventional capital budgeting were the only investment vehicle 
available, most biotechnology firms would be unlikely to undertake innovation 
independently”. 
                                                 
63 See Hofmann (2004) 
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2 Pharmaceutical Research and Development (R&D) 
This chapter describes the process of developing a new drug and bringing it to market.  This 
is done to the extent necessary for the understanding of the following chapters.  More details 
on the drug development process can be found in recent literature64, a wide variety of 
studies65, laws and regulations66 or on websites of local authorities67. 
2.1 Pharmaceutical Value Chain 
Developing a new drug is a long process with a highly uncertain outcome at the time of 
initiation.  On average, only one out of several thousand components entering the drug 
development process is carried through the entire process until it is granted regulatory 
approval and can be marketed as a new drug68.  Before a drug can be approved, its sponsor69 
has to complete a series of well defined process steps as summarized in Figure 2.1.  The 
figure shows that the pharmaceutical value chain can be separated into seven distinct process 
steps, each of them with specific scope and objectives. 
2.1.1 Base Research 
The pharmaceutical value chain starts in the laboratory where scientists search for targets that 
can be affected by a substance or a chemical compound.  Generally these targets are human 
molecules like enzymes, cell receptors, or other human proteins.  Once a target is found, the 
second challenge is to identify substances that have an impact on a specific target.  These 
substances can be newly developed chemical substances or compounds from a natural source.  
This is a time-consuming process because the impact of thousands of substances on the 
identified target have to be screened.  With high-throughput screening technologies (HTS), 
several thousand tests can be performed per day70 reducing the duration of this process step71.  
Substances passing this test are referred to as “new chemical entities” (NCEs). 
                                                 
64 For more information on pharmaceutical R&D refer, for example, to Collatz (1996), Harvey (1998), 
Cohen and Posner (2000), Collatz (2001), Schumacher and Schulgen (2002), Vogel (2002), Gaus 
(2003), Hara (2003), Kayser and Müller (2004) or Ng (2004). 
65 See also Bank Leu (2001), BCG (2001), BCG (2002), BPI (2003a), BPI (2003b), EFPIA (2003), 
PAREXEL (2003), BPI (2004a) or PhRMA (2004) 
66 See also Pabel (2003) 
67 E.g. www.fda.gov or www.bfarm.de 
68 On pharmaceutical project failure rates see Nichols (1994, p. 91), BPI (2003b, p. 25) or FDA (2004, 
p. 6). 
69 A drug’s sponsor in this context is the person or entity, which has the intention to bring a new drug 
to market and therefore has the responsibility to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and 
regulations.  Not only can a sponsor be an individual or a company but also a partnership, a 
governmental agency, or a scientific institution. 
70 Compare to VFA (2003, p. 17) 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.1: Pharmaceutical value chain72 
                                                                                                                                                        
71 These technologies are currently in the process of being further developed into Ultra High 
Throughput Screening (UHTS) technologies that allow even more substances to be tested within 
short periods of time. 
72 Adapted from AMB (2004, p. 101) 
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All identified NCEs qualify for more detailed investigations.  After passing additional tests, a 
multitude of slightly altered variants of the substance are designed and retested on the target.  
Improving the most promising variants through several iterations leads to a stage where a 
substance is considered an active component.  Active components that appear promising 
enough to justify additional research are generally patent protected and enter the phase of pre-
clinical trials73 as a potential drug candidate.74 
2.1.2 Pre-clinical Trials 
Objective of the pre-clinical trials is to generate knowledge of a compound’s interaction with 
an organism before it is released for human testing.  One focus area is the toxicity75 of a 
compound, which is tested in-vitro as well as in animal studies76 to identify unwanted side 
effects.  This can include a negative impact on fertility, changes to the genetic material or 
cancer enhancing characteristics.  These toxicity studies are performed as single dose toxicity 
testing77 and repeated dose toxicity testing78. 
It is also investigated how a compound is absorbed by, distributed in, and released from the 
organism.  To ensure high quality standards during this part of the research process, all tests 
have to comply with Good Laboratory Practices (GLP).  These guidelines not only ensure 
that the applied testing procedures cover all areas that have to be tested but also ensure a wide 
acceptance of the generated test results.  By following the GLP unnecessary and duplicated 
testing can be avoided. 
The knowledge gathered during this phase is used to determine beneficial application doses 
of a compound and to generate information about the application frequency and duration to 
allow safe testing on humans.  Once the decision is made that a new drug should go into 
clinical tests in the US, an initial drug application (IND) is filed with the FDA for review. 
In Germany, applications for clinical trials (CTA) are filed with the “Bundesinstitut für 
Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte (BfArM)” or the “Paul-Ehrlich-Institut (PEI)” and an 
independent ethic committee for review.  These regulatory agencies decide about the 
initiation of clinical trials based on a risk-benefit profile and have the authority to stop it at 
any time during phase I, II, or III if the situation changes.  This might be the case if 
unexpected side effects occur and the safety of the trial participants is jeopardized.  Another 
                                                 
73 Patent protection does not have to take place at that stage of the value chain.  It can also take place 
earlier or later but on average the application for patent protection is filed around that stage. 
74 The entire base research process is done in-vitro, which means it is performed in a laboratory 
environment not involving any tests on animals or human beings. 
75 Compare to FDA, Center for Drugs and Biologics (1987) and CDER (1989) 
76 In-vivo 
77 See CDER (1996) 
78 See CDER (1997) 
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reason could be a negative change in the risk-benefit profile caused by adjustments to the 
objectives of the trials. 
In 2004, 33.3%79 of the entire global pharmaceutical R&D spent was related to base research 
activities and pre-clinical trials, adding up to total expenditures of about US$16.4 billion. 
2.1.3 Clinical Trials I 
After an IND/CTA is positively reviewed, clinical trials can be initiated.  During the first 
phase a new drug is introduced to humans for the first time.  The drug is given to a small 
group of 10 to 50 healthy volunteers80 who receive small doses of the new drug to identify 
the threshold where side effects can be observed.  Multiple series of studies with increasing 
doses are conducted to verify the indications from pre-clinical testing on how a drug is 
absorbed, distributed, metabolized, and released from the human organism. 
During Clinical Trials I, sufficient information about a drug's pharmacological effects are 
obtained to permit the design of a well controlled and scientifically valid second phase of 
clinical trials.  To ensure the generation of widely accepted results and to minimize the risk 
for volunteers in these trials, a project has to follow the guidelines for Good Clinical Practice 
(GCP).  These guidelines define standards for the design, conduct, performance, 
monitoring, auditing, recording, analysis and reporting of clinical trials and specify, to 
which extent participants have to be informed about potential risks related to the trial phase. 
In addition to the GCP standards, the entity conducting the study also has to prove that the 
drug samples used have been produced following the Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) 
for pharmaceutical products.  The GMP guidelines define minimum quality standards for 
drugs used in human testing.  It also requires a series of quality analyses and the archiving of 
the results and the samples of the drug or substance analyzed. 
Of the global pharmaceutical R&D spend in 2003, 7.1%81 or US$3.5 billion were related to 
clinical phase I trials in 2003. 
2.1.4 Clinical Trials II 
During this phase, information on the effectiveness of a new drug in patients affected by the 
targeted condition is collected.  The objective is to determine, which doses of the new drug 
produce the best results and which side effects can potentially occur.  To collect the necessary 
                                                 
79 Based on PhRMA (2005, p. 37) with an adjustment for uncategorized costs, which are distributed 
over the different R&D functions by total spend. 
80 In certain cases this stage of clinical trials can already involve volunteers affected by a certain 
disease or condition.  This becomes especially true for life-threatening diseases where there is no 
other effective treatment available such as certain types of cancer. 
81 Based on PhRMA (2005, p. 37) with an adjustment for uncategorized costs, which are distributed 
over the different R&D functions by total spend. 
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information, the drug is tested in 20 to 300 affected volunteers.  Depending on the 
composition of the patient sample it is also investigated how patients with certain other 
conditions react to the drug and how they can absorb and metabolize its ingredients.  Phase II 
trials aim at avoiding accumulation of drug ingredients in the human body, identifying 
negative interactions with other substances, and at developing application strategies to avoid 
these unwanted effects. 
Clinical phase II trials are well controlled and closely monitored.  Patients are generally 
divided into two sub-groups, of which one is treated with the drug while the other one 
receives a harmless and inactive placebo.  To avoid a psychological bias, patients are not 
informed about which group they belong to.  This type of testing is called single blind testing.  
To ensure equal treatment of all patients, medical staff conducting the study and directly 
interacting with the patients may also remain uninformed about the composition of the 
sample groups.  In this case the type of study is called a double blind study.  In cases where 
ethical reasons would forbid treating patients only with a placebo, a standard therapy is 
administered to the entire group of patients in parallel to the actual trial of the new drug. 
Clinical phase II trials accounted for 11.5%82 of the total global pharmaceutical R&D spend 
or US$5.7 billion in 2003. 
2.1.5 Clinical Trials III 
If phase II trials show evidence of a drug’s effectiveness the study is expanded to collect 
sufficient evidence to generate a complete risk-benefit profile for short- and long-term use of 
a drug candidate.  The focus during this stage resides on the effectiveness and potential 
adverse side-effects of a drug candidate under real-life conditions.  The effectiveness of the 
new drug is also compared to other, established therapies for the targeted condition in cases 
where such therapies exist.  Phase III trials are conducted with a larger number of volunteer 
patients than phase II trials to generate statistically valid conclusions.  To have a group of 
patients that is representative for the entire population, a sample of a few hundred up to 
several thousand patients can be necessary depending on the targeted indication.  The number 
of patients required and the composition of the sample regarding certain characteristics83 is 
determined by the testing team in cooperation with statisticians. 
Similar to phase II trials the group of patients is divided into two or more sub-groups with a 
similar distribution of individual patient’s characteristics for blind testing.  As a consequence 
of the large number of patients required, it is often necessary to involve multiple locations, 
sometimes even globally, into the study.  This increases the need for standardized testing 
                                                 
82 Based on PhRMA (2005, p. 37) with an adjustment for uncategorized costs, which are distributed 
over the different R&D functions by total spend. 
83 Selection characteristics for the participants depend on the drug tested but can include age, gender, 
race, living environment, secondary illnesses and multiple other factors. 
2. Pharmaceutical Research and Development (R&D) 
 
27
procedures and documentation to ensure comparable results.  It also drives cost up and makes 
this phase of testing the most expensive one on an individual product base. 
The findings from this stage and their documentation are very important because they not 
only build the base for the following official drug approval process but also for marketing 
claims and physician labeling.  In the US, a new drug, which is passing clinical trials can 
potentially be made available to patients outside the actual research group if certain 
requirements are met.  This is the case if a drug showed evidence of effective treatment of a 
serious or life threatening disease, for which there is no alternative therapy of similar 
effectiveness available.  The drug is then labeled as a Treatment Investigational New Drugs 
(TIND) and can be made available to patients before regulatory approval84.  Although these 
additional drug users do not become part of the actual testing group, it creates the opportunity 
to obtain additional data on the drug's safety and effectiveness. 
The final clinical trial phase requires significant financial resources and accounts for 24.4%85 
of the entire global pharmaceutical R&D expenditures in 2003 being equivalent to about 
US$12.0 billion. 
2.1.6 Drug Approval Process 
After successful clinical trials, the sponsor can apply for official approval for the new drug.  
Regulatory approval is necessary for a company to be able to legally market, distribute, and 
sell a new drug.  Different agencies are involved in drug approval and it depends on the 
intended use or the production process of a new drug as to which regulatory body has to be 
contacted for final drug approval.  In the US, there are two centers of the FDA that are 
responsible for approving new drugs for human use.  Approval of drugs with a 
biotechnological origin are filed with the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
(CBER) while other, chemical based applications, are filed with the Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research (CDER). 
In Germany there are multiple institutions responsible for the approval of new drugs.  Drugs 
from a biotechnological source are investigated by the European Agency for the Evaluation 
of Medicines (EMEA).  The EMEA submits a recommendation for approval to the European 
Commission, which grants final approval valid for all EU countries.  Non-biotechnological 
products are approved by either the Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte 
(BfArM) or the Paul-Ehrlich Institute86 (PEI).87 
                                                 
84 Compare to CDER (1998) 
85 Based on PhRMA (2005, p. 37) with an adjustment for uncategorized costs, which are distributed 
over the different R&D functions by total spend. 
86 While the PEI is responsible for all blood products, vaccines, serums and cell or gene therapies, the 
BfArM is responsible for all remaining drugs or products of non-biotechnological origin. 
87 Starting in 2005, a second, decentralized process was established that gives companies the 
opportunity to file applications with multiple European local authorities at the same time. 
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During the drug approval process the sponsor has to submit sufficient information and 
documentation to prove that a drug is efficient, harmless and safe to use.  Such an application 
is backed up by chemical, pharmacological and toxicological analyses, reports from clinical 
trials and medical experts’ evaluations.  Final drug approval is the most important milestone 
in the drug development process because it determines if a company can enter the market and 
generate revenues to cover the development cost accumulated over several years.  Figure 2.2 
shows the mean approval times of regular NDAs and NDAs with biotechnological origin in 
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Figure 2.2: Mean NDA approval times US (1993-2003 in months)88 
The financial burden of the approval process for the global pharmaceutical industry added up 
to about US$6.2 billion in 2003 or 12.5%89 of the total R&D expenditures. 
2.1.7 Post-Approval Research – Clinical Trials Phase IV 
Clinical trials continue even after a new drug is introduced into the market. There are three 
main reasons for this additional post-approval research: 
1. They can be required by the approving agency to resolve open issues. 
2. They can be initiated by the sponsor to find additional application areas for the new 
drug unknown at the time of approval. 
3. To study the long-term impact on a large number of patients, which is essential to 
identify complications only occurring with a very low statistical probability.  This can 
include studying interactions with other drugs or a drug’s impact on long-term 
statistics like disease induced death rates. 
                                                 
88 Source: PhRMA (2004) 
89 Based on PhRMA (2005, p. 37) with an adjustment for uncategorized costs, which are distributed 
over the different R&D functions by total spend. 
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Phase IV clinical trials can involve a larger number of patients than all other trial phases and 
the number of participants can grow to over 10,000 individuals.  Independent from phase IV 
trials the sponsor has to closely monitor the application of a new drug.  Since the sponsor is 
responsible for the safety of his product, phase IV trials are necessary to identify adverse side 
effects that have not been observed in previous clinical trials.  Certain side effects occur in 
such a small percentage of drug users that thousands or even millions of users are necessary 
to identify them.  A drug’s impact on such a large number of patients can only be observed 
after it has been introduced into the market.  To ensure market monitoring, drug sponsors are 
required to file Periodic Safety Update Reports (PSURs) with the regulatory authorities to 
document their market observations.  It does happen that the distribution of a drug has to be 
discontinued for safety reasons even after it received regulatory approval.90 
Phase IV trials conducted after regulatory approval required global expenditures of US$5.5 
billion in 2003 and therefore account for 11.2%91 of the total R&D spend. 
2.1.8 Summary of Drug Development Process 
The previous sections describe the efforts necessary until a drug is approved and can be 
brought to market.  At this point it is important to note that the terms research and 
development are not used in a standardized way throughout scientific literature.  Some 
sources use the term research only for the initial phase of the value chain and define the 
remaining steps from pre-clinical testing on as the development phase.  Other groups either 
refer to the entire value chain as research and development (R&D) without distinguishing 
between the two terms or use one of the terms to summarize the entire value chain.  For this 
study the terms R&D, drug research, drug development, as well as research and development 
are all used with reference to the activities of the entire value chain until final drug approval.  
In cases where a specific part of the value chain is referenced, it is explicitly described in the 
context of the document. 
Although every drug development project has its own characteristics, it is necessary to derive 
some commonalities to better explain the functionality of the R&D option concept later in 
this study.  To do so, the concept of stylized facts92 is used, which was introduced by Kaldor 
(1961) and is summarized at Grupp (1997).  Using this concept, a sum of figures on historical 
drug development times is used to derive a general tendency of the duration of the various 
stages of the pharmaceutical value chain. 
                                                 
90 The 2001 case where Bayer had to take its blockbuster Lipobay® from the market is probably the 
most widely known case although not the only one as recent examples of drug recalls like Redux®, 
Vioxx®, Bextra®, and Tysabri® show.  On recent drug recalls see also Kutter et al. (2004), 
Handelsblatt (2004a), Handelsblatt (2004b), Handelsblatt (2005), Süddeutsche Zeitung (2005) or 
Lindner (2005). 
91 Based on PhRMA (2005, p. 37) with an adjustment for uncategorized costs, which are distributed 
over the different R&D functions by total spend. 
92 Romer (1989) describes the requirements these stylized facts have to fulfill. 
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The following approximations are derived for the duration of the different stages of the 
pharmaceutical value chain.  For the initial phase of basic research, a duration of 3.0 years is 
used.  For the stage of pre-clinical trials an additional duration of 3.0 years is expected.  The 
three phases I, II, and III of clinical trials are expected to require one, two, and three years 
respectively in order to be completed.  As the final step before a drug is approved and can be 
brought to market it has to go through the general drug approval process, which is expected 
to take on average around 2 years. 











Kellogg et. al. 1.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 13.0 
Bank Leu ~2.5 ~2.0 ~1.5 2.0 3.0 1.0 12.0 
BCG 6.1 1.6 7.0 14.7 
BPI 4.0 6.0 1.5 11.5 
Bain & Company n.a. 3.7 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.1 11.3+ 
Cassimon et. al. 2.0 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 14.0 
DiMasi 3.8 8.6 1.8 14.2 
VFA 2.0 ~3.2 ~1.7 ~1.8 ~1.9 ~1.4 ~12.0 
PhRMA 6.5 1.5 2.0 3.5 1.5 15.0 
Proxy used in this Study 3.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 14.0 
Table 2.1: Historical average drug development times (in years)93 
Clinical trials phase IV and other post-approval research activities are ongoing during the 
entire lifetime of an approved product and are therefore not shown in Table 2.1. 
2.2 Cost Structure of an Average Drug Development Project 
Developing new drugs has always been a costly procedure and expenses have increased 
significantly over the last two decades.  While an early study from 1979 estimated the cost of 
developing a new drug including failed projects and excluding post-approval cost at US$138 
million, this figure increased to over US$800 million in more recent studies.  DiMasi et al. 
(2003) quantify the fully capitalized cost to develop a new drug at US$802 million including 
the cost of failure and excluding post-approval expenses.  Including the cost of post-approval 
activities this number increases to US$897 million.  Figure 2.3 gives an overview of the 
results of multiple studies that have been conducted on drug development cost over the last 
two decades. 
                                                 
93 Source: Kellogg and Charnes (2000, p. 79), Bank Leu (2001, p. 20), BCG (2001, p. 12), DiMasi 
(2001a, p. 292), BPI (2003b), PAREXEL (2003, p. 168) and Cassimon et al. (2004, p. 46).  The 
figures represent average drug development times.  Development times for new drugs can vary 
significantly between different therapeutic areas. 


































Figure 2.3: Drug development cost (ex. post approval;1979-2003 in US$ mil.)94 
The major share of these high drug development costs can be attributed to the cost of projects 
that fail at some stage during the development process.  Tiedemann (2002) estimates this 




Phase I, US$ 64, 
8.0%Phase II, US$ 
104, 13.0%




Prehuman/ Preclinical Phase I Phase II Phase III Approval
Total: US$ 802 million
 
Figure 2.4: Breakdown of drug development cost by R&D phase95 
Since the majority of projects fail early in the process a significant share of the total cost is 
related to the initial base development phase.  Based on PhRMA (2005), 37.5% of total 
                                                 
94 Total capitalized cost until drug approval (ex post-approval cost) including cost of failed projects.  
Studies might vary in scope and approach.  Sources: Hansen (1979), DiMasi et al. (1991), Office of 
Technology Assessment (1993), BCG (2001), DiMasi et al. (2003) and PAREXEL (2003). 
95 Numbers shown are based on PhRMA (2005) and are adapted by excluding cost for phase IV 
clinical trials and allocating uncategorized cost proportionally over all remaining cost positions. 
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project R&D expenditures can be allocated to these base development activities96.  Figure 2.4 
shows a breakdown of the total research and development cost excluding post-approval 
activities by development stage.  Although the major share of the total cost is related to base 
research activities, phase III clinical trials are more expensive on a per project base because 
only a minor share of the projects covered in the initial research activities is ever carried 
through to phase III due to the significant failure risk of drug development projects97. 
To understand the real financial burden for a company pursuing drug development projects it 
is essential to consider the time perspective of the cost incurred by these projects.  Using the 
average R&D stage durations presented in Table 2.1 and assuming linear cost accumulation 
within the different development stages, it can be concluded that the total financial burden is 
close to a linear function of time.  Figure 2.5 illustrates this relation between cumulated total 
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Figure 2.5: Cum. R&D cost of a standard drug development project (US$ mil.) 98 
It has to be considered that the numbers in Figure 2.5 are related to the entirety of all initiated 
development projects necessary to produce one approved drug and not to one single project.  
As an intuitive conclusion related to the failure risk of drug development projects it is known 
that only a minor share of the early cost is related to the successful project while almost all 
costs are related to this single project when the end of the observation period is approached. 
It is important to note that drug development costs heavily depend on the type of research 
project, the indication targeted and the type of company pursuing these research activities and 
                                                 
96 PhRMA (2005, p. 37) report a share of 31.9% but against a total base including post-approval and 
uncategorized cost.  After excluding costs for phase IV clinical trials and allocating uncategorized 
cost proportionally over the remaining cost positions a cost share of 37.5% can be derived. 
97 For details on the risk of technical failure of a drug development refer to Table 7.3. 
98 Own analysis based on Table 2.1 and Figure 2.4. 
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that the figures presented above only represent an industry-wide average.  DiMasi et al. 
(1995) already showed in their study that smaller firms have shorter clinical development 
times and lower costs than larger corporations but also have a cost disadvantage when it 
comes to preclinical trials. 
2.3 Financing Requirements of an Average Drug Development Project 
To create an understanding of the financing requirements of a drug development project it is 
essential not only to evaluate the cost structure but also to consider the characteristics of the 
average revenue streams of an approved product.  To create a net financial performance 
profile of an average new drug, findings of multiple scientific sources are combined.  In 
addition to the average development times and cost investigated above, Grabowski and 
Vernon (2000b) provide insights on the profitability of an average project.  In addition, 
Grabowski et al. (2002) give valuable details on the life-cycle sales of the average drug. 
While Grabowski and Vernon (2000b, p. 100) find that it takes an average NCE about 16 
years to break even, Grabowski et al. (2002) investigate how drug sales develop over time.  
They find that annual sales figures of a new drug approval increase constantly over a multiple 
year ramp-up period until they reach a plateau level.  At this stage, sales volumes remain 
relatively stable until the point of patent expiration.  Past the point of patent expiration, sales 
volumes drop due to generic competition.  This life-cycle sales profile of a successful new 
drug introduction is shown in Figure 2.6.99 









Figure 2.6: Illustrative annual sales profile of successful new drug introduction100 
                                                 
99 Under the assumption that no alternative products directly competing with the product on sale are 
introduced in the market and are able to capture significant market share. 
100 Adapted from Grabowski et al. (2002, p. 17) 
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Based on the described cost structure of an average drug development project and the 
information on life-cycle sales, Figure 2.7 summarizes the characteristics of the cumulated 
net financial performance of an average development project over time including the cost of 
the related development projects, which have failed. 










Figure 2.7: Cumulative financial profile of successful new drug introduction 
For the purpose of this study, the cumulated net financial performance of an average drug 
development project shown in Figure 2.7 is adjusted for simplification purposes.  Without 
limiting the findings of this study, two assumptions are made: 
1. Annual sales volumes and contribution margins of an approved drug are constant over 
time between drug approval and patent expiration. 
2. Generic competition entering the market after patent expiration eliminates any margin 
from product sales immediately upon patent expiration.101 
This results in a linear accumulation of financial resources from the point of market entry 
until patent expiration.  In addition, the maximum financial performance generated by a 
project occurs at the time of patent expiration and is not increased over time beyond this 
point.  Figure 2.8 illustrates this adjusted simplified financial performance of a standard drug 
development project. 
                                                 
101 This can either be attributed to an immediate total loss of market share or to severe price pressure 
eliminating any opportunity for profitable product sales. 
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Figure 2.8: Simplified net financial profile of a new drug development project 
This simplified net financial position of a single drug development project illustrates the 
financing need of a single product company.  This need increases until it reaches its 
maximum at the point of regulatory approval.  Beyond this point, cash flows from product 
sales reduce the net financing need until break even, after which surplus funds are generated 
that can be distributed as profits among investors or can be used to fund additional projects. 
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3 Financial and Real Option Concepts and Applications 
This chapter introduces selected background information from the fields of financial and real 
option theory that are relevant for the upcoming discussions of the study.  At the end of the 
chapter a conclusion is drawn as to which extent theoretical valuation concepts from financial 
option theory can be transferred to the valuation of real option problems in general and to the 
valuation of drug development projects in particular. 
3.1 Financial Options 
A financial option represents a contractual right to carry out a financial transaction under 
predefined conditions.  The two most basic types of financial options give the owner either 
the right to buy (call option) or to sell (put option) a financial instrument, the so-called 
underlying asset.  It is important to recall that an option represents a right, not an obligation 
for the owner to take a specified action.  For the writer of an option on the other hand the 
option represents an obligation.  This obligation arises from the fact that the writer has to 
fulfill the contractual agreement if the owner chooses to exercise the option right he owns. 
Besides these two basic types of options there is a wide variety of more complex financial 
options offered in the market today.  From these so-called exotic options102 the concept of 
compound options is referred to at multiple points throughout this study.  The theoretical 
functionality of puts, calls103 and compound options104 are assumed to be known to the reader 
and not further explained at this point. 
3.1.1 Selected Key Concepts of Financial Option Theory 
The purpose of this section is to give a short introduction to some of the main theoretical 
principles often used in financial option theory and that are also relevant for the remainder of 
this study. 
                                                 
102 The topic of exotic financial options is not directly relevant for the purpose of this study and is 
therefore not discussed at this point.  Interested readers can find more background information on 
exotic options at Müller-Möhl (2002, p. 291), James (2003, p. 143) or Hull (2006, p. 529).  For a 
comprehensive work on theory, pricing, and applicability of exotic options targeted to the 
practitioner see Nelken (1996). 
103 If necessary readers can refer to introductory textbooks on financial option theory for more details.  
Selected examples are Ryan and Henin (1977), Jarrow and Rudd (1983), Ravindran (1993), Hull 
(2006) or Jarrow et al. (1995). 
104 For early scientific work on compound options that received the most attention in option literature 
refer to Geske (1979) and Carr (1988). 




One of the basic assumptions often used throughout financial option literature is the concept 
of frictionless markets.  Such a market represents an ideal trading environment that imposes 
no costs or restraints on transactions.105 
In particular this means that there are no transaction costs, no taxes, any amount of funds can 
be borrowed at the same rate as funds are loaned out, all traded securities are infinitely 
divisible, short selling is allowed106 without penalties related to it and trading takes place on a 
continuous basis. 
Duplication 
The term duplication refers to the concept of rebuilding the payoff structure of one security or 
portfolio with a combination of other securities.  If the initial and the duplicating portfolio 
have the same payoff structure, a rational investor is indifferent to which portfolio to own.  
Hull (2006, p. 328) presents the example of the following portfolio A, whose payoff structure 
can be duplicated with a second portfolio B.  Duplication is also the key idea behind the so 
called Put-Call-Parity often referred to in scientific literature and extensively used in option 
pricing theory.107 
Portfolio A: One European call option on a stock S with maturity T and exercise price X plus 
an amount of cash equivalent to X discounted back over the lifetime of the option. 
Portfolio B: One European put option on a stock S with maturity T and exercise price X plus 
the underlying stock itself. 
The following Table 3.1 shows that both portfolios have the same value at maturity T, 
irrespective if the stock price at T is above or below the exercise price X.  If the stock price 
exceeds X at T the value of both portfolios is equal to the value of the stock S, while the 
value is X if the stock price at maturity is below or equal to X. 
                                                 
105 This concept represents a theoretical simplification because in reality there are no truly frictionless 
markets since trading is always associated with certain costs or restraints, such as transaction costs, 
taxes or constraints on short selling. 
106 I.e. that the underlying asset can be sold today at current prices but the final settlement including 
full payment and delivery occurs at a pre-determined future date. 
107 The Put-Call-Parity refers to the static price relationship, given a stock's price, between the prices 
of European put and call options of the same class (i.e. same underlying, strike price and expiration 
date).  This relationship is derived over the described duplication approach.  These option and stock 
positions must all have the same return or arbitrage opportunities would exist.  Option pricing 
models that produces option prices that do not satisfy the Put-Call-Parity should be rejected because 
of the resulting arbitrage opportunities. 
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Portfolio A Case S>X Case S≤X 
Value of Call Option at Maturity MAX(S-X; 0) S-X 0 
Value of Xe-r(T-t) Bond Investment at Option Maturity T X X 
Resulting Value of Portfolio A at Maturity S X 
   
Portfolio B Case S>X Case S≤X 
Value of Put Option at Maturity MAX(X-S; 0) 0 X-S 
Value of Stock Investment at Option Maturity S S 
Resulting Value of Portfolio B at Maturity S X 
Table 3.1: Example of a portfolio duplication strategy 
Arbitrage 
Arbitrage refers to the concept of attempting to take advantage of market imbalances and to 
generate profits by exploiting price differences of identical or comparable goods or financial 
instruments.  These imbalances can exist between different markets or between the 
underlying asset and a related derivative security.  The objective of arbitrage is to generate 
profits without bearing any investment risk. 
A simple illustrative example of a potential arbitrage opportunity can be derived from the 
duplication strategy explained above.  It is known that both portfolios have the same value at 
the time of option maturity T being either the value of the stock S or the value of the exercise 
price X depending on the stock price development.  Now it is assumed that at any time t the 
price PA(t) of portfolio A exceeds the price PB(t) for portfolio B.  With PA(t)>PB(t) an 
arbitrage opportunity exists. 
An investor can sell portfolio A at time t and at the same time buy portfolio B with the 
proceeds of the sale of A.  The remaining proceeds [PA(t)-PB(t)] are a profit for the investor 
because at time T both investments have the same value and their payoffs eliminate each 
other without creating a profit or loss for the investor.  This strategy therefore represents a 
risk-free arbitrage opportunity. 
Complete Market 
In a complete market the payoff structure of any traded security can be duplicated through 
investments in other market traded securities.  In such a complete market, all possible future 
states of an asset can be constructed with other existing assets. 
With the size and transparency of today’s markets it is an often used assumption that 
financial option markets represent complete markets108.  Stiglitz (1989) argues that 
                                                 
108 According to Ryan and Henin (1977, p. 3), institutionalized financial option trading did not start 
until 1973 with the opening of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).  Since that time, 
multiple exchange markets trading financial options have been established worldwide and trading 
volumes have increased significantly.  Examples of some of the major option markets are the 
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complete109 markets can only exist if there is absolutely no cost related to gathering 
information, which does not hold true in real business settings.  This would make the 
assumption of complete markets an idealistic one, even in today’s markets. 
Risk Neutral Valuation 
Risk-neutral valuation summarizes valuation concepts that do not include any risk 
preferences of individual investors110.  Under the risk-neutral valuation concept an investor 
always prefers the investment with the highest expected return irrespective of the related risk.  
Although the real world is realistically not a risk-neutral environment and investors can 
generally be considered risk-averse111, the concept is still applicable if certain conditions are 
met.  This is the case if the risk involved in an investment is market traded.  This means that 
risky assets can be combined into a portfolio in a way that the portfolio has a known value in 
the future irrespective of the way the market develops.  The resulting portfolio then has the 
same value to a risk-neutral investor as to a risk-averse investor.  An investment into this 
portfolio therefore does not justify a risk premium and generates the risk-free rate of return. 
Since risk-neutral valuation methods do not consider the risk preferences of individual 
investors, their expectations do not affect the result of such a valuation approach.  This is the 
reason why risk-neutral valuation can also be considered an objective valuation technique.112 
Subjective Valuation 
Subjective valuation approaches, as opposed to risk-neutral approaches, explicitly include 
risk preferences and investors’ expectations into the valuation.  To determine the potential 
future payoffs of an option investment, assumptions about the stochastic processes behind the 
value of the underlying asset are made.  Once the future payoffs are estimated their present 
value is determined to estimate today’s value of the investment.  The applied discount rate in 
this approach is not the risk-free rate of interest but includes investors’ subjective impression 
about the investment’s risk level.  The subjective discount rate is usually equal to the return, 
an investor could earn from another investment with comparable risk characteristics113. 
                                                                                                                                                        
London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE), the Tokyo International 
Financial Futures Exchange (TIFFE), the French Futures & Options Exchange (MATIF), or the 
European Exchange (EUREX), which was formed by the merger of the German “Deutsche 
Terminbörse” (DTB) and the Swiss “Schweizer Terminbörse” (SOFFEX). 
109 And arbitrage free markets. 
110 For a more detailed introduction to the concept of risk-neutral valuation one can refer to Jarrow 
and Rudd (1983, p. 88) or Hull (2006, p. 244). 
111 Risk-averse investors prefer less risky assets over risky assets unless they are compensated by a 
risk premium to take on the additional risk. 
112 Widely known examples of risk-neutral valuation approaches in financial option literature include 
Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973), and Cox and Ross (1976). 
113 This return of a comparable alternative investment is called opportunity cost.  An introduction to 
this topic can be found at Perridon and Steiner (2002, p. 87). 
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3.1.2 Applications of Financial Options and Fund Raising Effect 
Generally there are three different uses of options, which are extensively discussed in basic 
option literature114.  These three are speculation, hedging and arbitrage115.  While these uses 
of options are widely known this section focuses on a specific secondary characteristic of 
certain speculation and hedging strategies that can be considered a fund raising effect. 
This effect can occur in cases where market participants act as option writers in the market.  
It results from the fact that the option premium is generally due at the time a contract is 
initiated while closing takes place at the end of the option’s lifetime for a European type 
option116.  During the lifetime of the contract the option writer remains in possession of the 
option premium.  These funds can be used to finance other investments at the discretion of 
the option writer.  From the known payoff behavior of simple option contracts like calls and 
puts it is intuitively clear that this way of fund raising can either be free of charge or be 
extremely expensive for the option writer depending on the market development of the 
underlying asset during the option’s lifetime and on the option use, under which the option 
was written.  This is demonstrated by the following two examples of a speculation and a 
hedging strategy. 
First assume an investor who is not present in the market and sells a European call option on 
a stock for speculation purposes117.  This investor expects a constant118 or decreasing stock 
price.  In the event his expectations are correct, the option expires worthless and raising the 
premium at deal initiation is free of charge.  In the event stock prices increase during the 
lifetime of the option, the owner of the option requests delivery of the stock at the agreed 
exercise price.  Since the writer is not present in the stock market and has to acquire the 
stock, he incurs a loss in the amount of the difference between actual stock price and agreed 
exercise price.  This can be considered his cost for raising funds equivalent to the amount of 
the option premium.  It is needless to say that this cost can be indefinitely large since there is 
theoretically no upper limit on stock prices. 
                                                 
114 For more detailed information on this topic one can refer to basic option literature or one of the 
various more specific scientific articles on option use.  A random example could be the work of 
Ravindran (1995) who discusses hedging strategies to reduce currency exposure. 
115 Some sources like Wilmott et al. (1993, p. 12) list only two types of option use and consider 
arbitrage a specific type of hedging. 
116 While the option owner might be able to sell his formalized right in the market the writer himself 
has no obligation until the maturity date of the European option. 
117 This is called a naked or uncovered position. 
118 Depending on the exercise price.  If it is set below the actual stock price the investor expects 
decreasing prices because the option is already in the money at the initiation of the contract. 
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As a second example assume an investor who sells the same European call option while 
being present in the market with the corresponding stock investment119.  In this case selling 
the option represents a hedging strategy120 to reduce potential losses from the stock 
investment.  In this case the fund raising is not free of charge even if the option expires 
worthless because the writer incurs a loss from his stock investment in this case.  On the other 
hand the indefinitely large cost is reduced by a profit from the stock investment if stock 
prices increase.  No matter which strategy a market participant pursues, the obtained 
premium from selling the European call is available from the time of option contract 
initiation until the contract is closed at the agreed expiration date. 
3.1.3 Financial European Call Option Price Influencing Factors 
Following the Nobel-price winning study of Black and Scholes (1973), prices of financial 
options on non-dividend paying stock depend on five different factors being the exercise 
price of the option, the market price of the underlying asset, the time to maturity, the risk 
involved expressed in volatility of the price of the underlying asset, and the risk-free interest 
rate to be earned on the financial market.  At this point the behavior of the price of a 
European call option on a non-dividend paying stock with respect to parameter changes is 
qualitatively described. 121 
Exercise Price X 
The decision about exercising or not exercising a European call option at maturity only 
depends on the exercise price and the stock price at expiration.  With ST being the stock price 
at expiration date T, the option right is worth MAX[ST-X; 0] to the owner of the call option at 
time T.  Since ST-X1>ST-X2 with X1<X2 it can be concluded that increasing the exercise price 
decreases the final payoff of a call option.  In return, the reduced payoff also reduces the 
value of the call option. 
                                                 
119 This is called a covered position. 
120 A different hedging strategy would be the acquisition of a put option.  Assuming a perfect 
correlation, a sold call option only reduces the downside risk of the stock investment by its 
premium.  At the same time buying a perfectly negatively correlated put option can limit losses at a 
certain level due to its different payoff structure.  The strategies also differ if stock prices increase.  
While the stock in combination with the purchased put option still has an unlimited upside potential 
the other strategy does not.  Since the sold call option can cause an unlimited loss if stock prices 
increase, it eliminates the profit of the stock investment setting a cap on the maximum profit that 
can be achieved by this strategy.  Since the hedging strategy of purchasing a put option does not 
have the secondary fund raising effect important in the context of this study the other example of the 
sold call option was selected. 
121 The formal derivation of these relationships is presented in section 6.2.  A more detailed discussion 
of the sensitivity of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula to its input parameters can be found at 
Jarrow and Rudd (1983, p. 119 ), Hull (2006, p. 341) or Chriss (1997, p. 162). 
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Price of Underlying Stock S 
The impact of changes in the price S of a non-dividend paying stock on the price of a 
European call is straightforward.  Since the call option represents a value of MAX[ST-X; 0] 
to its owner at expiration T, this value increases as ST increases because ST1-X>ST2-X with 
ST1>ST2.  This increases in most cases the anticipated payoff of the European call and 
therefore an increasing stock price also increases the price of the call option with all other 
parameters remaining unchanged. 
Time to Maturity (T-t) 
Time to maturity describes the period between time t and the exercise date T of an option.  
There are two effects that have an impact on the price of the call option with respect to time 
to maturity.  The first one is related to the lump sum an option owner has to pay at maturity to 
exercise his option right.  Due to the time value of money the present value of this lump sum 
payment decreases as time to maturity increases and therefore the buyer is willing to pay a 
higher price at deal initiation.  The second, more important effect is the fact that in the 
absence of dividends, the longer the time to maturity, the higher the probability of favorable 
price increases of the underlying stock and therefore the higher the price of the option. 
Since both effects work in the same direction for the European call option it can be said that 
the longer the time to maturity the higher the price of this option on a non-dividend paying 
stock with all other parameters remaining unchanged. 
Risk/Stock Price Volatility σ 
Stock price volatility measures the uncertainty related to the future price development of a 
stock122.  It can be shown that higher volatility increases the price of a European call option 
with all other parameters remaining unchanged.  Larger uncertainty increases the possibility 
of positive as well as for negative market developments and increases the value of the option.  
This is the case because the owner of a call option can benefit to a full extent from positive 
movements but only has to participate to a limited extent in negative movements. 
Risk-free Interest Rate r 
The last factor to be described is the risk-free interest rate r, whose impact can simply be 
described using the time value of money concept.  The owner of a call option knows the 
contractually required future exercise payment X today and therefore is going to discount it 
back over the lifetime of the option to put it into relation to the known current stock price.  
Knowing this, one can argue for a call option that the higher the interest rate, the larger the 
impact of discounting X back over time and therefore the more promising the call option and 
the higher its price.  This is the case because todays value of X is effected by changes in 
discount rate but the known and observable stock price today is not. 
                                                 
122 While Black and Scholes (1973) assume constant stock price volatility over time, Nagel (2001) 
investigates potential option valuation approaches with stochastic volatility. 
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Some sources in option pricing theory explain the impact of changes in the risk-free interest 
rate in an alternative way, which is not as intuitively clear as the one above but generates the 
same result.  On one hand, increasing interest rates tend to increase the expected growth of 
stock prices but on the other hand, it also decreases the value future cash flows have to the 
option owner.  The first effect increases the value of the call option while the second one 
reduces the price a buyer is willing to pay to acquire a call option.  Hull (2006, p. 362) and 
Stoll and Whaley (1993, p. 229) show that the first effect always outweighs the second and 
therefore the price of a European call option increases as interest rates increase with all other 
parameters remaining unchanged. 
Table 3.2 summarizes how changes in the five option price influencing variables affect the 
price of a European call option in the absence of dividend payments. 
Influencing Factor Increasing factor value causes Call price to … 
Exercise Price ▼ - decrease 
Price of Underlying ▲ - increase 
Time to Maturity ▲ - increase 
Risk / Volatility ▲ - increase 
Risk-free Interest Rate ▲ - increase 
Table 3.2: Price influencing factors of European call option123 
3.2 Real Options (RO) 
Just like financial options, real options represent a right to take a specific action in the future.  
As opposed to financial options, the underlying of a real option is not an abstract financial 
instrument but a real business situation.124  The theory of real options stretches back to the 
early 1950s when Dean (1951) developed the first ideas to quantify the value of managerial 
decision alternatives125. 
3.2.1 Academic Types of Real Options 
There are six types of decisions that make up managerial flexibility and that are generally 
considered the basic types of real options in academic literature.126  These types are the 
                                                 
123 In the absence of dividend payments.  Table based on Jarrow and Rudd (1983, p. 16) 
124 As Amram and Kulatilaka (1999, p. 6) state, “in a narrow sense, the real options approach is the 
extension of financial option theory to options on real (nonfinancial) assets.  While financial options 
are detailed in the contract, real options embedded in strategic investments must be identified and 
specified.  Moving from financial options to real options requires a way of thinking, one that brings 
the discipline of the financial markets to internal strategic investment decisions”. 
125 For a short summary on the history of real options refer to Hilzenbecher (2000, p. 218) and for a 
more detailed introduction to Kulatilaka and Marcus (1988) or Trigeorgis (1995). 
126 There is a consensus in most publications about the meaning of the term real option and its 
connection to managerial flexibility.  While most authors agree on the description, their individual 
classifications do vary slightly.  Examples of early classifications and some good summaries on real 
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option to grow, the option to wait, the option to change scope, the exit option, the option to 
switch, and the option to learn. 
Option to grow 
Some projects or investments in real assets open up the opportunity to invest in new projects 
or subsequent project stages.  This opportunity is called the option to grow throughout real 
option literature.127  Growth options represent a value to their owner and are sometimes used 
as an explanation as to why some companies are valued higher on the stock market than 
someone evaluating their fundamental indicators would expect.128 
A growth option can be the development of a new product or any other activity that grants 
access to and establishes a company in new markets or market segments.  Such a project 
might even be pursued if results from traditional valuation techniques generate negative 
results for the project if evaluated individually.129  Growth options are not limited to products 
or other physical assets.  Intangible assets like internal knowledge, patents, reputation or a 
strong management team can also be considered options for future growth. 
Industries that are characterized as dynamic, volatile and unpredictable are generally 
associated with growth options.  The telecommunication, high tech electronics130, 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology131 industry are some frequently quoted examples132.  In a 
drug development context an option to grow can be identified in a potential expansion of a 
drug into new fields of therapeutic use or in the development of alternative application 
methods to expand the initial target market. 
                                                                                                                                                        
option classifications can be found at Kilka (1995, p. 3), Trigeorgis (1995, p. 3), Trigeorgis (1996, 
p. 9), Amram and Kulatilaka (1999, p. 10) or Copeland and Antikarov (2001, p. 5). 
127 Basic work on growth options has been done by Myers (1977), Kester (1984), Pindyck (1988), 
Trigeorgis (1988), Kester (1993) and Brealey and Myers (2000). 
128 Boer (2002) for example describes the case of the biotech company Genentech that became a US$ 
billion company without substantial cash flows.  Kellogg and Charnes (2000) use a similar growth 
option based approach to value a biotechnology company.  Garner et al. (2002) explain the market 
capitalization of a sample of Biotech and Internet companies with negative earnings with corporate 
growth options.  Schwartz and Moon (2000) explain extraordinary market valuations of internet 
companies with a valuation model based on future growth options, which they further refine in their 
later study Schwartz and Moon (2001). Other case examples can be found at Copeland and 
Antikarov (2001, p. 301) for a high-tech company and at Bühler and Uhrig-Homburg (2003, p. 129) 
for an IT company and a brewing company. 
129 Before the development of real option theory, decisions to pursue projects with unfavorable 
outlook resulting from standard NPV analysis but finally resulting in big corporate success stories 
were often described as entrepreneurial business acumen or managerial intuition. 
130 Boer (2002, p. 124) describes the case where developing a microcomputer becomes a favorable 
project because of the option to invest in a second generation of microcomputers in the future. 
131 Ottoo (1998) builds a model to evaluate a research project in the biotech industry as a corporate 
growth option. 
132 See Dixit and Pindyck (1995, p. 105) or Freihube (2001, p. 27). 
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Option to wait 
When investment decisions are made in a business environment they are generally not bound 
to specific investment dates unless dictated by existing contracts or bid processes.  In most 
cases management has the flexibility to decide when a certain investment is made.  While 
delaying an investment potentially results in later market entry and lost market shares, 
waiting can also have a positive value for a company.133  Two main reasons are responsible 
for the positive value of the option to wait.  Within the period a project is delayed, new 
information can arrive about risk and reward of the project that allow better decision making.  
In addition to the arrival of new information, market conditions themselves might change 
while the project is delayed allowing the investor to adjust his investment strategy 
accordingly.  In cases of positive market changes the financial outlook of the investment can 
turn more positive justifying an immediate investment or it can turn unfavorable preventing 
management from investing in an unfavorable project altogether.  In certain industries the 
option to wait can represent a highly valuable asset to the owner. 
Often quoted examples are companies that are involved in the exploration of natural 
resources, the development of land, commercial real estate or the agricultural industry.134  In 
a drug development context the option to wait can be considered less important especially 
after a company has already applied for patent protection status of a new drug.  Waiting in 
this context reduces the effective patent protection period of a new product, which is essential 
for a company to break even with a new product.135 
Option to change scope (expand/reduce) 
Most investment projects can be altered in terms of scope even after an initial investment has 
been made.136  This opportunity to adapt to changing market conditions is another valuable 
type of real option.  If market conditions turn more favorable, management can decide to 
                                                 
133 Early efforts to quantify the value of an option to wait have been made by Titman (1985) who 
investigated how long land should be kept vacant and when it should be developed.  Other studies 
quantifying waiting options are the one by Paddock et al. (1988) and Bjerksund (1991) who both 
examine when a firm should explore and develop a petroleum lease.  Brennan and Schwartz (1985) 
also investigate the timing of natural resource investments.  More general work on waiting options 
has been done by McDonald and Siegel (1986) and by Ingersoll and Ross (1992).  The latter 
conducted simulations indicating that it might be beneficial not to initiate investment projects until 
the expected benefits are twice as high as the required investment.  Ingersoll and Ross (1992) 
concluded in their study that even very simple investment projects have waiting options that need to 
be considered in the decision making process. 
134 Waiting options are not limited to these industries.  Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza (2003) show 
that waiting options are also relevant when investing in information technology under uncertainty. 
135 See also Figure 1.5 and Figure 5.2 in this context. 
136 A study explicitly considering this type of option is the one by McDonald and Siegel (1985) who 
consider the option to temporarily shut down production.  Pindyck (1988) investigates the value of 
the option not to use an installed production unit and Abel et al. (1996) show how opportunities to 
expand or contract future activities can be considered options that add value to a project. 
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expand production to increase sales and maximize profits.  During times when markets turn 
unfavorable, the opportunity to reduce production can be a valuable alternative to sustain 
profitability.  An extreme case of reducing production scope is the option to temporarily shut 
down production.137 
An example138 of an option to change the scope of a project is the installation of production 
lines whose capacity can be adapted depending on existing demand.  Such a flexible line 
enables a company to satisfy peaks in demand if the market is strong and can avoid 
overproduction if the market indicates flagging demand.  The option to change scope is 
relevant for all manufacturing industries but especially valuable for those with cyclical 
production like consumer goods or fashion apparel. 
In drug development the option to change scope is of little relevance but once a product is 
approved and introduced into the market, the ability to change the scope of production is as 
relevant for the drug producer as it is for other manufacturing companies. 
Option to exit 
Only a small fraction of real investment projects have to be carried all the way through to the 
end of their scheduled lifetime.  Most investment projects leave management the opportunity 
to discontinue a project and sell the related assets.  This kind of exit option serves as an 
insurance139 if things develop in the wrong direction and a project does not meet defined 
project milestones and objectives.140  As opposed to the option to temporarily shut down 
production, the exit option is an ultimate decision because the assets are liquidated and not 
available for further production once the exit option has been exercised. 
Capital intensive industries are extremely interested in owning exit options.  Examples are 
airlines, railroad companies or companies introducing products to uncertain markets.  In drug 
development the option to abandon ongoing projects for whatever reason is essential to 
remain profitable and concentrate resources on the most promising projects.  Since the drug 
                                                 
137 Kilka (1995, p. 35), Freihube (2001, p. 24) and Lucke (2001, p. 17) consider the option to 
temporarily shut down production as a separate type of real option.  This is contrary to the 
classification used in Trigeorgis (1995, p. 3), Meise (1998, p. 107) or Brach (2003, p. 84) treating 
the option to shut down as an extreme case of the option to reduce scope. 
138 Another example often cited in this context is the ability of the mining or oil drilling industry to 
increase or decrease their production speed within certain limits depending on current market prices.  
A similar behavior can be observed in the energy market depending on current energy prices as 
discussed at Leslie and Michaels (1997), who investigated real options in the energy sector. 
139 Brach (2003, p. 80) describes this type of real option as “a hedge against an economic downturn”. 
140 Studies on abandonment options like the one conducted by Myers and Majd (1990) or Berger et al. 
(1996) support the view that this kind of option adds value for the investor.  Another study 
investigating this topic is the one by Dixit (1989) who builds a model that derives trigger prices for 
entry and exit decisions in an uncertain market environment. 
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development process does not require large physical assets compared to the physical assets 
required for large-scale production, the exit option can be exercised relatively easily.141 
Option to switch 
Switching options can be described as the flexibility to alternate between different modes of 
operation.  Switching can occur between production inputs142, between production outputs143, 
between different production technologies or processes, or between manufacturing locations.  
The multitude of switching opportunities shows the complexity of this option type.  To 
reduce complexity, most studies apply a more focused point of view and limit their scope to 
changes in input parameters144 to produce the same output or to changes in output145 
produced with the same input.146 
Switching options are valuable but generally not free of charge and result in switching costs.  
These costs can be related to idle time in production, installation of alternative technologies, 
cleaning cost for equipment, training of employees or other costs caused by the decision to 
switch from one mode of operation to another. 
                                                 
141 For industries that require valuable physical assets the existence of a liquid second hand market 
increases the practical applicability of an exit option.  This is the case for car rental companies 
whose fleets can be sold in the used car market in case of market exit.  This market has a broader 
customer base than the used aircraft market for example, where it is more difficult to exercise the 
exit option. 
142 Depending on the infrastructure in place, an electrical power company might have the option to use 
coal, oil, gas or other energy sources to generate the same output, which is electrical power.  
Another example for an industry with good input switching options is the farming industry when 
raising livestock.  Here farmers have the option to switch between various types of feed for their 
animals to generate the desired growth. 
143 Switching options in output parameters are most relevant for industries that have to deal with 
frequent changes in demand.  The more universal the production equipment, the greater the option 
to switch with respect to output.  Car manufacturers might have the option to manufacture product B 
instead of product A on an existing line.  Agricultural corporations can also alter the output mix of 
their “production sites” but only with a relatively long lead time depending on harvesting cycles.  
Another good example for switching options would be a company using injection molding to 
manufacture plastic parts.  Within a short period of time they can switch from producing parts for 
the car industry to producing parts for toys simply by exchanging the molding tool used. 
144 Early work on switching options in financial arrangements has been done by Margrabe (1978).  
Based on this study, Kensinger (1987) developed a model to value the flexibility related to 
switching between two different input parameters.  Kulatilaka (1993) also investigated switching 
flexibility with respect to input parameters on the example of a dual fuel burner with the option to 
switch between different input fuels in comparison to a single fuel burner. 
145 Output flexibility was investigated by Kulatilaka (1988) who investigated the value of Flexible 
Manufacturing Systems (FMS) and by He and Pindyck (1992). 
146 Two other interesting applications of switching options can be found at Baldwin and Ruback 
(1986) and Botteron et al. (2003).  Baldwin and Ruback (1986) studied switching options for 
investments in fixed assets and found that short lived assets are more valuable to a company than 
long lived assets.  Botteron et al. (2003) modeled the flexibility of multinational companies to 
switch production and sales between different countries in a real option framework. 
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Option to stage/learn 
Most long-term investment projects do not have to be pursued as one single project but can 
be separated into stages.  During each stage information about the outcome and the 
environment of the project are collected creating the opportunity to adjust the following 
stages to the new situation.  This opportunity to continuously learn allows for better decision 
making during the course of a project.  At the end of a project stage, management can decide 
based on its acquired knowledge whether the project should be carried on, altered in terms of 
scope or timing or if it should be abandoned.147 
Four industries148 are often mentioned when staged investments are discussed, namely the 
exploration of natural resources149, the pharmaceutical industry, aircraft manufacturers150 and 
the motion picture151 industry.  The idea of a staged process with an option to learn is well 
suited for drug development projects because of their distinct project phases, which are 
explained in chapter 2.1.  This way of thinking is widely accepted and used throughout 
scientific literature.  Brach (2003, p. 97) uses a six stage process model to introduce the idea 
of a staged investment in drug development and so do Cassimon et al. (2004) to value a 
pharmaceutical NDA. 
The explanations above already show that a drug development project does not represent a 
single type of real option but a combination of multiple types just as most other real life 
business transactions can also be considered a combination of multiple academic real options.  
                                                 
147 Early discussions on staged investment decisions and the related option value can be found at Majd 
and Pindyck (1987) who derive optimal investment rules in sequential projects and Carr (1988) who 
estimates the value of sequential exchange options in multiple settings.  Other studies have been 
conducted by Teisberg (1994) who evaluates an investment in a utility power plant, which is 
described as a process with multiple stages to be completed sequentially and by Weitzman et al. 
(1981) describing how large-scale government subsidized research can be evaluated as staged 
investments.  More recent work on sequential real options has been conducted by Cassimon et al. 
(2002) trying to evaluate the value of research conducting pharmaceutical companies with a 
compound option model based on the work of Geske (1979) for financial compound options. 
148 These are four examples while Willner (1995) describes all start-up ventures as multi-step 
compound options.  Boer (1999, p. 21) describes every industrial R&D project leading to new 
technologies as a multi-stage project consisting of six different stages.  Kotler and Bliemel (1995, p. 
505) support the view that industrial research projects are structured along different project stages. 
149 Stensland and Tjostheim (1991) and Mun (2002, p. 36) describe a typical oil or gas exploration 
project as a four stage investment consisting of an exploration, a development, a production, and a 
decommissioning phase and their view is supported by BP’s CEO John Browne at Prokesch (1997).  
Another good example for a learning option when natural resources are explored is the case study 
from the mining industry to be found at Copeland and Keenan (1998, p. 134). 
150 Majd and Pindyck (1987) describe the process of developing a new aircraft as a four step process 
consisting of engineering, prototype production, testing and final tooling, which can in total take 
eight to ten years to complete. 
151 For the motion picture industry, Boer (2002, p. 253) characterizes a project with a four step process 
consisting of script development, movie production, box office release and advertising/promotion. 
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This makes it difficult to precisely classify real business transactions in this academic 
framework.152  For that reason an alternative classification scheme is presented below. 
3.2.2 Real Options in a Business Oriented Framework 
In contrast to the academic real option framework above, Hilzenbecher (2000, p. 224) 
describes a more business oriented view that enables better differentiation between different 
types of business activities representing real options from each other and from financial 
options.  This approach divides real options into four different categories and allows a better 
classification of a drug development project and is therefore more appropriate for the purpose 
of this study. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the comparison of the main characteristics of a financial option with 
the characteristics of these real options classified as type 0, I, II, and III. 
Real Options 
Characteristics 
Financial and Type 




• buy option 
One time: 















Compoundness Depending on option type sometimes always always 
Trading Institutionalized - continuous Not institutionalized - discontinuous 
Pricing market prices individual pricing based on negotiation results 
Maturity fixed date variable variable variable 
Exclusivity Yes no no no 
Contracts standardized not standardized 
Valuation Method risk-neutral valuation methods 
(incorrect) risk-neutral valuation, subjective valuation methods 
or simulations 
 
Table 3.3: Direct comparison of financial and various types of real options153,154 
                                                 
152 For more information on the limitations of real option thinking see Copeland and Antikarov 
(2001), Adner and Levinthal (2004a), Adner and Levinthal (2004b) or McGrath et al. (2004). 
153 Because type 0 real options have characteristics very similar to the ones of financial options they 
are represented by one column in the table.  To improve readability, statements referring to 
financial options in this chapter also apply to real options type 0 without explicitly being mentioned. 
154 Adapted from Hilzenbecher (2000, p. 229) 
Flexibility
Complexity
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RO Type 0: Options on Market Traded Real Assets 
Real options type 0 represent standardized option contracts on real assets that are acquired 
through one time investments.  As for financial options, exercise price and maturity date are 
generally fixed and known at the time of entering the agreement.  The option itself and the 
underlying real asset are traded on institutionalized, regulated markets.  While this is the case 
for stocks and stock options in the financial market, it is also the case for options on assets 
such as gold, oil, other raw materials and some agricultural products traded on commodity 
markets.155 
As opposed to the market traded type 0 real options there are other business transactions that 
are not traded on institutionalized markets.  These options are more complex and include a 
higher degree of uncertainty.  In the introduced classification scheme these more complex 
business transactions are divided into three real option types. 
RO Type I: Purchased Product Trading 
Real options type I represent the business transaction of selling purchased products.156  In this 
type of transaction the real option owner bears the risk of changes in product prices and 
demand.  The investment risk on owner’s side is limited to the financial resources invested in 
products currently in stock.  For this type of real option flexibility is relatively high and 
reaction times to environmental changes are short. 
RO Type II: Self-manufactured Product Trading 
Type II real options represent type I real options expanded in scope by the manufacturing 
process of the products to be sold.157  While type I included acquiring, storing and selling 
products, type II real options include the acquisition of raw materials or parts, the production 
process of goods, product storage and the final sales activities.  The financial risk is larger 
and the complexity increases because additional funds have to be invested to set up and run 
the infrastructure required for production.  In addition to the production infrastructure, type II 
real options also contain the risk associated with the production process itself while this risk 
resides with the product supplier for type I real options.  Managerial flexibility is reduced and 
reaction times increase in this type of business transaction. 
                                                 
155 It is important to note that the real options type 0 only include options on trading oil or raw 
materials but not on their exploration or production.  Exploration projects represent a different type 
of real option as described later in this chapter. 
156 Examples of industries holding these types of real options are department stores, car dealerships as 
opposed to car manufacturers, supermarkets and the entire retail industry. 
157 Examples of industries with this type of real options are contract manufacturers in various 
industries and generally all industries manufacturing basic or standardized products requiring none 
or only minor research activities. 
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RO Type III: Self-developed/Self-manufactured Product Trading 
Type III represents the highest type of real option in this framework and is a further extension 
of the type II RO.  In addition to type II, type III also incorporates research and development 
activities to bring a new product to market and keep it up to the latest technological standards 
and trends.158  Real options of type III contain all risk factors of type II plus the risk involved 
in setting up the R&D infrastructure and running these processes.  This risk mainly contains a 
technical component159 and the risk related to uncertain development timing160 and cost.  The 
additional risk makes the investment cost and timing for type III real options more uncertain 
than for type II.  With R&D activities generally being a time-consuming process requiring 
significant financial resources, businesses holding type III real options can only react slower 
to environmental influences than the ones operating with type I and II real options. 
3.2.3 Real Option Characteristics of a Drug Development Project 
In the academic real option framework, drug development projects represent a combination 
of several types of real options.  The growth aspect of a drug development project is obvious 
because all activities are conducted to create a new drug that is supposed to result in product 
sales.  Additional growth options exist in the form of three different types of expansion 
options.  The first one being the option to expand a project in terms of potential applications a 
product can be used for in the future.  While a pharmaceutical compound is generally 
developed in one specific form, management has the option to invest funds to develop 
additional application forms to increase its market potential.161  The second expansion option 
is represented by the opportunity to cover new therapeutic areas.  In this case management 
can invest in additional research to test the effectiveness of a new drug in other therapeutic 
areas.  These expansion options can be considered call options on future cash flows with the 
cost for the required additional research being their exercise price. 
The third form of expansion option exists in the form of potential patent extensions.  While 
patents are generally granted for a period of twenty years there is an opportunity to extend 
this period under certain circumstances.162  In this case a company has a call option on 
additional years of patent protected cash flows with the exercise price being the filing cost for 
the required application. 
                                                 
158 Examples of industries holding type III real options include aircraft manufacturers, computer chip 
producers, car manufacturers or pharmaceutical companies. 
159 The risk that research activities do not lead to a new product or technology that can be sold in the 
marketplace. 
160 Research and development can be a very time-consuming process.  E.g. it take eight to ten years to 
bring a new aircraft to market and up to 14 years to develop a new drug. 
161 An example would be the development of an injectable drug that already exists in oral form. 
162 In the US as well as in Germany this opportunity exists in form of so-called Supplementary 
Protection Certificates (SPCs).  More details on potential patent protection extensions and the effect 
of the Waxman-Hatch Act in the US can be found at Grabowski and Vernon (2000b). 
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In addition to the growth option, the exit option is another type of flexibility in the drug 
development process.  It represents the freedom to stop a project at any time with no 
obligation to finalize it later.  As opposed to the growth option, this type can be considered a 
put option with an exercise price equivalent to potential liquidation cost.  The value of the 
underlying asset in this case is equivalent to a potential salvage value of the project.163  The 
exit option is closely related to the learning option because the research conducting company 
constantly generates new information on the prospects of a project during its research 
activities therefore reducing the related uncertainty.  Based on the additional information 
generated, the company is able to make the decision to exercise its exit option or to continue 
the development process. 
With all of these options being linked to each other the drug development project has to be 
considered an interdependent real option in the academic sense.  There are studies on 
interdependent real option like the ones by Kemna (1993), Trigeorgis (1993), Kulatilaka 
(1995), Rose (1998, p. 711) or Lucke (2001) but no such study is known to the author directly 
investigating a drug development project.  In the context of drug development authors tend to 
simplify complexity by neglecting one or more types of options.  Copeland and Keenan 
(1998, p. 140) for example avoid the option to expand and divide the future market potential 
in great and mediocre products without explicitly considering the opportunity to develop new 
drug application.  Brach (2003, p. 98) follows a similar approach by splitting future potential 
into a best and into a worst case scenario while Shockley et al. (2003, p. 46) keep the future 
market potential constant without considering different scenarios at all.  In later chapters of 
this study the option to expand is modeled with potential positive jumps in the market 
potential simulation for a new drug. 
Within the more business oriented real option framework a drug development project can be 
assigned to the real option type III category.  With the classification in this framework being 
unambiguous, it is used to compare real options to financial options with the objective of 
deriving indications about the transferability of existing option valuation methods. 
                                                 
163 In case of technical failure of a project this salvage value can be zero. 
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3.3 Comparison Real vs. Financial Options 
Comparing the key characteristics of real and financial options164 is a prerequisite of chapter 
6 of this study where the applicability of existing valuation methods on an option sold on a 
drug development project is investigated.165  For this purpose the business oriented real 
options view is used.  This approach allows an unambiguous classification of business 
activities into non-interacting real option classes. 
Comparing a type 0 real option with a basic financial stock option reveals similar 
characteristics.  Besides the fact that both options are formalized in standardized contracts, 
are initiated through a one time investment and that exercise price and maturity date are 
known at the initiation date, another key similarity is related to the way these real options are 
traded.  In this case both option types are traded on institutionalized markets as are the related 
underlying assets.  With the option contract and the underlying asset being market traded, 
tracking portfolios166 can be created to duplicate the payoff of these types of option contracts.  
Under the no-arbitrage assumption of regulated markets, the same risk-neutral valuation 
methods can therefore be applied to type 0 real options as used to price financial options. 
Because they are market traded, type 0 real options do not need to be held until maturity but 
can be sold at any time.  This allows the owner to react quickly to environmental changes and 
remain flexible in his decision making.  With real options of type 0 having financial option 
like characteristics they are combined into one single category in the following discussion.  
The remaining statements in this section on financial options therefore also apply to real 
options type 0 and vice versa. 
From the RO type I over type II to the highest type III, certain characteristics develop in a 
straightforward way.  As the type of a real option increases so does the uncertainty related to 
the size of the required initial investment and the one related to the time period required to 
create the real option.  This is the case because every step to the next higher category 
involves a new process adding uncertainty.  At type II, the production process is included 
with unknown set-up cost and timing.  For type III, the even higher uncertainty is related to 
the additional research and development activities not included in type II. 
                                                 
164 The term financial option in this context refers to simple financial option contracts such as a 
European call option and not to all financial options.  This limitation is necessary because financial 
options can be constructed in a wide variety of ways with very different characteristics and therefore 
it is not possible to draw conclusions relevant for all financial options. 
165 There are multiple studies like Kilka (1995, p. 49), Meise (1998, p. 47) or Freihube (2001, p. 122) 
that include a comparison of real options with financial options.  A simple comparison of “the” real 
option with financial options represents an oversimplification of the issue failing to capture the 
individual characteristics of the different real option types.  How an economic real option compares 
to a financial call option also depends on the classification type in the introduced framework and 
therefore the classification of type 0 to type III real options is used for the purpose of comparison. 
166 On constructing tracking portfolios on commodities refer to Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.178). 
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The investment method itself also differs between the types of options considered.  For 
financial and for type I real options, a one time investment is necessary to acquire the option 
contract or the goods to be sold.  While financial options do not include any investment 
timing risk because the time of the one time investment is known, there is a small risk 
remaining in type I real options because of the lack of institutionalized markets for certain 
products.  The small uncertainty is related to finding the appropriate business partner and 
closing the necessary contracts.  For type II and type III real options the option right needs to 
be created and cannot be bought at one point in time.  The payouts to create these option 
rights are stretched over an unknown time period.  Since type III real options include the 
largest scope of investment activities, the largest risk in investment timing is also associated 
with it.  Type II real options exclude the entire research process and therefore the investment 
timing is generally shorter and less uncertain compared to type III.  As shown, significantly 
less timing risk is involved in type I real options and financial options. 
Another point distinguishing financial options from real options is the way options are closed.  
While financial options have a contractually fixed maturity date and can be sold in the 
market, this is not the case for real options type I to III.  It is intuitively clear that generally 
the time of product sales167 cannot exactly be predicted in advance and depends on supply 
and demand for the goods to be sold.  For type II and III there is also the uncertainty that the 
real option holding company cannot exactly predict at what time the production or the R&D 
process of a product will be completed and the product can be sold.168  Considering these 
points shows that time to maturity is not known for real options type I, II, and III with the 
uncertainty increasing for every classification step.  This is an important characteristic of 
most real options while financial options generally have contractually fixed maturity dates. 
Just as uncertainty in the maturity of real options increases with each category so does the 
compoundness.  Compoundness describes the degree, to which an option can be divided into 
subsequent project or investment stages.  Simple financial options do not include multiple 
stages therefore no compoundness needs to be considered.  Whether compound 
characteristics can be observed for type I real options depends on the characteristics of the 
traded products and can exist in certain cases.  Type II real options are always related to 
compoundness and can at least be divided into a production and a sales stage.  This 
compoundness is larger for type III caused by the additional research and development stage. 
The issue of exclusivity is another characteristic to be considered in this context.  Financial 
options grant the owner an exclusive right to take a specific action.  This is different for RO 
                                                 
167 Except contracted production with predetermined delivery dates. 
168 With modern production scheduling systems this uncertainty can be reduced to a minmum for the 
production process but can still be considered more uncertain than the maturity date in a virtual 
contract not involving a physical asset. 
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type I, II and III, which are shared options169.  Consider a retailer who has an option to 
generate cash flows by selling purchased products.  This retailer has the exclusive right to sell 
his own products in stock but competing retailers have the same option to sell their own 
products to the same customer base170.  In a second example consider a pharmaceutical 
company attempting to develop and sell a patent protected drug A to treat the symptoms of an 
HIV infection.  While the company has the exclusive right to sell drug A to the market, other 
pharmaceutical companies share the option to generate revenues with the same customer base 
by selling a competing drug B to also treat the symptoms of a HIV infection171.  Exclusive 
options represent a higher value to the owner because of the absence of competition. 
Apart from the points described above, the main difference between financial and real options 
I, II and III is the fact that there is only an institutionalized market for financial options where 
the option and the related underlying asset are traded.  An existing market ensures continuous 
trading at market prices with publicly available pricing information.  This type of trading 
does not take place for RO type I to III.  They can only be traded under certain conditions172 
and if they are traded, markets are not complete.  Trading in these cases occurs 
discontinuously and prices are the outcome of individual negotiations. 
It is known that the applicability of objective risk-neutral option valuation techniques 
depends on the requirement that markets are complete and that the risk associated with an 
investment is fully market traded.  Traditional academic literature usually assumes market 
completeness173 for financial markets and therefore supports the applicability of risk-neutral 
option valuation techniques.  This assumption is not fulfilled for real options type I, II, and 
III.  The existence of private, not market traded risk is the reason why risk-neutral valuation 
techniques are not applicable when evaluating real options of a higher type.  As opposed to 
financial options the valuation of real options I, II and III require a subjective valuation 
approach that explicitly considers non-market traded risk components of real options and 
                                                 
169 Instead of referring to the different types of options as exclusive and shared, Kester (1984, p. 156) 
labels them as “proprietary” and “shared”. 
170 Copeland and Tufano (2004) use the option to build a plant in a foreign country to visualize the 
point of shared option rights.  While a company might have this opportunity, several other 
companies have exactly the same opportunity to open a plant in the country considered. 
171 As a similar real life example consider the development of Viagra where Pfizer exercised its option 
to grow by penetrating a entirely new market segment.  If the development of Viagra© had been an 
exclusive option no company could have entered this market but in reality GlaxoSmithKline entered 
the market with the competing product Levitra© and Eli Lilly with Cialis©. 
172 Real options created by real investments are generally not traded.  However, they can be traded if 
the company discontinues the project and sells all assets required to exercise the option.  In most 
cases the option is inseparably connected to these assets.  Real options are more tradable if the 
option right is based on an intangible asset.  These assets like patents or licenses can more easily be 
transferred than entire production facilities. 
173 There are also studies investigating valuation problems in incomplete markets, which are not 
further investigated at this point. 
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their dissimilarities compared to financial options.  There are early studies on real options 
like the ones of Garman (1977), Constantinides (1978), Harrison and Kreps (1979) or Cox et 
al. (1985) that attempted to duplicate non-market traded real options with a tracking portfolio 
of market traded securities to allow the application of financial option valuation methods.  
Based on Amram and Kulatilaka (1999, p. 52) this approach always results in a tracking error 
therefore the applicability of risk-neutral valuation techniques is also related to a valuation 
error.  Mello and Pyo (2003, p. 90) also conclude that a replication of the risk involved in 
drug development cannot be replicated with market traded securities. 
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4 Corporate Financing of Young Biotech/Pharma Companies 
The objective of this section is to assess young biotechnology companies’ need for innovative 
financing strategies174 such as the presented concept of selling research options on ongoing 
drug development projects in the current175 market environment. 
4.1 Availability of Traditional Financing Methods 
In a traditional corporate financing framework, corporations have two main types of 
financing sources available to raise funds for their operations.  One being internal financing 
where funds are generated within the corporation itself and the other being sources from 
outside the company that make funds available to the company due to different reasons and 
with different objectives.176 
Internal Financing 
Four main financing methods are generally considered when internal financing is discussed, 
being the retention of earnings, financing by depreciations, financing through regrouping of 
assets and financing through building reserves. 
Recalling the definition of a young biotech company as being a company conducting research 
activities without generating continuous revenue streams through product sales it becomes 
obvious that internal financing is of no practical relevance to these companies.  Without 
revenues these companies are not capable of generating substantial earnings and therefore the 
opportunity to finance themselves through the retention of earnings is not feasible. 
A similar situation exists when it comes to financing through depreciations177 or reserve 
building.  Conceptually these opportunities are open to all companies fulfilling certain 
criteria.  One main point is the fact that the depreciations and reserves considered for 
financing need to be covered by excess cash flows178.  Since young biotechnology companies 
lack regular cash inflows, this way of financing is generally not a viable approach. 
                                                 
174 For a more detailed presentation of the traditional methods of corporate financing appearing in this 
chapter refer to basic corporate financing literature such as Schmalenbach (1966), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Sandig and Köhler (1979), Schmidt and Terberger (1999) or Betsch et al. (2000). 
175 The relevant time period for this assessment is the industry situation during the years 2003/2004.  
The statements in this section might change over time because they strongly depend on general 
market trends, the entire economic situation, maturity of the industry and legislative initiatives 
affecting the industry. 
176 Perridon and Steiner (2002, p. 354) consider the breakdown into internal and external financing the 
traditional source-based classification approach.  They also present a second classification approach, 
which is based on the legal status of the capital providing entity.  This second approach is not used 
in this study but can be found at Perridon and Steiner (2002, p. 353). 
177 Good examples on the financing effect of depreciations can be found at Keun and Wiese (1977, p. 
27) or Langen (1970). 
178 Cash inflows exceeding cash outflows. 
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The last main internal financing method is the opportunity to finance operations through the 
regrouping of balance sheet items.  This can be done by disposing assets not essential for 
operations and transforming them into monetary funds.  This approach is also not available to 
young biotech companies because it is very unlikely that young research intensive companies 
have accumulated significant disposable assets.  During the start-up phase where corporations 
operate on limited budgets, usually only those assets are acquired that are essential for 
operations and are therefore non-disposable.  The only assets that young biotech companies 
are potentially able to sell are intangible by nature.  Patent rights on discoveries not related to 
their core development projects might be of interest to other companies and can be sold179. 
The alternative way of financing by regrouping assets is through corporate restructuring 
instead of fixed asset disposal, which can also be considered a minor financing opportunity.  
In the absence of large inventory or accounts receivable positions the opportunity to transfer 
working capital into funds is minor.  If rationalization activities are conducted, which is 
extensively done in the current market environment180, these activities can generally not 
provide additional funds.  This is the case because they rather affect the cost structure of a 
company and reduce the corporate burn rate instead of freeing up financial resources181. 
This brief qualitative assessment of internal financing opportunities revealed that they are 
only available to young biotech companies to a minor extent.  Compared to these internal 
financing sources, external types of financing are more relevant for young biotech companies.  
Their availability is assessed below. 
External Financing 
The main external sources of financing discussed at this point are additional investments by 
existing stakeholders, venture capital investments, public stock offerings, public grants, credit 
substitutes and financing through common debt. 
When discussing external financing methods available to young biotech companies182, it is 
important to create an understanding of the stage of corporate development they operate in.  
This is essential because during each corporate development stage, companies have specific 
financing methods available while they have only limited access to others.  In return, these 
types of financing methods might then be more easily available during other corporate 
development stages.  While there are different stage models available in recent 
publications183, this study builds on the financing stages defined at Schefczyk (2000, p. 24). 
                                                 
179 On the value of patent rights see Reitzig (2002). 
180 Compare to Firn (2003) 
181 These rationalization efforts rather avoid future cash outflows than generate current cash inflows. 
182 Kaminski (1988) and Fischer, Barbara (2003) discuss this topic on a general level for medium size 
and start-up companies. 
183 An example of an alternative model can be found at Giesecke (2001, p. 89). 
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In general, the type of young biotech companies discussed in this study operates in a “Start-
up” phase conducting development activities and getting ready to introduce a product into the 
market.  Table 4.1 shows the different stages of corporate development and the different 
financing options most likely to be available during each stage. 
Available Means 
of Financing
• Take over by 




• Potential entry 
of institutional 
investors















Late StageExpansion StageEarly StageStages of 
Financing
Debt Financing









Table 4.1: Stages of corporate development and available sources of financing184 
One of the main findings of Schefczyk (2000) is the conclusion that companies operating in 
this “start-up” stage experience distrust and suspicion from investors as one of the main 
management issues.  As a result, the general number of available financing methods at that 
stage is reduced and an external financing gap can be observed.  This finding also holds true 
for the young biotech companies as shown in the following sections discussing the 
availability of the various financing methods in more detail.  At this point it is important to 
recall the fact that the majority of German young biotechnology companies are lagging 
behind their American counterparts in terms of corporate development and therefore different 
observations are made at certain points for the industries of these two countries. 
Going Public 
After the stock market boom of the 1990s it has become more difficult for the entire biotech 
industry to raise money through Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).  Figure 4.1 shows how the 
number of IPOs developed in Germany and the US since the last boom year 2000. 
                                                 
184 Adapted and expanded from Schefczyk (2000). 
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Figure 4.1: Biotech IPOs in the US and Germany (2000-2004)185 
In Germany the IPO market and the biotech bubble on the stock markets collapsed at the 
beginning of the new century.  There were still four IPOs in 2000 while there were only two 
placements in 2001 and not a single one during the following two years.  It took until July 
2004 for the next biotech company186 to place its shares in the German market.  For the US 
biotech industry the situation was similar during the years 2001 and 2002 with only a few 
biotech IPOs.  As opposed to Germany, the number of IPOs recovered from four to seven in 
2003 and in 2004, thirty companies placed their stock for the first time. 
The US is currently a more favorable market for IPO financing than Germany because US 
companies better meet the requirements for a successful IPO.  The first requirement is that 
companies should have a product out in the market or at least in the late stages of clinical 
trials.  The guideline for a minimum requirement is the successful completion of phase II 
clinical trials.187  From a size perspective, investors expect at least a market capitalization of 
US$200 million to consider a company being of sufficient size for a successful IPO.188 
These minimum requirements should be fulfilled because IPO investors have become more 
risk sensitive and require a discount to be compensated for the risk that early R&D activities 
might fail.  Hall (2002) already found that as R&D intensity increases, so does the cost of 
capital for the research conducting company.  Such a discount is also required by 
underwriting banks to ensure a successful market placement189.  Without this discount the 
                                                 
185 Sources: Ernst&Young (2004b), Ernst&Young (2004d), Burrill&Company (2005), and DAI 
Factbook 2004. 
186 Epigenomics AG 
187 According to Markus Mann / Union Investment, in DPA (2005). 
188 Comment by the COO/CFO of Atugen AG, Berlin in Ernst&Young (2003) 
189 On the issue of signaling through underpricing at IPOs refer to Allen and Faulhaber (1989). 
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willingness of underwriters to take over risky public placements is limited because of the fear 
of reputational damage in case of an unsuccessful placement.190  These discounts explain why 
multiple offerings in the US failed to meet their fund raising potential.191 
With the pipelines for biotech IPOs being filled in the US192 as well as in Germany193, this 
financing opportunity is still not available for many young biotech companies because of the 
requirements mentioned.  Since US biotech companies are on average more mature and have 
more products in later development stages, they are expected to attract investors faster than 
their German counterparts.  Although a study by Ernst&Young (2004b, p. 108) found that 52 
German biotech companies expect to go public within the next three years this strongly 
depends on the progress of ongoing research activities.  As for now, privately owned 
companies in Germany do not have a single approved product out in the market and most of 
their products are still in very early stages.  Here resides the problem of IPO financing in 
Germany.  With successful completion of phase II clinical trials being a mandatory 
requirement for a successful IPO and only 3 products of privately held companies in 
Germany currently passing phase III clinical trials194, this mode of financing will not be 
available in the very near future. 
Blättchen (1996) goes one step further by concluding that fund raising should not be the 
reason for an IPO at all.  The reason for this is that a company that needs money does not 
give a promising signal to investors.  In his opinion, companies only qualify for an IPO if 
they fulfill minimum requirements in terms of profit margins.195  Following his 
argumentation young biotech companies in urgent need of funds to finance R&D activities 
are not suited for an IPO because they rarely generate any profits from ongoing operations. 
Stakeholder Investments 
From a theoretical standpoint it is always possible for existing owners of a privately held 
company to provide additional funds to operate and grow the business, irrespective of the 
corporate development stage in which a company operates in.  This also applies to the biotech 
industry but it is accompanied by is a practical limitation.  Once a research conducting 
biotech company has started its drug development activities, the need for financial resources 
continuously increases to keep operations running.  Figure 2.5 shows the cost structure of a 
typical pharmaceutical development project from base research to market approval. 
                                                 
190 See also de Matos (2001, p. 160) 
191 Compare to Hennessey (2004) 
192 According to Hennessey (2004) 
193 According to Knop (2005) 
194 According to Ernst&Young (2004b) 
195 A minimum profit margin of 4% is quoted, which increases as company size decreases.  It can be 
up to 10% for very small companies. 
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With capital requirements significantly increasing during the stages of clinical trials II and 
III, chances that existing owners are able and willing to provide the funds needed to keep 
operations running decrease.  Recalling the fact that it can cost multiple hundred million 
dollars to bring a product innovation through the entire drug development process it becomes 
clear that the chances one or a few initial investors are willing to finance the entire venture 
with their own financial resources are reduced to a minimum.  Except for selected rare cases, 
additional stakeholder investments alone can therefore be considered insufficient in terms of 
financing power for the completion of an entire drug development project.  In return, the 
support of investors from outside the company can be considered mandatory. 
Venture Capital 
The availability of venture capital (VC)196 to the biotech industry differs between the 
countries in scope of this study.  While the US VC market is increasingly targeting the 
biotech sector again with its investments, the market remains on a moderate level in 
Germany.  In the US, the VC situation has already become favorable for biotech investments 
while Germany is still struggling.  In 2003 there were over 30% more VC funds flowing into 
biotech deals than the year before.  This figure reached its peak in 2004 when another 30% 
increase led to a total VC investment volume in the US of around €3.3 billion197.  Figure 4.2 
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Figure 4.2: VC Biotech research funding US and Germany (1998-2004 in € mil.)198 
                                                 
196 For a more detailed discussion on venture capital investments see Schween (1996), Weitnauer and 
Guth (2000), Stadler (2001) or Stadler (2004).  For a detailed description of the VC investment 
process refer to Giovannini (2004) and for regional differences between the venture capital markets in 
the US and Germany refer to Gaida (2002). 
197 US$3,733 million at an exchange rate of 0.88€/US$; Source: Burrill&Company (2005). 
198 Source: Ernst&Young (2005, p. 105) and Ernst&Young (2004d, p. 48) at an exchange rate of 0.88 
€/US$ 2004 from Burrill&Company (2005). 
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While recovery on the US market appears to be a relief for the companies in urgent need of 
funds, only a selected group of companies actually benefit from this development.  New 
engagements are selected carefully and tend to be closed with larger, more mature companies 
operating in later development stages.199  It is essential for investors that profits are generated 
in the foreseeable future because VC investors “are not there to save the world, they’re there 
to show an ROI200”201.  For smaller, early stage companies without a product near market 
introduction, the availability of VC funds remains critical. 
After the VC biotech investments dropped from 2000 to 2002, the German market did not 
recover significantly and remained at a level of €236 million in 2004.  Despite this 
development, venture capital is still the most important financing tool for German biotech 
companies202.  Three trends have evolved in Germany over recent years: 
1. The share of medium sized investments has decreased while the number of small and 
large deals has increased203.  This can be explained with investors becoming more 
risk-averse with their investment strategies.  Either low risk, large-scale investments 
are made in the few solid and promising deals or small investments are spread across 
multiple deals for diversification purposes. 
2. With regard to deals that were closed in 2003 and 2004, negotiating power was on 
investor’s side because of the urgent need for financial resources on the biotech side.  
If investments were made during this timeframe, then generally at a price discount for 
the venture capital investor204. 
3. The third trend, which is especially relevant for young biotech companies requiring 
early financing, is the trend towards later stage investments.  While 60% of all VC 
investment deals were related to early stage financing in 2001, this share decreased to 
47% in 2003205.  This development is similar to the one in the IPO market where 
investments are shifted towards companies that are involved in development stages 
close to market entry and therefore also close to revenue generation. 
                                                 
199 Compare to Knop (2004) 
200 ROI = Return on Investment 
201 Neil Ryan, founder and managing partner of Oxford Biosciences in Chiruvolu (2002). 
202 Around 40% of all German biotech companies use some kind of venture capital financing 
according to Ernst&Young (2004b, p. 49). 
203 Small < €5 mil.; medium €5 - €20 million; large > €20 million. 
204 As explicitly emphasized by Ernst&Young (2003, p. 81). 
205 If this trend is expressed in share of invested capital, the ratio becomes even less favorable for 
companies operating in early stages of the value chain.  Only 4% of the total investment volume in 
Germany was related to seed- and first-round financing.  This share was significantly higher in 2001 
when it reached 29% of the total investment volume.  Compare to Ernst&Young (2004b, p. 95). 
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These trends make it increasingly difficult for very young biotech companies in Germany to 
raise VC funds and they are potentially unattractive because of the risk discounts required. 
Besides the availability of VC investments, it is also important to state that VC investments 
are not always the financing method of choice for young biotech companies.  While VC 
investors typically target young, innovative companies with significant growth potential206 
there are some VC characteristics that make young biotech companies prefer other financing 
sources if available.  This is related to the wide range of individual rights generally granted to 
the VC investor through the investment contract.207  In extreme cases, the combination of 
such rights might lead to a complete loss of control over the company for the initial owners in 
situations where the company does not fulfill certain contractually fixed performance or 
progress expectations.208  In addition to these rights, the founders’ willingness to exit the 
company is, in certain cases, a requirement of VC investors209, which is often not in the 
interest of the initial owners. 
Debt Financing 
Raising funds through bank loans or issuing bonds can, in certain cases, represent an 
attractive financing tool because it has multiple positive characteristics compared to equity 
fund raising210.  Although it has some theoretical advantages there are four main reasons why 
common debt financing usually disqualifies as a financing method for young biotechnology 
companies: 
1. In general, debt financing contracts have a certain maturity date and therefore the 
financial resources are only available to the financing company for a limited time and 
have to be paid back at the end of the contract’s lifetime.  Since most young 
biotechnology companies are not certain when they will be able to generate revenues 
to fund their operations, the obligation to pay back debts might precede the time of 
revenue generation and force the company into liquidation. 
2. During the lifetime of the contract the financing company is obligated to make 
interest payments.  Since most young biotech companies do not generate sufficient 
revenues to cover interest payments, these obligations slowly but consistently hollow 
out their capital base, which in return reduces their operational flexibility. 
                                                 
206 On VC objectives see Klemm (1988) or Schuster (2003).  Some sources further distinguish 
between true venture capital firms that focus on young, innovative, high growth companies and a 
second form that mainly invest in more mature and established companies.  See Gerke (1972), 
Juncker and Schlegmilch (1976), Schefczyk (2000, p. 8) or Perridon and Steiner (2002, p. 365). 
207 Typical rights covered in VC contracts are cash flow allocation rights, board rights, voting rights, 
liquidation rights and other control rights.  On investors’ rights see Berrios (1999) for  more details. 
208 For a detailed study on Venture Capital contracts refer to Kaplan and Strömberg (2003). 
209 As explicitly emphasized by Ernst&Young (2003, p. 83). 
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3. It is an expensive type of financing because entities investing in young, research 
intensive companies expose themselves to a high degree of risk of loosing their 
investments.  As a compensation for the accepted risk they require a higher rate of 
return211 on their investment resulting in large interest obligations212 for the financing 
company that can finally lead to the biotech company’s inability to cover them. 
4. Since young biotech companies do not have a reputation in the credit market, lack any 
type of credit rating and have only limited securities to cover debt positions it is 
difficult for young biotech companies to find a partner willing to enter into a common 
debt agreement with them. 
These four points make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for young biotech companies 
in Germany as well as in the US to implement a financing strategy based on common debt. 
Public Grants 
Another form of financing that might be available to selected companies in certain industries 
are public grants.  Grants are funds provided by private, federal, state, or regional entities213 
that are usually tied to a specific purpose214.  General purposes215 can be the economic 
strengthening of geographic regions, the targeted support of key industries to encourage 
settlement by providing a favorable business environment, the direct support of selected 
development projects to ensure their completion or the support of industry cooperations216 
that might result in new key technologies or products.  Besides the true grant representing 
funds that support an activity and do not have to be paid back, funds can also come as interest 
free or interest reduced loans or in multiple other ways. 
Especially in the early days of the biotechnology industry, public grants played an important 
role in the financing strategies of young biotechnology companies.  With the increasing 
financial problems of public authorities a lot of public funding programs suffered from tighter 
budget control.  In 2002, a BPI (2002, p. 38) study found that 38% of the German biotech 
companies still used some type of public grants to finance their operations.  The study also 
                                                                                                                                                        
210 For example, profit leveraging tax effects or the general inability of debt investors to influence 
operations as opposed to equity investors. 
211 Uhrig-Homburg (2001, p. 42) shows that required interest rates with equal maturities decrease as 
the default risk of a fund raising company decreases. 
212 Compare to Hall (2002) 
213 For a discussion on regional support programs for the biotechnology industry in Germany refer to 
Reiß and Koschatzky (1997). 
214 For an overview on selected German public funding programs see Ernst&Young (2004b, p. 99). 
215 More specific purposes can be the requirement of sharing discoveries with other institutions 
Begley (2004), the integration of new equity investors Reiß and Koschatzky (1997, p. 110) or for 
the development of treatments against biological weapons Barbaro (2004). 
216 See Wolff et al. (1994) 
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revealed that this share is decreasing significantly.  Main reason being the mentioned 
decreasing availability of funds and the bureaucracy companies have to go through when 
applying for these grants. 
For an assessment of the ability to solve the financing problems of young biotech companies 
by using grants, one should consider the following figures.  From 2000 until 2003, €51 
million in public grants were awarded to German biotech companies.  Although in some 
selected cases, biotech companies could significantly benefit from these grants and raised up 
to €4 million217, public grants cannot solve the problems of the industry considering a short-
term estimated financing gap of around €800 million218 in Germany alone. 
Financing with Credit Substitutes 
The area of financing with credit substitutes includes the three fund raising methods 
Factoring219, Asset Backed Securities220 and Leasing221in its various forms. 
There are obvious and intuitively clear reasons why credit substitutes are not relevant when it 
comes to financing strategies for young biotechnology companies.  Young, research 
conducting companies without operative revenues do not accumulate accounts receivable 
positions and therefore do not qualify for Factoring or for issuing Asset Backed Securities. 
Regular leasing agreements on the other hand can only reduce the immediate need for 
financial resources by eliminating asset purchases but cannot generate funds that are available 
for daily operations.  Significant funds could only be raised through sale-and-lease-back 
agreements.  Since young biotech companies generally operate on a minimized asset base and 
have not accumulated excess assets during their short existence, this type of agreement is not 
a relevant fund raising strategy either. 
4.2 Availability of Industry Specific Financing Methods 
In addition to the traditional general financing methods discussed above, the biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical industry have additional ways of fund raising.  These industry specific 
types of financing include industry cooperations, product licensing and stock warrant off-
                                                 
217 Biofrontera Pharmaceuticals/Leverkusen 
218 According to Ernst&Young (2004b, p. 103) 
219 On Factoring see Bette (1997) or Schwarz, Werner (2002). 
220 On Asset Backed Securities see Dickler (1990), Ohl (1994), Eisenächer (1994) or Bartelt (1999). 
221 For details on Leasing agreements refer to Leasing specific literature like Mukherjee (1991), 
Kratzer and Kreuzmair (2002) or more general introductory finance textbooks such as Van Horne 
(1971), Copeland and Weston (1979), Brealey and Myers (2000), Ross et al. (2005).  For the critical 
conceptual differences between renting and leasing see Spittler (2002). 
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balance sheet research and development222.  The following section briefly describes223 and 
discusses these additional ways of financing. 
Cooperations 
One way of raising funds, which becomes especially attractive during times when other 
financing sources become unavailable are inter-company cooperations.  When entering into a 
cooperation, the research conducting biotechnology company decides to share its future 
revenues or profits with a strategic partner in return for financial support for its operations.  
Strategic partners have multiple ways to make these funds available.  The following provide 
some examples as to how payment agreements can be structured: 
• One-time upfront payment at the beginning of a cooperation. 
• Continuous partial absorption of research and development cost. 
• Milestone payments after successful completion of pre-defined project steps. 
• Payment of so-called “Fees for Services” for specific research activities. 
• Partial or entire absorption of marketing and distribution cost. 
Large pharmaceutical companies or larger biotechnology companies with more mature 
product portfolios and stable revenue steams are common partners of young biotech 
companies for inter-company cooperations. 
Large companies in the pharmaceutical industry and the companies of the biotech industry 
are currently mutually dependent on each other224 and therefore cooperations are of 
significant importance to both industries.  While large pharmaceutical companies need the 
innovation power of young biotech companies to achieve their corporate growth targets225, 
biotech companies need support to complete the product development process and establish 
the resulting products in the marketplace.  Cooperations represent the interface between the 
two industries allowing each of them to achieve their own individual objectives. 
While cooperations during the bull market in 1998-2000 usually took place in form of the 
small biotech companies being acquired by large pharmaceutical companies, this situation 
                                                 
222 Another tool often cited when financing is discussed in the context of the biotech industry are 
Private Investments in Public Equity or PIPEs.  Since this strategy requires a company to be present 
in the public market, PIPEs represent a form of secondary offering.  Since secondary offerings are 
not a form of early stage financing, they are not considered within the scope of this study. 
223 While traditional ways of financing are not described in the previous section, it appears reasonable 
to give a short description of the industry specific approaches as their functionality cannot be 
considered public knowledge. 
224 Except the few large biotech players like Amgen, Genentech, Genzyme, Chiron, Biogen Idec, etc. 
225 Growth rates already had to be reduced from 10% to 8.5% as a five year industry average 
according to Scodari (2004). 
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has changed.  Already in 2001, the number of direct acquisitions decreased and the number of 
technology, product and marketing cooperations increased significantly226. 
Although anticipated, a revival of mergers and acquisitions did not take place to the expected 
extent when the economic situation and stock markets turned more favorable in 2003.  The 
number of merger activities increased only slightly in the US and Germany.  Biotech and 
pharmaceutical companies clearly favored cooperations over direct mergers.  While biotech 
companies are most concerned about their independence, the reasoning behind this behavior 
is another one for large pharmaceutical companies.  They hesitate to acquire solely research 
conducting companies because they constantly burn cash and do not contribute to corporate 
profits.  With such an acquisition there would be a dilution in earnings and some 
pharmaceutical companies try to avoid such negative signals that could make the company 
look less attractive to potential investors in the marketplace. 
Instead of entering into more acquisition deals, pharmaceutical companies rather take on 
greater risk by pushing the qualification border for new cooperations down the value chain.227  
While large pharmaceutical companies were not interested in cooperating with biotech 
companies during early stages of the development process to a large extent in recent years, 
this situation changed in 2003 and 2004 as the industry is seeing an increasing number of 
early stage cooperations. 
As soon as research activities have reached a mid-stage level, cooperations with large 
pharmaceutical companies are and will remain one of the predominant tools for young 
biotech companies to resolve their financing problems.  This becomes increasingly true as 
development projects mature and the biotech companies’ negotiating position improves228. 
Cooperations between young biotech and medium-size pharmaceutical companies on the 
other hand are generally not pursued229 because these companies often operate on similar 
tight budgets230 as the average young company of the biotech industry. 
The trends described in cooperations develop to a large extent analogously in the US and in 
Germany.  The major difference is the stronger negotiating power of the average US biotech 
company resulting from its more advanced research portfolio and larger number of products 
being close to market introduction. 
                                                 
226 In Germany technology cooperations +96%, product cooperations +86% and marketing 
cooperations +73% from 2000 to 2001 according to Ernst&Young (2002, p. 32). 
227 In this environment acquisitions mostly take place under two conditions.  The first one being that 
the biotech target company owns promising experimental projects close to completion and the 
second one being that it is in urgent need of funds and therefore in a weak negotiating position 
unable to achieve some other type of funding.  In this context see Bowe and Dyer (2004). 
228 “For those with coveted products, deal terms are becoming more generous and lucrative than ever 
before” according Ernst&Young (2004c, p. 36). 
229 Except for very specific purposes in niche markets. 




Licensing231 represents a special but popular form of cooperations between companies of the 
biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry232.  The licenses used in such a cooperation 
“transfer the right of disposal of a newly developed technology from one company or R&D 
institution to another”233.  Under a licensing agreement the so-called licensor grants patent 
rights234, know-how and relevant data to a so-called licensee.  The licensee in return offers 
his expertise in product development, production, approval, marketing and distribution to 
bring a product to market.  The license is granted for a specific period of time235 during which 
the licensee is required to compensate236 the licensor for the use of its intellectual property 
rights.  Although no two licensing agreements are alike, the typical licensing deal in the 
biotechnology industry consists of three principle financing features237: 
• An upfront licensing fee. 
• Milestone payments depending on the achievement of defined project stages. 
• Royalties on the sales of the product. 
Since there is no established market for licenses, agreements are closed on a bilateral basis 
between licensor and licensee.  The final terms depend on the negotiation strength of the 
parties involved.  The terms also depend on the extent, to which rights are granted.  As 
opposed to a non-exclusive agreement, where multiple licensees can acquire rights to use 
intellectual property, rights can also be granted exclusively to one single partner, in which 
case a financial premium is required.  Another price determining factor is the type of right 
covered by a licensing agreement.  Generally they can be separated in three groups. 
1. Established products or technologies:  The licensee acquires the right to make use of a 
product or technology that has already been successfully introduced into the 
market.238  This is the least risky form of licensing but it also requires the highest fees. 
2. Products or technologies under development:  In this case the licensor does not 
complete the entire research and development process himself but grants the usage 
                                                                                                                                                        
230 Compare to BPI (2002, p. 39) 
231 For more details on licensing see Megantz (1996) or Henn (2003). 
232 But licensing is not limited to these industries.  It is also frequently used in the chemical, high-tech, 
and all other research intensive industries where intellectual property rights play a vital role. 
233 See Jungmittag et al. (2000, p. 77) 
234 Patents can be related to a product or a technology as emphasized by Ernst&Young (2002, p. 29). 
235 Usually but not necessarily until the time of patent expiration. 
236 On the valuation of licensing projects see Boer (1999, p. 264) or Hommel et al. (2001, p. 79). 
237 The three components of a typical agreement can also be used individually or in any combination. 
238 It is often used to regionally expand availability of a product or technology to regions where the 
initial owner is not present. 
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rights on an unfinished invention to the licensee.239  Since the licensee takes over part 
of the development risk, this type requires smaller fees than the first case described 
above.  This type represents the most common type of licensing in the biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical industry. 
3. Mere patent right:  In cases where an initial inventor possesses even less development 
know-how, market expertise and financial resources he might choose to sell rights on 
a simple patent without a specific product related to it.  In this scenario achievable 
fees are further reduced because the entire development risk is transferred to the 
licensee.  On the other hand the inventor might be able to sell multiple pseudo-
exclusive rights to licensees within non-competing industries.240 
Licensing agreements offer large biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies the 
opportunity to expand their product portfolios and achieve the growth rates required by the 
market.  At the same time it allows them to avoid the risky as well as time- and resource- 
consuming process of base development.241  On the other hand licensing offers an 
opportunity for the large number of small biotechnology companies to benefit to a maximum 
extent from their product or technology innovations without the necessity to build up their 
own production, marketing and distribution capabilities. 
As a specific type of cooperation, licensing agreements follow a similar trend as cooperations 
in general.  Large pharmaceutical players are also rather interested in mature product deals 
that allow them to license-in products from late stages of the value chain with a higher 
potential to become revenue generators.242  This situation is changing as well because 
competition between licensing companies for promising products intensifies.  The increasing 
competition leads to a rapidly decreasing number of mature candidates available for licensing 
deals forcing pharmaceutical companies to move further down the value chain in the search 
for licensing candidates.  A study by BCG (2004a) revealed that approximately 20% of all 
biotech compounds being in phase I to III of clinical trials were available for licensing in 
2004.  With the trend towards licensing continuing to increase at a rate of 10% a year, the 
                                                 
239 Generally this type of licensing deal is closed if the licensor does not have the required 
infrastructure, know-how or financial resources to complete the development process himself. 
240 Boer (1999, p. 266) describes the hypothetical case of the discovery of a new molecule that might 
serve as a pharmaceutical compound, a pesticide or a food additive.  The inventor now has the 
possibility to license this molecule out to companies from each industry with an exclusive usage 
right for their individual industry. 
241 Biotech companies are also in-licensing products from pharmaceutical companies or other biotech 
companies.  This is usually done to bring projects into the company that have been introduced into 
the market or are close to market introduction to make the company make look more attractive to 
investors and potential partners.  From a financing perspective, the situation of in-licensing by 
pharmaceutical company and out-licensing by biotech is the most important one. 
242 Compare to Ernst&Young (2003) 
4. Corporate Financing of Young Biotech/Pharma Companies 
 
71
pool of compounds available for licensing from biotech companies is expected to be entirely 
dried out by the year 2010. 
For young biotech companies with development projects being in the stage of pre-clinical 
trials the licensing market is currently not a significant source of financing but this might 
change as the market becomes more competitive and licensors are forced to move down the 
value chain in the search for new products.  This clearly shows how important licensing 
agreements are for both industries but it also shows that the market will become increasingly 
competitive within the next few years. 
Stock Warrant Off-Balance Sheet Research and Development (SWORD) 
Another form of financing, which is specific to all types of research intensive industries, is 
known as stock warrant off-balance sheet research and development or SWORD.  The 
concept was first used by biotechnology companies in 1988243 and for the first time 
scientifically investigated as a financing tool by Solt (1993).244 
When using SWORD as a financing tool a Resource Requiring Company (RRC) sets up a 
new entity, a so-called Research and Development Limited Partnership (RDLP), which is 
theoretically independent and maintains its own, separate balance sheet.  In a Technology 
License Agreement (TLA) this RDLP receives the unlimited, exclusive and royalty-free 
rights on a product or technology currently under development.  While the RDLP owns all 
rights on the new product or technology, the development process is still pursued by the RRC 
itself.  As a compensation for incurred research and development expenses, the RDLP 
regularly transfers funds to the RRC as defined in a development contract. 
Since the RDLP is not a fully operating company but rather a financial intermediary unable to 
physically use the product or technology rights it owns, an additional License Option 
Agreement (LOA) is closed.  Under this LOA the RRC has the opportunity to use the rights 
owned by the RDLP under predefined conditions.  Potential conditions would be lump sum 
payments or continuous royalty payments. 
The RDLP on the other hand closes financing agreements with external parties to raise funds 
to pay for ongoing research activities conducted by the RRC.  Under this agreement common 
stock of the RDLP is sold to outside investors.  The shares sold are callable by the RRC, 
which means they can be bought back at predefined conditions to avoid that competitors or 
unwanted third parties can acquire stock of the RDLP.  Together with each share the 
investors receive an option that grants the right to purchase stock of the RRC.  This option 
serves as a protection for the investor by giving him indirect access to cash flows generated 
by the RRC that are not related to the project controlled by the RDLP.  This form of 
                                                 
243 Early SWORD announcements included ALZA founding the company Bio-Electro Systems, 
Centocor founding Tocor, Immunex founding Receptech, and Genzyme founding Neozyme. 
244 An additional study dealing with off-balance sheet financing by using research and development 
limited partnerships was conducted by Carment et al. (2001). 
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protection becomes necessary because the management of the RRC has more information 
about the R&D project than outside investors do.  This situation may potentially result in an 
adverse selection245 problem where the RRC could move the least promising projects off its 
balance sheet into RDLPs246.  The added option on the stock of the RRC therefore represents 
a signal to investors about the value of the R&D project that cannot entirely eliminate the risk 
of adverse selection but can reduce its negative impact on the investor. 
It is important to state that these two option rights are independent from each other.  Even if 
the RRC exercises its right to buy back stock of the RDLP, investors can still benefit from the 
innovation by exercising their right to acquire shares of the RRC.  Table 4.2 shows the 
ownership structure and the duties related to a SWORD after closing all contracts247. 
 RRC RDLP Investor 
Owner of … • Option to acquire 
license from RDLP 
and bring new 
product/ development 
to market 
• Unrestricted rights on 
new product/ 
development 
• Funds to finance R&D 
• Common stock of 
RDLP (callable by 
RRC) 
• Call Option on 
common stock of RRC
Duties • Conduct R&D on new 
product/ development 
• Provide admin. 
services to RDLP 
• Manage funds 
• Compensate RRC for 
R&D activities 
• Transfer funds to 
RDLP for stock and 
option rights 
Table 4.2: Rights and duties of parties involved in a SWORD financing deal 
Using a SWORD as a project financing tool has several advantages for the fund raising 
company.  The most important one being that all funds come from equity not requiring any 
interest payments from the RRC during the course of the project.248  In addition there is an 
increase in transparency of corporate reporting because funds related to a specific project are 
reported on an individual balance sheet and are not mixed with other corporate assets on the 
RRC’s main balance sheet.  Especially if a company has multiple other activities ongoing this 
gives potential creditors a clearer view of the economic situation.  Another advantage is the 
                                                 
245 An introduction into the research field of adverse selection with an overview of the academic 
literature can be found at Wohlschieß (1996). 
246 On the related issue of selling corporate stakes under asymmetrical information refer to the work of 
Akerlof (1970) on the so-called “lemon” problem. 
247 In addition to the four contracts mentioned above (Technology License Agreement, Development 
Contract, License Option Agreement, and Financing Agreements) there is an additional Service 
Agreement between the new organization and the biotech company.  This statement regulates the 
provision of administrative services that allow the new organization to remain a pro forma company 
without its own employees and administrative overhead. 
248 Debt financing would require significant interest payments due to the risk involved in drug 
development.  Since the only asset of the new organization is intangible by nature there would not 
be any security for potential debt creditors, which would result in a risk premium.  Considering the 
long development times there would be a high-risk of corporate default irrespective of the projects 
outcome, due to ongoing interest payments without corresponding cash inflows. 
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distribution of project risk because the shares of the RDLP can be sold to multiple investors 
who are able to diversify the related risk within their own investment portfolios. 
The favorable characteristics come at a cost for the RRC because the option of the investor to 
call shares of the company causes dilution for existing shareholders if exercised.249  In 
addition to the effect that exercising these options dilutes future profits for existing 
shareholders, it can also introduce new owners into the company trying to influence the 
future corporate strategy.  Solt (1993) shows evidence that the influence of these new owners 
can become of significant magnitude250.  Especially in young, dynamic companies this is not 
always a desirable development. 
In his study Solt (1993) also shows that SWORDs are not the result of adverse selection 
effects from the RRC trying to move unpromising projects off its balance sheet251 and 
Carment et al. (2001) support this view in an additional study252.  The findings of Solt (1993) 
and Carment et al. (2001) indicate that SWORD offerings are a viable financing alternative 
for research intensive companies, such as companies from the biotech industry.  They 
emphasize that this is especially true for smaller companies253. 
In the absence of recent market figures on number and size of initiated SWORD deals, no 
valid conclusions can be drawn about the practical relevance of this type of financing for 
young biotech companies.  While the concept appears attractive at the first glance it has 
drawbacks beyond the potential adverse selection problem related to it.  Investors in a 
SWORD deal are generally financial investors and the construction of a SWORD deal does 
not consider the other need of young biotech companies for support in bringing their products 
to market.  A SWORD deal might provide the funds necessary to carry a project through the 
R&D process but it does not provide additional support.  This support can be essential for 
young biotech companies when it comes to large-scale production, marketing strategies or 
setting up a global distribution network.  This type of support cannot be provided if a 
multitude of investors acquire shares in an RDLP.  Licensing deals or any other form of 
direct cooperation can be considered the more appropriate way of financing for young 
biotech companies because it ties a partner more closely to the operations of a company.  
                                                 
249 In the sample Solt (1993) uses for his study, this potential dilution effect ranges from 9.7% to 
29.4% if all options are exercised. 
250 Considering the maximum dilution effect of 29.4% from his study. 
251 Solt does so by evaluating stock price behavior around the announcement of a SWORD deal.  
Decreasing stock prices after the announcement of a SWORD deal indicate that either project 
prospects are not satisfying or that SWORDs are not a viable financing tool.  On the other hand, an 
increasing stock price would indicate that generally promising projects are selected for SWORD 
deals and it is positively valued that they are offered.  The analysis could not support the existence 
of adverse selection and showed a general positive market reaction after SWORD offerings. 
252 Carment et al. (2001) confirm a positive market reaction for companies sponsoring a RDLP. 
253 „RDLP financing is a more significant source of financing for smaller firms […]”, Carment et al. 
(2001, p. 168) 
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Another negative factor is the complexity of a SWORD deal from a legal and from a 
valuation standpoint, which potentially reduces the attractiveness of the concept. 
4.3 Consequences of Lacking Financing Power 
Besides the fact that a lack of financial resources in the industry leads to a decreasing number 
of independent companies254, there are other trends arising from a lack of financing power: 
Out-licensing: While the predominant strategy within the industry is the full product 
approach, multiple companies have to discontinue their research activities and license out or 
sell their products before they enter expensive clinical trials II and III.  Only 13% of the 
German biotech companies255 expect that they will be able to carry a product all the way 
through clinical trials.  This lack of financial resources to complete the product development 
process is one of the reasons for the increasing out-licensing trend in the industry. 
Services: Companies are forced to either move away from product development or at least 
have to include service operations to generate cash flows.  This does not mean they are 
abandoning product development as their strategic focus but they have to include activities to 
stretch their financial cushion.  This can have a negative impact on the products currently 
under development.  Additional operations tie up resources and therefore other projects might 
be delayed, resulting in a reduction of effective patent protection period and the loss of a 
potential first mover advantage. 
Corporate takeovers: In the absence of outside partners willing to finance their operations, 
owners of companies with promising prospects might be forced to sell the operation to avoid 
bankruptcy, sometimes below estimated fair market value.  This trend can be documented 
with the increasing number of foreign investors buying companies in critical situations.  
Sometimes companies are even bought that have already filed for bankruptcy256.257 
Cooperations: The last trend is the increasing number of various forms of cooperations.  
Handelsblatt (2003a) concludes that the lack of financial resources forces biotech companies 
at a certain point to enter a cooperation because otherwise operations have to be discontinued.  
These cooperations allow companies in critical conditions to continue operating but also 
deprive them from their future benefits, which have to be shared with the new partners. 
This development does not only have an impact on every single company affected but also on 
the entire industry where a trend towards consolidation is expected to occur.  For Germany it 
                                                 
254 As a result of mergers, acquisitions or bankruptcies.  For Germany, Ernst&Young (2005, p. 11) 
show that five times as many biotech companies filed for bankruptcy in 2004 than in 2001. 
255 According to Ernst&Young (2004c, p. 54) 
256 With Abeta, bioLeads and Memorec Stoffel, three cases have been reported in 2003. 
257 This trend not only holds true for companies that are close to bankruptcy.  The existing or even the 
expected lack of financial resources generally causes an increasing number of biotech companies to 
be acquired by large pharmaceutical companies as shown in Hofmann (2005b). 
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is expected that the biotech industry will enter a stage of severe consolidation significantly 
reducing the number of independent companies258.  A similar prediction was made for the US 
several years ago but in fact, it never took place on the predicted scale. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Although there are many different methods of corporate financing, not all of them are 
available to young biotech companies.  While internal financing, common debt and credit 
substitutes are not an option because of lacking revenues and securities for investors, the 
situation is different for other financing methods.  Fund raising through public grants or 
additional investments of existing owners exist but are limited in terms of scale and are only 
in rare cases sufficient as a stand-alone source of financing.  IPOs and VC investments, the 
sources of abundant financial resources as little as five years ago, have become more difficult 
to be opened up because of increasing investors’ selectivity and risk aversion.  While US 
biotech companies are in a better position in this financing area with their further advanced 
product development pipelines, German companies are often left with industry specific 
financing strategies, such as cooperations and licensing agreements. 
When pursuing an integrated product approach, young biotech companies face a dilemma.  
On the one hand, VC and IPO investors as well as potential licensing partners expect them to 
have products in late development stages in order to provide funds.  On the other hand, these 
funds are, as a result of the absence of stable revenue streams and the increasing cost during 
the R&D process, often a necessary prerequisite to reach these later stages.  This reveals that 
especially those companies are likely to find themselves in a critical situation that operate at 
the end of their initial seed capital without having reached at least phase II clinical studies. 
These companies are in urgent need of innovative financing strategies to overcome this 
potential financing gap.  Such a strategy ideally allows them to pursue their R&D activities to 
final drug approval or at least until they become more attractive for outside investors.  Since 
the funds are available on the investors’ side259 but are often not made available to young 
companies, the objective is more to find a way to adjust the investment risk structure for 
potential investors so that funds are made available earlier during the drug development 
process.  The following sections investigate if selling option rights on ongoing drug 
development projects can serve as a tool to close this potential financing gap for young 
biotech companies. 
                                                 
258 Compare to Frankfurter Rundschau (2003) 
259 “There is plenty of money for companies with products near to market”, Ernst&Young (2004c). 
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PART II:  Concept & Scientific Context 
5 Concept of Writing Options on Ongoing R&D Projects 
To obtain a judgment as to whether writing options on ongoing R&D projects for financing 
purposes represents a practically applicable concept it is qualitatively and quantitatively 
investigated.  The qualitative investigation in this chapter describes the various risk factors 
associated with the R&D process of a new drug and the structure of the option financing 
concept itself.  The chapter is concluded by a description of the advantages and disadvantages 
such a concept has for the buyer and the seller of the option.  The quantitative analysis is 
conducted in subsequent chapters of this study. 
5.1 Risk Factors in Drug Development 
During the process of drug development a company is exposed to five main sources of 
uncertainty affecting the prospects of a project.  These five areas of risk are the technical risk 
of project failure, the uncertainty about the point of market entry, the unknown lifetime of a 
product, the risk related to the economic environment and the potential risk arising from 

















Figure 5.1: Five main areas of risk in drug development 
5.1.1 Technical Risk 
The technical risk involved in the drug development process represents the risk that an 
ongoing project fails before the final regulatory approval process is completed and a product 
can be introduced into the market.  It also includes the risk that approval is not granted by 
regulatory authorities during the final review process.  Multiple reasons can be responsible 
                                                 
260 Boer (2002, 231) defines legal risk as another risk factor for the pharmaceutical industry.  This risk 
factor is predominantly relevant for the US market but not considered within the classification of 
this study. 
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for this type of project failure.261  A drug candidate can fail because severe side effects are 
discovered during the required testing activities making it unsafe for human use.  In addition 
to the potential health hazard, it is also possible that an initially promising candidate fails to 
demonstrate its effectiveness during clinical trials or its risk-benefit profile is not promising 
enough to justify further development. 
Various studies have been conducted investigating the probability of technical failure in drug 
development, all with similar results.  Table 5.1 shows the probability that a drug candidate 
fails to reach the point of final drug approval when entering the indicated process stages.  The 
chance that a product, which enters the stage of pre-clinical trials fails before final regulatory 
approval is therefore between 89.7% and 91.7%.  After this point the risk of technical failure 
decreases as research activities continue.  When the drug sponsor finally applies for 
regulatory approval at the end of the development process, there is still a remaining risk of 
about 9% that the drug candidate fails to meet all necessary requirements to get approved. 
 CMR International262 VFA263 Bain & Company264 
Pre-clinical Test 89.7% 91.7% 91.7% 
Clinical Phase I 81.6% 79.2% 75.0% 
Clinical Phase II 71.9% 70.6% 63.0% 
Clinical Phase III 34.2% 44.4% 28.6% 
Approval Process 9.4% 9.1% 9.1% 
Table 5.1: Expected failure risk entering different stages of drug development 
5.1.2 Uncertain Market Entry Timing 
In cases where a product does not fail from a technical perspective at some time during the 
R&D process there is still uncertainty about when the process will be completed and the new 
drug can be launched on the market.  As shown in chapter 2.1, a new product has to go 
through five distinct phases of the pharmaceutical value chain after it has been patent 
protected and before it can be introduced to the market.  These five stages of the 
pharmaceutical value chain do not have a predefined duration but can vary in length 
depending on a multitude of different factors.265  The duration of the process stages is 
stochastic by nature and therefore the final date of market introduction is also a stochastic 
variable and can only be described “ex post”.  In addition the entire process can be delayed 
through additional requirements imposed onto the drug developing company by regulatory 
authorities before final approval is granted. 
                                                 
261 Villinger and Bogdan (2005) discuss the different reasons for project failure and investigate their 
relevance for pharmaceutical drug development valuation. 
262 Source: PAREXEL (2003, p. 184) 
263 Source: FDA (2004, p. 5) 
264 Source: PAREXEL (2003, p. 170) 
265 For detailed studies on drug development speed see PAREXEL (2003, p. 170) where multiple 
studies on various aspects of drug development times are summarized. 
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The uncertainty related to market entry timing is of high importance to all drug developing 
companies because it has a significant impact on the value of a drug development project.  
This is caused by the relatively early point of patent protection in the value chain and the 
direct link between market entry timing and effective patent protection period.  This 
relationship is described in more detail in the following section on uncertain product lifetime.  
Table 2.1 shows the results of various studies regarding the duration of the different stages in 
the pharmaceutical value chain. 
5.1.3 Uncertain Product Lifetime 
As shown in the previous section, the point of final drug approval is related to uncertainty.  In 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry this uncertainty has a direct impact on the 
lifetime of a product.  This is related to patent protection issues and the rapid capturing of 
market share by generic drug companies as soon as the status of patent protection expires.266 
In the US and Germany, patent protection on new drugs is granted for a period of 20 years.  
The application for patent protection status is generally filed around the time a product enters 
pre-clinical trials.  Therefore the 20-year protection period can be divided into two separate 
periods.  The first period is represented by the time between when a company files for patent 
protection and the time of market introduction.  The second period is represented by the time 
following market introduction until the patent expires after its 20-year protection period.  
Since a company is only able to generate revenues during the second time period it is also 
referred to as the “effective” patent protection period.  Lanjouw (1998, p. 695) shows in his 
study that patent protection status is extremely valuable in the pharmaceutical industry if a 
product turns out to be successful and reaches the second time period where actual product 
sales take place.267  Figure 5.2 shows the relationship between the general patent protection 
period and the effective patent protection time. 
Application for 
Patent Protection Market Introduction Patent Expiration
Total Patent Protection Period




Figure 5.2: Effective patent protection period timeline 
                                                 
266 A very comprehensive work about the value of patent rights can be found at Reitzig (2002). 
267 This situation is different in other industries.  In the computer industry for example over half the 
patents become worthless within ten years of their application according to Lanjouw (1998, p. 672). 
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A distinction between the regular and effective patent protection period is essential because it 
is only the effective patent protection period companies have available to generate revenues 
necessary to cover their research and development cost and generate a sufficient return for 
their investors.268  BPI (2003b, p. 15) states that it is not unusual for pharmaceutical 
companies to operate with an effective patent protection period of less than ten years.  Based 
on the standardized R&D process of Table 2.1, the average effective patent protection period 
is as low as nine years.  In the US as well as in Germany there is a possibility to further 
extend patent protection by applying for a so-called Supplementary Protection Certificate 
(SPC).  In the US the SPC can extend the effective patent protection period to a maximum of 
14 years269 while it can extend it to 15 years270 in Germany271. 
The main reason making effective patent protection such an important issue for drug 
developing companies is the increasing market pressure from generic drug manufacturers272.  
In some cases big pharmaceutical companies are trying to delay the market entry of generic 
competition with complex and costly lawsuits to extend their effective patent protection 
period but only with limited success.273  This opportunity to use legal actions to extend the 
effective patent protection period of a product is not considered in this study.  The comments 
in this section show that there is a direct relationship between market entry timing and the 
effective patent protection period of a new drug and therefore this relationship will be 
modeled in the quantitative analysis later on in this study. 
5.1.4 General Market Uncertainty 
The fourth type of uncertainty related to a new drug development can be labeled market 
uncertainty and can be split into two dimensions.  The first dimension is the uncertainty 
related to the environment companies operate in.  The second one can be described as the 
general uncertainty about the future market potential of a new drug in terms of volumes, 
prices and cost.  The environmental risk is mostly determined by laws and governmental 
restrictions that affect the entire industry.  Exemplary factors are safety regulations for 
dealing with biologically active agents, tax treatment of R&D cost, general tax laws, 
                                                 
268 On effective patent protection times and the benefits of speeding up the drug development process 
see DiMasi (2002). 
269 More details on potential patent protection extensions and the effect of the Wayman-Hatch Act in 
the US can be found at Grabowski and Vernon (2000b). 
270 The duration of the SPC may thereby not exceed a term of five years Screen and Jones (2002, p. 5). 
271 Grabowski and Vernon (2000b, p. 109) found in a study of 126 drugs introduced between 1990-
1995 that on average an extension of the patent protection period of three years has been granted. 
272 As an example, Baumann and Salz (2002, p. 74) state that every single day of additional effective 
patent protection period for Prilosec® represents a profit of ~US$7 million for its manufacturer 
AstraZeneca. 
273 See also Baumann and Salz (2002), Handelsblatt (2002b), Handelsblatt (2002c), Sleegers (2005) or 
Hofmann (2005a). 
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availability of public grants, the educational system to ensure availability of skilled research 
personnel and multiple other factors. 
Although new drug developments have in certain cases a quasi-monopolistic position that 
allows for maximum pricing flexibility and high profits, there are certain risk factors with a 
potentially negative impact on the profitability of a company.  The most relevant market 
forces in this context are price control mechanisms imposed by public authorities.  In addition 
there is also a certain degree of uncertainty related to sales volumes and the ability of a 
company’s sales force to penetrate the market with an innovative product.  Market 
uncertainty can be summarized as the inability of a company to precisely predict profit 
generation with its drug innovations.  Grabowski and Vernon (2000a, p. 31) state that “even 
very large firms with sizeable portfolios of R&D projects are subject to substantial volatility 
in the sales performance of their new drug introductions” and are therefore exposed to market 
uncertainty. 
5.1.5 Competition 
In addition, there is uncertainty related to the fact that patents can only protect a company 
against direct competition.  A patent does grant the owner the right to exclusively market and 
sell a specific drug but it does not grant the right to exclusively serve a specific market.  In 
reality a company can have a patent on a drug to treat a specific disease but at the same time 
it can face competition from substitute products targeting the same medical indication despite 
an existing patent protection status. 
This can best be illustrated using a real life example.  When Pfizer was granted approval for 
its innovative drug Viagra®, it received the right to exclusively produce and sell a product, 
which consists of a certain chemical compound and treats erectile dysfunctions.  At the same 
time this patent did not give Pfizer the exclusive right to treat the indication of erectile 
dysfunctions.  Since this proved to be an attractive market it did not take long until 
GlaxoSmithKline entered this market with the competing product Levitra® and Eli Lilly with 
its product Cialis®.  These products treat the condition in a different way and are based on 
different chemical substances therefore they did not violate Pfizer’s Viagra® patents.  
Although these products are not directly violating Pfizer’s patent rights they do compete in 
the same therapeutic area.  If the patent for Viagra® was exclusive for the therapeutic area, no 
other company could enter this market.  Since this is not the case and patents do not grant 
exclusivity within a therapeutic area there is always the risk that competitors will enter the 
market and seize market shares from the initial innovator. 
5.2 Classification of Risk Categories 
For the purpose of this study it is important to determine which risk factors in drug 
development are relevant for the valuation of a research project as the underlying asset of a 
R&D option.  In general, real life investors can be considered being risk-averse according to 
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Brigham et al. (1999, p. 168) and therefore they require a compensation for the risk they 
expose themselves to.  In contrast to this opinion Loch and Bode-Greuel (2001) assume that 
large diversified companies are risk-neutral when making an individual investment274.  
Although their work directly targets the drug developing industry their point of view is 
rejected for the purpose of this study.  Considering large pharmaceutical companies as risk-
neutral implies that there is no risk these companies expect compensation for, which is not a 
realistic assumption in a real life setting.  Although these companies can be considered as 
being well diversified within their industry there is still a valuation relevant risk these 
companies are exposed to as described in the following paragraphs. 
To which extent investors require additional compensation depends on their individual 
willingness to tolerate risk and the extent to which they can eliminate some risks through 
diversification over multiple investments.  Considering the opportunity to reduce some risk 
through diversification reveals that not all risk categories are relevant for every investor to the 
same extent and excessive adjustments can lead to inappropriate estimates regarding the 
financing potential of a R&D option275.  To determine valuation relevant risk factors they are 
classified into two main categories frequently used in quantitative analysis.  Following 
Brealey and Myers (2000) risk factors can be divided into market risk factors and unique risk 
factors.  They define unique or private risk276 as a risk that can be diversified and market or 
shared risk277 as a risk that is not diversifiable.  The key difference between these two types 
of risk is the way they are considered in quantitative analysis.  In situations where market 
participants have the opportunity to diversify unique risk it has an assigned value of zero and 
investors do not require a premium for being exposed to it.  Since market or shared risk on 
the other hand cannot be diversified, all market participants are exposed to it and always 
require an appropriate compensation. 
Hommel et al. (2001, p. 263) consider the risk related to regulatory and political uncertainty 
as market risk all industry players are exposed to and therefore it cannot be diversified.  Even 
very large companies holding extensive research portfolios are exposed to this type of risk.  
Since this risk cannot be avoided, every market player expects to be compensated for it.  
Specific incidents that fall into this risk category are changes in tax laws affecting the 
treatment of R&D expenses, mandatory drug rebates for health care organizations or the 
introduction of a general drug sales tax on all products. 
                                                 
274 “A large company […] is typically risk-neutral, as the projects under discussion are small relative 
to the company’s business” Loch and Bode-Greuel (2001). 
275 This is confirmed by Hodder and Riggs (1985, p. 135) who investigate the value of research 
projects itself and conclude that “key is that these risks are likely to be highly diversifiable.  Failure 
to recognize this fact represents a systematic bias against R&D projects”. 
276 Sometimes also referred to as diversifiable, company-specific or unsystematic risk according to 
Brigham et al. (1999, p. 178). 
277 Sometimes also referred to as nondiversifiable, systematic or beta risk according to Brigham et al. 
(1999, p. 178). 
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As opposed to this general market risk, all other introduced sources of risk in drug 
development can be considered private by nature and specific to an individual project.  The 
first risk to be mentioned in this category is the risk of potential project failure before the 
drug development process is completed.  This technical risk is only related to the individual 
project itself and is independent from the technical risk of other projects.  With this in mind it 
can be considered a private and therefore a diversifiable risk factor. 
The same holds true for the risk of substitute products entering the target market of a drug 
under development.  If the situation occurs that a competitor enters the target market of a 
drug under development with a substitute product it only affects this one individual project of 
a research conducting company.  All other projects where products for other indications and 
therefore for other target markets are developed are not affected by this market entry.  This 
demonstrates that the risk of competition of substitute products represents a private risk factor 
that can be reduced by building large research portfolios. 
In his study, Boer (2002, p. 215) qualitatively investigates pharmaceutical research projects 
as real options and confirms that technical failure risk and the risk of competitive products 
entering the market represent private risk factors, which can be diversified over multiple 
research projects.  This point of view can be shared if one follows the definition for private 
risk given at Brigham et al. (1999, p. 178).  They consider all events as private by nature that 
“are unique to a particular firm”, which is the case for the potential technical failure of a drug 
project and also for the potential entry of competitors threatening the economic success of an 
individual project. 
Private risk in drug development is not limited to failure risk and the risk of competitive 
products.  The uncertainty related to the unknown duration of a drug development project and 
therefore the related uncertain product lifetime also fall into this category.  How long it takes 
to complete the R&D process of a new drug is specific to an individual project and therefore 
the risk related to a potential delay falls under the definition of a private risk factor.  With the 
lifetime of a product being directly related to the day of final drug approval the uncertainty in 
a product’s lifetime also represents private risk.  Reason for this is the direct relation between 
final drug approval and effective patent protection period representing the lifetime of a 
product278.  Knowing that the uncertainty related to the date of final drug approval represents 
private and diversifiable risk it can be concluded that the risk related to an unknown effective 
patent protection period also represents private risk. 
Figure 5.3 visualizes the classification of the various risk factors involved in drug 
development. 
                                                 
278 Under the assumption that generic competition takes over the entire market immediately at the 
point of patent expiration. 
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Figure 5.3: Classification of five main risk dimensions in drug development 
All risk-averse investors expect a compensation for the exposure to market risk because 
irrespective of size and composition of their research portfolios of different drug development 
projects it cannot be diversified279.  For this reason an appropriate valuation approach 
considers an expected return equivalent to the risk-free rate of return plus a premium 
compensating investors for the non-diversifiable risk of general market uncertainty.  This 
explicit consideration of a market risk premium applies to every investor who operates within 
the drug development industry.  The consideration of private risk factors in a valuation model 
is different from the risk category of market risk because they do not apply to all investors to 
the same extent. 
For the remaining private risk factors not all investors require an additional premium because 
of their different possibilities to diversify risk.  A fully diversified investor280 with a large 
research and development portfolio consisting of a wide variety of different drug 
development projects does not require an additional premium for the exposure to private risk 
factors.  The situation is different for smaller, less diversified companies that are exposed to 
different levels of private risk.  These companies expect a risk premium equivalent to the 
amount of private risk they are not able to diversify within their research portfolios. 
Amram and Kulatilaka (1999, p. 56) confirm this view and state that in cases where not all 
private risk is diversified, it has to be included explicitly in quantitative valuation approaches.  
As opposed to market risk where factors for an appropriate risk premium can be inferred 
                                                 
279 Diversification effects could be observed if a drug developing company started research activities 
in other industries but within this study, such theoretical opportunity is not investigated.  Maximum 
diversification in the context of this study is defined as total diversification within the industry but 
not within the entire economy. 
280 Fully diversified in this context refers to being fully diversified within the industry and not across 
the entire economy. 
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from public data, the consideration of private risk has to be based on personal experience and 
historical observations.  A natural consequence of this lack of public data sources is the 
higher subjectivity related to the valuation of private risk compared to the valuation of market 
risk. 
5.3 Concept of Corporate Financing using R&D Options 
Chapter 4 describes the problems young biotech companies experience when attempting to 
raise funds through traditional ways of financing.  The main reasons for these financing 
problems are their lack of stable cash flows and that their most valuable assets are intangible 
by nature.  These intangible assets do have a value to the research conducting company281 
therefore an alternative way of financing could be the attempt to transform these intangible 
assets into cash flows.  Since selling these assets is generally not a desired alternative, a 
different approach to unlock the value of these intangible assets for financing purposes could 
be by selling option rights on the outcome of the related R&D projects.  This chapter 
describes how such a concept could be structured, which assumptions are made and describes 
the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of its implementation from the perspective of 
the company selling the option as well as from the perspective of a potential buyer. 
5.3.1 Description of R&D Option Financing Approach 
The approach of selling a R&D option is conceptually similar to selling a basic financial call 
option.  The difference between these two types of options is their underlying asset.  While a 
basic financial call option is written on stocks or other financial instruments, the R&D option 
is written on a drug development project with its potential outcome being the underlying 
asset.  Since the compounds investigated in the drug development process are generally 
patent protected after the base research phase, these patents and all related rights represent the 
potential underlying asset of a R&D option for the purpose of this discussion. 
In the R&D option deal, a research conducting company grants another company or investor 
at time t1 the right to acquire the unlimited, exclusive and royalty-free rights on a product 
under development at time t2 for a predetermined price X.  In return, the investor purchasing 
the option pays an amount C to the selling company as the option premium at time t1.  At t2, 
the buyer of the R&D option has the right to take over the results of the research project 
including all potential future cash flows resulting from it.  If the buyer exercises this right, the 
research conducting company receives the amount X in exchange for the research project.  
Figure 5.4 summarizes the main characteristics of such a R&D option deal. 
                                                 
281 Compare to Kester (1984, p. 160) 






• Pays amount C
• Receives the right to take over results 
from research project at time t2
Research Conducting Company (RCC):
• Receives amount C
Option Buyer:
• Pays amount X if he decides to exercise the option 
right and receives all rights on the outcome of the 
research project
• Remains inactive and lets the R&D option expire 
if not interested in taking over the project
Research Conducting Company:
• Receives amount X if buyer exercises the R&D 
option and transfers all rights on the research 
project to the buyer
• If R&D option is not exercised, company keeps all 
rights on the outcomes of the research project
Option buyer waits
RCC finalizes R&D process  
Figure 5.4: Concept timing of a R&D option deal 
5.3.2 Framework Assumptions 
For this study, certain assumptions are made to better define the R&D option and to reduce 
complexity later in this study.  This becomes necessary because a R&D option represents an 
individual, non-standardized contract between two parties, which can be constructed in a 
variety of ways making it difficult to derive general conclusions. 
The first assumption is related to the value chain as described in chapter 2.  In reality, 
promising substances found in the phase of base research are patent protected after their 
potential has been identified and before they enter the phase of pre-clinical trials.  For the 
purpose of this study it is assumed that the application for patent protection occurs exactly at 
the time a project has completed base research and enters the phase of pre-clinical trials. 
The second assumption is related to the initiation time t1 of a R&D option deal.  At this point 
the limitation is introduced that the time of patent protection represents the first possible time 
a R&D option can be sold to another company or investor.  This is a reasonable assumption 
since patent protection legally secures technical “know-how” and turns an intangible asset 
with an unascertainable life282 into an intangible asset with an ascertainable life.283  
Especially in the environment of drug development, patents are the basis for value 
generation.284  The main reason for this assumption is the fact that before patent protection 
there is no formalized intangible asset that can serve as the underlying asset for a R&D option 
deal.  It also eliminates the necessity to investigate potential patent races between multiple 
competitors doing research on the same compound.285  To reduce complexity during the 
formalization of the R&D option valuation problem later in this study, all times denoted as t 
in this study are measured against the time of patent protection with t = 0. 
                                                 
282 Referred to as “Goodwill” in balance sheet analysis. 
283 Detailed definitions and examples of intangible assets with an unascertainable or ascertainable life 
can be found at Vaughan (1972, p. 128). 
284 On the importance of patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry see Boer (1999, p. 354). 
285 For a detailed discussion on competition in R&D before patent protection see Weeds (2002). 
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The third assumption is related to the exercise date t2.  As opposed to most financial options 
where the maturity date is a fixed calendar date, t2 in this study is fixed relative to the value 
chain.  The time t2 is defined as the time the development process is completed and approval 
is granted or refused for a new drug.  Exercising the option is only possible at time t2.  With 
this assumption the R&D option can be described as a European type call option with an 
uncertain time to maturity.  This is in line with most publications treating development 
projects as real options and considering them as being European style286.  The exercise 
decision at time t2 is assumed to be a fully rational decision.  This implies that an investor 
always exercises the option if the value of the underlying project exceeds the exercise price at 
the expiration date of the option.  For all cases where the value of the project is below the 
exercise price, the option expires unexercised.  By assuming rational behavior, individual 
cases can be avoided where investors pursue strategies although rational behavior would 
suggest the contrary.287  Figure 5.5 shows the timeline of a typical drug development project 
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Figure 5.5: Drug development timeline relative to patent protection 
With: 
TS  : Time to complete base research until a discovery can be patent protected 
t = -TS  : Start of the drug development project relative to patent application 
t = 0  : Time of patent application 
TA  : Time period until a drug is approved or refused by regulatory authorities 
t = TA  : Time of final drug approval relative to the point of patent application 
t1    : Deal initiation date relative to patent application with t1∈Dt1, Dt1=[0;TA[ 
t2 = TA  : Expiration date of a R&D option 
                                                 
286 As an example see Pennings and Lint (1997, p. 84). 
287 For a discussion of this issue of non-rational behavior see Zardkoohi (2004). 
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In addition to the assumptions above it is critical to discuss the distribution of information 
between the research conducting company and the buyer of the R&D option.  It is obvious 
that the research conducting company has superior information about progress and prospects 
of a project and therefore the assumption is made that all information is shared in preparation 
for and during a R&D option deal.  It is described above that a detailed investigation on 
asymmetric information issues represents an independent study in itself and therefore this 
assumption is made for the purpose of this study. 
In addition it is assumed that the research conducting company continues its R&D activities 
based on rational evaluations after selling an option as it would do without selling it.  For the 
buying side this assumption of rational behavior means that it does not interact with the 
research conducting company while it holds the option.  Without interactions the buyer does 
not influence the decision to discontinue the project and only decides about exercising the 
option at the point of final drug approval. 
There is an important additional definition to be introduced at this point.  If the term fund 
raising or financing potential is used during the course of this study it exclusively refers to the 
cash inflow that is generated at t1 that supports ongoing research activities until regulatory 
approval.  If on the other hand the term total fund raising or total financing potential is used, 
the term refers to the total cash inflow a company can expect from a R&D option deal.  This 
total fund raising or total financing potential therefore consists of the initial cash inflow C at 
time t1 plus the potential cash inflow X at t2, which is only relevant if the option is exercised. 
5.3.3 Concept Advantages and Disadvantages 
To describe advantages and disadvantages of a R&D option it is necessary to recall the 
financing requirements of an average development project.  These requirements have shown 
that the drug development process can be divided into two parts. 
Part one lasts from the initiation of a project until the date a new drug is approved.  This part 
is characterized by cash outflows to finance expenditures during base research, pre-clinical 
testing, the different phases of clinical trials and the drug approval process itself.  Since 
product sales cannot start until a drug is approved there are no corresponding cash inflows 
during this part of the project resulting in a maximum financing need at the time of approval.  
After drug approval, part two of a project starts with the generation of cash inflows resulting 
from product sales.  These cash inflows reduce the total net financing need of a project.  
Eventually the cumulated cash inflows exceed the maximum net financing need resulting in 
the break-even of the project.  After break-even the project generates excess funds that can be 
used to finance other projects or can be distributed among owners of the company. 
Once a drug receives final approval from regulatory authorities there is a theoretically 
unlimited upward potential to create funds in excess of the maximum net financing need.  In 
reality this upward potential is limited by factors like market size, remaining patent protection 
period, pricing restrictions and the presence of competitive products in the market.  The 
following sections build on the simplified net financial performance of an average drug 
development project as shown in Figure 2.8. 
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5.3.3.1 Seller’s Point of View 
When a company enters a R&D option deal the net financing profile changes compared to the 
traditional profile visualized in Figure 2.8.  The constant cash outflows resulting from base 
research, pre-clinical testing, the different phases of clinical trials and the drug approval 
process are subsidized by a cash inflow equivalent to the option premium C at time t1. 
Assuming that the R&D option is exercised, the second major change in the financing profile 
is related to the cash inflow during final drug approval.  Instead of a long period of cash 
inflows that are expected to exceed the maximum financing requirements at some time in the 
future, there is only one additional cash flow.  This cash flow of size X occurs at time t2 when 
the option owner decides to exercise his option.  The resulting simplified cumulated cash 
flow profile is illustrated in Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Cumulated cash flows of a R&D option deal - seller’s view (exercised) 
Entering a R&D option deal as a method of raising funds has multiple theoretical advantages 
and disadvantages for the seller of the research option. 
Advantages 
One advantage for the seller of the R&D option is related to the time cash flows are 
generated.  With a R&D option the research conducting company receives its first cash 
inflow already at time t1 when it enters into the option agreement.  At this point it receives the 
option premium C from the buyer of the option.  This anticipated cash flow reduces the 
maximum financing need because the amount C can immediately be used to reduce its 
financial obligations from early cash outflows. 
Another advantage for the seller of the option is a reduced uncertainty about future cash 
flows.  After a research conducting company enters into a R&D option deal it knows exactly 
that it is going to receive the contractually fixed amount X if the project is successful and the 
option owner exercises his option right.  Since the amount X is received at once the option 
seller also experiences the advantage of an anticipated break-even resulting from an 
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immediate cost recovery at time t2.  In case the option premium C and the agreed exercise 
price X exceed the total financing need, the seller of the option immediately breaks even at 
time t2 when the option is exercised.  In this way profits can be generated earlier as in a 
traditional project where break even does not occur until a product has been sold in the 
market for an extended period of time.288 
In addition to the points mentioned, a young biotechnology company gains another advantage 
by selling a R&D option.  Large pharmaceutical companies with extensive research portfolios 
are likely to associate a higher value with a project under development than the research 
conducting company does internally.  This is a result of potential risk diversification289 
opportunities on the side of the large company resulting in the willingness to invest more in 
the R&D option than the research conducting company would itself.  Through this effect the 
research conducting company can indirectly participate in the risk diversification 
opportunities of the option buyer.290 
In contrast to other financing methods, raising funds by selling R&D options has the 
advantage that there is no transfer of company ownership involved in the transaction.  In way 
the company selling the option can take full advantage of all other corporate activities and 
claim their future outcomes and profits to their full extent, which is especially relevant for 
fast growing companies with a broad research pipeline.  This characteristic appears to appeal 
to companies that experience a short-term financing need due to multiple promising ongoing 
projects that require immediate funding.  Anticipating cash inflows with the use of option 
sales can potentially generate the funds necessary to keep a company going without a transfer 
of ownership.  The resulting corporate independence is desired by most owners of small 
dynamic companies but is generally hard to achieve with traditional financing methods291. 
In addition to the anticipation of cash flows it also has to be noted that the end of an entire 
project is anticipated for the company selling the option in the event that the owner exercises 
the option.  If the option is exercised by the owner the project is finalized for the seller before 
large-scale production starts.  This eliminates the need for the research conducting company 
to set up large-scale production facilities and build up the related production, marketing and 
distribution expertise. 
Disadvantages 
The opposite holds true in cases where the option owner does not exercise his option right 
and the research conducting company continues to own all project related rights beyond the 
                                                 
288 Grabowski and Vernon (2000b, p. 100) found that it takes 16 years for an average drug to break 
even.  On one hand this period is much shorter for Blockbuster drugs while drugs with below 
average sales rates might never recoup their investment. 
289 For the difference between diversifiable and non-diversifiable risk factors refer to chapter 5.2. 
290 The ability of some buyers to reduce risk through diversification is discussed in chapter 7.2.1. 
291 See chapter 4 for more details on corporate financing methods. 
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point of drug approval.  In this case the company does not receive the exercise price X of the 
option but has the opportunity to market the approved drug itself292.  Whether this can be 
considered an advantage or a disadvantage depends on the future sales potential of the 
approved drug as shown in Figure 5.7.  One characteristic that represents a disadvantage if 
the option is not exercised is the fact that the research conducting company has to build 
production, marketing and distribution capabilities to sell a product in the marketplace if the 
project cannot be sold to a third party.  Alternatively the product can be brought to market 
through a co-marketing arrangement with another party not involved in the R&D option deal. 
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Figure 5.7: Cumulated cash flows of a R&D option deal - seller’s view (expired) 
While entering a R&D option deal has several theoretical advantages for the research 
conducting company it has also negative characteristics that need to be considered.  The main 
disadvantage arises from the fact that the option right can be exercised at a contractually 
fixed price X.  A fixed exercise price allows the owner of the option to take over a project 
irrespective of the real value of the project at the time of approval, therefore limiting the 
maximum benefit a research conducting company can achieve.  While the option deal 
deprives the option writer of a potential upside he receives the premium C as an anticipated 
compensation for this characteristic at time t1. 
Another disadvantage is the loss of know-how related to exercising a R&D option.  Once 
exercised, the research conducting company misses out on the opportunity to develop 
additional applications from the innovation or expand it into new therapeutic areas.  This 
elimination of future options to grow from a project is hard to quantify in early stages of a 
project but has to be considered when quantifying a R&D option deal. 
                                                 
292 Alternatively the entire project can be sold to a third party. 
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5.3.3.2 Buyers Point of View 
While a R&D option deal has favorable characteristics for the research conducting company 
as shown above it also has advantages for the company acquiring the option.  To enter this 
discussion, Figure 5.8 shows the cumulated cash flow position from the perspective of the 
option owner in case the option right is exercised. 
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Figure 5.8: Cumulated cash flows of a R&D option deal - buyer’s view (exercised) 
Advantages 
The main advantage is that a company can secure access to innovations and new products 
without internally maintaining the related R&D organization, which resides with the 
company selling the option.  By holding an option the owner can receive full access to an 
innovation of the research conducting company if the agreed amount X is paid.  To acquire 
this right the option premium is paid to the research conducting company at an earlier date t1.  
This amount C represents the maximum financial risk taken over by the option owner in case 
of project failure therefore increasing the accuracy of cash flow planning.  Additional 
planning security arises from the fact that the option owner knows in advance the cost related 
to taking over the project once it is approved and a product is ready to be introduced into the 
market.  It is known at time t1 when the option contract is finalized what additional amount X 
it costs to acquire all rights to the project if it proves successful. 
Securing access to a new innovation by acquiring an option right requires a smaller initial 
investment than conducting the project internally293.  Therefore a company can spread a fixed 
budget over multiple projects and an R&D project portfolio can be set up.  By building an 
                                                 
293 “The cost of an option on an asset is small, relative to the cost of purchasing the asset.  Thus, with 
the same resources to spend, more opportunities can be explored using options”, McGrath and 
Nerkar (2004, p. 3). 
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R&D project portfolio a company can reduce its exposure to private risk294, which is 
impossible for small companies because of the capital intensiveness of drug development.  
The large capital requirements generally allow young companies to focus only on one or a 
few projects without the opportunity to diversify private risk. 
The ability to spread a fixed budget over multiple projects appears beneficial for large 
pharmaceutical companies in their search for blockbuster drugs.  It allows them to secure 
rights on a larger number of drug candidates, in turn strengthening their development 
pipelines.295  With more candidates in the pipeline the probability increases to own access 
rights on a project that turns out to be a blockbuster.  Currently, pharmaceutical companies 
are endeavoring to strengthen their product pipelines through acquisitions296 requiring 
significant financial resources or through licensing agreements. 
By owning access rights to a project while leaving research activities to the option seller also 
allows the buying company to benefit from the more flexible working environment and the 
resulting shorter development times of smaller companies.297 
Disadvantages 
As for the writer of a R&D option there are also disadvantages for the buyer compared to an 
internal drug development approach.  When acquiring an option the buyer decides to leave 
research activities with the option writer resulting in reduced control over structure and 
progress of these R&D activities.298  In addition, a company acquiring multiple options 
instead of conducting projects in-house misses out on the opportunity to realize synergy 
effects between individual projects.  Synergies can exist in the form of a more efficient 
deployment of resources or better asset utilization. 
                                                 
294 Private or “non-market” risk represents the risk that is unique for a specific project and cannot be 
replicated by securities traded at security markets.  This is opposed to market risk, which is the risk 
related to the market environment.  All companies in a market face this kind of risk and it cannot be 
diversified.  Since the different stages of drug development are related to a high risk of technical 
failure related to exactly one specific project, this risk is private by nature and cannot be replicated 
in the capital market.  This ability of management to diversify some risk components is one of the 
most common pitfalls when evaluating risky projects according to Hodder and Riggs (1985, p. 129). 
295 On the importance of creating research portfolios and the project selection process see Sharpe, Paul 
and Keelin (1998). 
296 Compare to Bowe and Dyer (2004) 
297 Quinn (1986) questions the existence of this phenomenon.  He argues that unsuccessful projects 
are fully visible at large companies while a multitude of small, unsuccessful ventures remain 
unrecognized creating the impression that small companies are more effective innovators. 
298 This disadvantage can be limited through appropriate clauses in the legal option agreement 
allowing co-management under certain conditions. 
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• No transfer of ownership 
• Immediate cash generation 
• More predictable cash flows 
• Rapid cost recovery if exercised 
• No need to develop internal 
production/distribution 
• Long-term independence 
• Benefit from risk diversification 
opportunities of investor 
• Reduced total financing need 
• Limited upside potential 







• Assures access right to new 
developments without own R&D 
• Potential increase of drug pipeline 
• New products with limited upfront 
investment 
• Risk diversification by building 
option portfolios 
• Increasing probability to get access to 
Blockbuster product 
• Potentially faster drug development 
process 
• Limited control over R&D process 
• Loss of potential synergies between 
individual projects 
Table 5.2: Advantages and disadvantages of R&D option deal financing 
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6 Option Theory in the Valuation of Drug Development 
Basic option theory stretches back to the first scientific discussions of Bachelier (1900) and 
Bronzin (1908) at the beginning of the last century.  Since that time, numerous studies and 
publications have expanded financial option theory into other scientific areas.  One reason for 
the increasing use of option valuation in other areas is the consensus that traditional valuation 
methods like net present value analysis are not appropriate to evaluate real life business 
decisions.  These approaches do not consider management’s flexibility to adapt strategies to 
changing market conditions299.  Traditional models generally assume that once the decision 
on a strategy is made, it cannot be changed, which is clearly not a realistic assumption.300  
This “static” thinking can be avoided by applying option based valuation approaches. 
Since the time researchers started applying option theory to real life problems, several 
industries are repeatedly being listed as being well suited for option thinking.  According to 
Yeo and Qiu (2003, p. 250) these are mostly industries “where volatility and uncertainty is 
high and the need for flexibility is at its premium”, like the oil and gas exploration 
industry301, the mining industry302, high tech R&D303, the multimedia industry304, real estate 
development305, general manufacturing with flexible processes306, pharmaceutical companies 
in general307 and also the related individual drug development projects308. 
As for most of these industries, there is a general consensus that drug development represents 
a real option on future cash flows.  This led to the development of a variety of studies trying 
to assign a value to ongoing drug development projects using some kind of adapted financial 
option valuation method.  The following sections give a brief overview of selected financial 
                                                 
299 Hodder and Riggs (1985) criticize three main characteristics of the discounted cash flow method.  
First that it neglects the effect of inflation, second the different levels of uncertainty in different 
project phases and third the management’s ability to mitigate risk. 
300 Valuable discussions demonstrating the advantages of option theory over traditional valuation 
methods and their application in real-life business strategy can be found at Kester (1984), Dixit and 
Pindyck (1995), Luehrman (1998a) or Luehrman (1998b). 
301 Compare to Paddock et al. (1988) 
302 Compare to Leslie and Michaels (1997) 
303 Compare to Copeland and Antikarov (2001, p. 301) 
304 Compare to Pennings and Lint (1997), Schwartz and Moon (2000) or Schwartz and Moon (2001) 
305 Compare to Titman (1985) or Quigg (1995) 
306 Compare to McDonald and Siegel (1985) 
307 Compare to Kellogg and Charnes (2000) or Bäcker and Hommel (2002) 
308 A general work on option theory and investments in research and development can be found at 
Greenberg (1992). 
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option valuation models309 and how they are applied in scientific literature to evaluate drug 
development projects.  This is done with the objective of assessing whether these valuation 
approaches can also be used to estimate the financing potential of the R&D option being the 
main focus of this study. 
6.1 Tree Based Valuation Approaches 
Binomial Trees 
The main reason for the popularity of the binomial tree method in financial option theory is 
the fact that it is a very descriptive method avoiding the use of complex mathematical tools 
like statistical time series modeling or partial differential equations.  Besides the advantage 
that they can be solved with basic mathematical procedures they are also valuable in 
modeling one-time occurrences like dividends or volatility changes310. 
Methodology 
The fundamental approach of valuing options by using binomial trees received substantial 
attention since it was investigated by Cox et al. (1979).  The intention of their work was to 
establish an option pricing approach that uses only basic mathematical principles instead of 
sophisticated mathematical tools.  Instead of the assumption that stocks are traded 
continuously, they use a discrete time approach where option prices are only observable after 
specified periods of time311. 
In this approach new stock prices are determined by a simple stochastic process and can only 
result in one out of two specific occurrences after one time period.  If a time period is related 
to an upward movement, the stock price S becomes uS and if it is related to a downward 
movement, it becomes dS.  Upward movements occur with a probability q312 while 
downward movements occur with a probability (1-q).  To transfer this stock price movement 
into a valuation model Cox et al. (1979) use some of the same assumptions as Black and 
Scholes (1973): 
                                                 
309 This chapter is not intended to give a complete overview over all valuation techniques that exist in 
financial option theory but is limited to the ones that have been transferred to the valuation of 
pharmaceutical companies.  Other approaches like the Finite Difference Method (FDM), which are 
established financial option valuation techniques, are not covered at this point because there are no 
known scientific studies applying them to pharmaceutical valuation problems.  For a more complete 
overview on financial option theory one can refer to basic literature on financial options like Hull 
(2006).  A detailed description of the mentioned Finite Difference Method and its applications can 
be found at Brennan and Schwartz (1977), Brennan and Schwartz (1978), Geske and Shastri (1985), 
Hull and White (1990) or Wilmott et al. (1993, p. 267). 
310 See Christoffersen et al. (2005) 
311 Leisen (1998) extend this approach by allowing time increments between occurences to be random 
instead of being of fixed length. 
312 0≤q≤1 
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• The risk-free interest rate is publicly available, is constant over time and is the same 
for all maturities. 
• Markets are frictionless. 
• Markets are complete. 
• Markets are arbitrage free. 
• With r being the risk-free rate of interest, the no-arbitrage assumption leads to the 
conclusion that u>(1+r)>d313, otherwise arbitrage opportunities would exist. 
• The underlying stock pays no dividends. 
• The option represents a “European” type option. 
The valuation approach builds on the main assumption that markets are free of arbitrage 
opportunities.  Since it is possible in a complete market to duplicate the payoffs of every 
security by a portfolio of other securities, a portfolio of bonds and stocks is built to duplicate 
the payoff of a call option.  By borrowing money (selling bonds) and buying a certain number 
of stocks for the proceeds it is possible to create a portfolio that duplicates the payoff a call 
option would generate at maturity.  Thus, the price of the call option and the price of the 
portfolio containing a certain number of stock ∆S and the risk-free bond B have to be the 
same to eliminate arbitrage opportunities.  The following section briefly summarizes the main 
valuation steps of Cox et al. (1979) for a one-period and for a multiple period scenario. 
One period scenario314 
In a one period scenario the value of the stock and therefore also the value of the call option 
C with exercise price X and the value of the portfolio can only take on two values as shown 

















Figure 6.1: One period binomial option valuation model 
                                                 
313 Compare Cox and Rubinstein (1985, p. 171) 
314 For a more detailed discussion of this scenario refer to Cox et al. (1979). 
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By selecting ∆ and B in a way that the value V of the portfolio matches the value of the 
option at each of the two occurrences315 and by knowing that today’s price of the option C 
and the price of the portfolio ∆S+B have to be the same, it can be concluded that the value of 
the call today can be expressed as equation (6.1). 
(6.1) 
To simplify this equation, a new parameter p is defined as (6.2). 
(6.2) 
Substituting (6.2) in (6.1) simplifies the equation for the value of a call option to (6.3). 
(6.3) 
Multiple n-period scenario 
To more precisely specify a binomial tree model and to include a wider range of potential 
occurrences of the underlying asset, the number of decision points between the point of 
valuation and the expiration date can be increased.  By doing so, the one period model is 
expanded into an n-period model.  From a valuation standpoint the breakdown into an n-
period model does not increase the mathematical complexity and can still be solved using the 
same basic algebra used to solve the one period example.  The main advantage of the n-step 
tree model over the simple one-step model is the fact that for duplication purposes, cash-
flows can be modeled more dynamically as opposed to the static one-step approach and can 
therefore consider a more comlex and changing valuation environment. 
                                                 



































































































Figure 6.2: N-period binomial option valuation model 
Following the same approach for the n-period model that is used to derive equation (6.1) 
involves solving a system of (n+1) equations and leads to the following valuation formula 
(6.4) for a European call option. 
(6.4) 
In order for MAX[0;ujdn-jS-X] to become greater zero, the term (ujdn-jS) has to exceed the 
exercise price X of the option.  Since j represents the number of upward movements in the 
model this is the case if j exceeds a certain limit a.  Knowing that ( ) XSdu jnj ≥−  for all 
aj ≥ , (6.4) can be rewritten as equation (6.5). 
(6.5) 
With the binomial distribution function316, a portion of (6.5) can be extracted and simplified 
using the complementary binomial distribution function (6.6). 
(6.6) 
Thus, equation (6.5) can be simplified into the following formula. 
[ ] ( ) [ ]pnarXpnaSC n ;;1´;; Φ+−Φ= −                                                                                    (6.7) 
with 
                                                 

























































































































The above equation represents the pricing formula for a European call option on a non-
dividend paying stock in an n-period binomial model. 
Use in valuation of drug development projects 
Shockley et al. (2003) use a binomial tree approach to evaluate an individual drug 
development project.  They start their analysis by building a binomial tree model as if the 
project was completed irrespective of environmental influences.  As a starting point they use 
the expected net present value E(NPVlaunch) of the project at the time of product launch.  This 
parameter is defined as the value of all cash flows expected from the final product during its 
lifetime discounted back to the point of drug approval. 
Since the time of product launch occurs at some time in the future E(NPVlaunch) is discounted 
back over the duration of the entire R&D process using a risk-adjusted corporate discount 
rate rc to derive an expected net present value eNPV.  If the project has i project stages and di 
represents the duration of one project stage, the resulting starting point for the analysis is 
calculated using equation (6.8). 
(6.8) 
To include risk and uncertainty in their valuation they build a binomial tree to model the 
uncertainty related to the value of the project.  Following a procedure described at Hull 
(2006, p. 394), they modify the initial value eNPV by assuming that it can change by a factor 
u or d during each stage of the R&D process.  For the up- or downward movements of eNPV 
they define the jump probabilities u and d as follows using the volatility factor σ. 
teu σ=   
u
d 1=  
The resulting binomial tree, which is used at Shockley et al. (2003) to model the value 





































t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 … ... t = i
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Figure 6.3: Binomial tree to evaluate drug development projects 
To consider that a drug development project can economically fail during the research 
process they work backwards along the binomial tree to evaluate the project.  The starting 
point for their valuation approach is the potential project launch after i time periods.  
Assuming rational behavior they conclude that an investment kn to enter the next project 
stage n will only be invested if the project represents a positive value to the investor.  This 
means that the expected value of the remainder of the project exceeds the required investment 
kn.  If this is not the case, the project will be abandoned without adding any value for the 
investor.  At the point of final drug approval after i time periods and “a” upward movements 
in the binomial tree, the value Via of the project can therefore be written as (6.9). 
(6.9) 317 
With equation (6.9), each node of the binomial tree at time i can receive an assigned value Via 
with a = 0, …, i.  For all previous nodes the value of the project depends on the two scenarios 
that can potentially follow at the next time period.  Both possible cases are weighted with 
their risk-neutral probabilities and then discounted back over the period under discussion 
using the risk-free interest rate before they are compared to the cost k necessary to conduct 
this project phase.  The risk-neutral probability urn of an upward movement is calculated as 
follows:318 
                                                 
317 Since 
u
d 1=  and therefore 1* =ud , the two factors u and d can partially offset each other. 
318 The subscript rn is used to emphasize that it represents the risk-neutral probability and not a 
subjective probability for an up- or downward movement along the binomial tree. 
[ ]0;)( iaiaia kdeNPVuMAXV −= −





















 and )1( rnrn ud −=  
With these risk-neutral probabilities urn and drn the value V(i-1)a of the project at the beginning 
of the period (i-1) with a=0, ..., (i-1) upward movements can be calculated using (6.10). 
(6.10) 
This methodology can be applied to all decision points of the binomial tree assigning a value 
to every node of the tree as shown in Figure 6.4. 
…
[ ]0;iiii keNPVuMAXV −=
[ ]0;)2()1( iiii keNPVuMAXV −= −−
[ ]0;)4()2( iiii keNPVuMAXV −= −−
[ ]0;0 iii keNPVdMAXV −=
[ ]0;)2(1 iii keNPVdMAXV −= −
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Figure 6.4: Tree based valuation approach for drug development projects 
A practical application of tree analysis can be observed at SmithKline Beecham, where the 
approach is mainly appreciated for its transparency and its ability to capture risk factors that 
are specific to the drug development process.319 
Other Tree based approaches in the valuation of pharmaceutical R&D 
A similar tree based approach to evaluate a drug development project can be found at Brach 
(2003) who uses decision tree analysis to evaluate an individual research project.  Her 
approach uses the specific characteristics of a drug development project and breaks it down 
into six individual project stages, which can clearly be separated from each other.  While the 
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commercialization of a new drug represents the very last stage of the process, each of the 
precedent stages represents an option to execute the following stage.  Her approach is based 
on the steps of the pharmaceutical value chain introduced in chapter 5.3.2.  Each stage 
requires the previous stage to be successfully completed and stage completion is also related 
to a cost.  The factor ki represent the cost to complete a specific stage i representing the 
option premium securing the right to execute the following stage.  Each stage i is also related 
to a specific probability qi that it can be completed successfully.  If all process stages are 
successfully completed the final product can be a success in the marketplace resulting in a 
best case net present value BC at the start of the commercialization phase.  Alternatively, the 
project can be disappointing with a worst case net present value of WC.  Figure 6.5 visualizes 
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Figure 6.5: Drug development evaluation using a compound option approach 
With q6 being the probability for a successful market launch resulting in the best case 
scenario BC, the expected net present value eNPV of the project at the time of market entry 
can be calculated using equation (6.11). 
(6.11) 
For every preceding project stage i, the expected net present value eNPVi can be calculated 
using the corporate discount rate rc, the probability for successful completion of a project 
stage qi, and the duration di it takes to complete a specific project stage.  With these input 
parameters eNPVi can be derived using (6.12). 
(6.12) 
Besides the expected value at each project stage it is also known in which range the actual 
value NPVi occurs.  Since BC6 represents the best possible outcome of the project it can be 
concluded that this also represents the upper limit at each project stage if discounted back to 
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adjust for time value of money.  Equation (6.13) can therefore be used to determine the upper 
value limit at each period i. 
(6.13) 
As opposed to the upper limit, which varies at each stage, the lower limit for all WCi with 
0<i<6 is zero because of the technical failure risk at each stage.  After upper limits, lower 
limits, and expected net present values for all stages are calculated, Brach (2003) determines 
the risk-neutral probabilities for up- or downward movements at each stage.  The approach 
used is similar to that of Cox et al. (1979) for financial options using the risk-free interest rate 
r.  These risk-neutral probabilities are then determined using (6.14). 
(6.14) 
With these risk-neutral probabilities, the real option value of the drug development project 
can be calculated for each of the different stages i using equation (6.15). 
(6.15) 
With the various equations described above, Brach (2003) calculates the value of a drug 
development project starting in reverse order from the very last project phase to the starting 
point of the project as summarized in Figure 6.6. 
Real Option based 
project value 
starting stage i
Risk free probability 
stage i
Expected Net Present 
Value (eNPVi)
WC600000
Lower Limit project 
value 
BC6


























































































































6.2 Black-Scholes (BS) Based Valuation 
Probably the most widely know method of continuous time option pricing is the one 
developed by Black and Scholes (1973)320, which is described in this section. 
Methodology 
The option valuation approach of Black and Scholes (1973) reached its predominant status in 
financial option literature because it is a closed form equilibrium formula that consists of only 
observable and objective input parameters.  Another advantage of this approach is the limited 
need for external information because their formula is based on only six input parameters. 
S : Stock price of the stock representing the underlying asset of the option 
X : Price at which the option right can be exercised 
T : Expiration date 
t : Current date 
r : Risk-free interest rate 
σ : Volatility of the price of the stock serving as the underlying asset 
BS base their valuation approach on the same idea of a duplicating portfolio as Cox et al. 
(1979) do with their binomial tree approach described above.321  They duplicate the payoff 
structure of a call option with a debt financed stock portfolio.  With the payoff structure being 
the same, the duplicating portfolio and the sold call result in a risk-free portfolio because both 
payoffs offset each other.  By knowing that the portfolio is risk-free it is also known that it 
has to generate a return equivalent to the risk-free interest rate.  If it would not generate the 
risk free interest rate, arbitrage opportunities would exist.322  From this thought they derive 
the following valuation formula for a European call option on a non-dividend paying stock323: 
(6.16) 
with  
                                                 
320 Selected examples of valuable discussions on the Black and Scholes equation are Black and 
Scholes (1973), Jarrow and Rudd (1983, p. 117), Merton (1990, p. 255), Duffie (1992, p. 77), 
Trigeorgis (1996, p. 89), Chriss (1997, p. 119), Korn and Korn (1999, p. 101), Bingham and Kiesel 
(2004, p. 131), Hull (2006, p. 281) and others. 
321 In fact, the binomial tree valuation method converges to the BS formula if the length of the discrete 
time steps becomes infinitesimally small. 
322 Black and Scholes (1973) describe a second way to derive the BS formula by deriving the 
underlying differential equation from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by 
Sharpe, William F. (1964). 
323 For a very detailed discussion on the stochastic calculus and probability theory underlying the 
work of Black-Scholes one can refer to Ikeda et al. (1996). 
























While (6.16) is an appealing, easy to apply closed-form equation, it only holds true under 
what Black and Scholes consider “ideal conditions”.324  Specific care must be taken that the 
following assumptions are fulfilled for the equation to be applicable: 
• The risk-free rate of interest is publicly available and it is constant over time. 
• Stock prices follow a stochastic process of the form δS=µSδt+σSδz with 
µ: expected rate of return of the underlying stock also called “drift”325 of S. 
σ: volatility of the price of the underlying stock also called “diffusion”326 of S. 
δz: stochastic factor modeling the randomness of the stock price development.327 
• Both the drift rate µ as well as the diffusion factor σ are constant over time. 
• Markets are frictionless and complete. 
• The underlying stock pays no dividends. 
• The option represents a “European” type option. 
Although the formula might not appear intuitive to the reader, the different components of the 
BS formula can be interpreted in quite a descriptive way328: 
• SN(d1) represents the expected value of the stock at the expiration date if S exceeds 
the exercise price X. 
• N(d2) represents the risk neutral probability that the stock price will exceed X at 
expiration. 
• Xe-r(T-t) represents the net present value of the exercise price of the option. 
As qualitatively described in chapter 3.1.3, the value of a call option evaluated with formula 
(6.16) reacts in a certain way to changes in the various input parameters with all other 
parameters remaining unchanged.329 
                                                 
324 See Black and Scholes (1973) 
325 See Duffie (1992, p. 81) 
326 See Duffie (1992, p. 81) 
327 Black Scholes assume a geometric Brownian motion for the stock price development. 
328 Compare to Amram and Kulatilaka (1999, p. 121) 
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Changes in price of underlying stock (Delta ∆) 
If the price of the underlying stock increases, the value of the related call option increases as 
well because the first derivative over S is always greater than zero.  This first derivative is 
often referred to as Delta. 
(6.17) 
Changes in the exercise price 
The higher the exercise price of an option the lower its value with all other parameters 
remaining the same.  This can be concluded from the first derivative of the BS formula over 
X, which is always smaller than zero. 
(6.18) 
Changes in time to maturity (Theta Θ) 
The greater the time to maturity (T-t), the greater the value of the call option resulting from 
the first derivative of the BS equation over the remaining time to maturity (T-t) being greater 















Changes in the risk-free interest rate (Rho Ρ) 
Increases in the risk-free interest rate also increase the value of the European call option as 
can be derived from the first derivative of (6.16) over the risk-free rate of return, which is 
greater than zero.  This parameter is often referred to as Rho. 
(6.20) 
Changes in stock price volatility (Lambda Λ)330 
Increasing stock price volatility increases the value of the European call option because the 
first derivative over the volatility factor is always greater than zero.  This first derivative is 
often referred to as Lambda. 
                                                                                                                                                        
329 Summarized at Jarrow and Rudd (1983, p. 119) and Kilka (1995, p. 52). 


















































Certain assumptions regarding the Black-Scholes formula can be relaxed as Merton (1973) 
did to include dividend payments into the model.  With δ being a constant dividend yield 
related to the underlying stock of an option, equation (6.16) can be rewritten to include 
























Equation (6.22) represents the valuation equation for a European call option on a stock 
paying a constant dividend yield δ. 
Use in valuation of drug development projects 
An early example where the BS approach is applied to the valuation of drug development is 
described by Nichols (1994, p. 92) and Sender (1994).  The paper describes how drug 
developing companies can apply the defined financial option valuation framework to more 
appropriately evaluate their projects than by using simple net present value analysis.  To 
obtain the input parameters for the BS formula, the conversions in Table 6.1 are used.332 
                                                 
331 Compare also to Kilka (1995, p. 56) 
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Variable Black and Scholes (1973) Sender (1994) 
Underlying asset (S) Current stock price Present value of expected project cash flows333 
Exercise price (X) Fixed stock price Required capital investment 
Maturity date (T) One fixed date (Europ. call) Subjective estimate for potential market entry 
Risk-free interest rate (r) Market rate for appropriate maturity 
U.S. treasury rate for 
respective maturity 
Risk/Volatility (σ) Stock price movements Annual standard deviation of typical industry stocks 
Table 6.1: Input parameter comparison between financial and real option valuation 
They found that applying the Black-Scholes option model captures the value of drug 
development projects better than net present value techniques.  Nichols (1994) argues that by 
using option valuation techniques companies are able to quantify some of the intuition 
businesspeople have and that are not captured by net present value techniques.  Another 
finding is related to an option to wait as described in chapter 3.2.1.  Sender (1994) concludes 
that the value of a drug development real option becomes more valuable as its time to 
expiration increases because a company “would be able to collect more information and 
therefore make better investment decisions”334.  While this is consistent with (6.19) of the 
Black-Scholes framework it might not be applicable to drug development projects as 
discussed in section 9.2. 
Another example where the Black-Scholes model is applied to value a real option represented 
by a drug development project is the study by Banerjee (2003).  The study attempts to 
evaluate two components of ongoing research projects of an Indian drug manufacturer.  
Banerjee (2003) uses the Black-Scholes formula (6.22) for a call option on a dividend paying 
stock as opposed to the simple form (6.16) used by Sender (1994) to estimate the value of 
these projects.  In addition to the input factors of  Table 6.1, Banerjee (2003) argues that a 
deducting factor such as the dividend yield has to be included to consider the specific 
situation of the drug developing industry that revenues can only be generated during the 
effective patent protection period.335  By including such a factor he shows that after a 
component is patent protected, an increasing time to maturity does not necessarily increase 
the value of the option.  While this is not consistent with Sender (1994) and (6.19) of the 
Black-Scholes model, it is intuitively understandable because the longer a company waits to 
bring a new drug to market, the shorter the effective patent protection period to recover R&D 
cost and generate profits. 
                                                 
333 This is in line with Pennings and Lint (1997, p. 85), who found that for real options the “expected 
value of the project value outcome equals the estimated underlying value”. 
334 See Sender (1994, p. 92) 
335 It is a simplifying assumption that there are no post-patent period revenues but it can be considered 
appropriate because severe price pressure and competition of generic drug manufacturers sets in as 
soon as a drug loses its patent protection status.  See also section 1.3.1 on generic drug competition. 
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6.3 Compound Option Based Valuation 
Another breakthrough in financial option theory relevant for this study is the compound 
option valuation method using closed form equations.  The method covers situations where 
options are not written on assets like a stock but rather on other options therefore representing 
options on options.  In this approach the staged character of the investment is not evaluated 
by using tree algorithms but modeled with a closed form equation. 
Methodology 
Geske (1979) developed the first closed-form equation to value compound options by 
building on the established valuation approach of Black and Scholes.  The assumptions Geske 
(1979) uses for his model are similar to the ones used by Black and Scholes.336  Assuming 
that C1 represents a call option on a stock S with an exercise price X1 and exercise date T1 
and C2 represents another call to acquire the initial option C1 at time T2337 at a specified price 
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=  
and S* being the lowest stock price, at which the compound option C2 is exercised by a 
rational investor.  The threshold S* has to fulfill requirement (6.24). 
(6.24) 
Equation (6.23) represents the pricing formula for a compound call on another call.  Geske’s 
two stage model was expanded by Lin (2002), Cassimon et al. (2004) or Mölls et al. (2005) 
into a multiple studies to derive a closed-form solution for multi-stage compound options. 
                                                 
336 The assumptions of the Black-Scholes model are summarized in chapter 6.2. 
337 With T2<T1 
338 Geske (1979) initially did not develop his model by investigating a financial call option on another 
financial call option but by considering a financial call option on a stock and interpreting the stock 
as an option on the assets of the underlying firm.  Generalizations of this approach evaluating a 
financial call on another financial call can be found at Jarrow and Rudd (1983, p. 143). 
0),,,*;( 112 =− KXTrSC σ
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Use in valuation of drug development projects 
Evaluating a drug development project by using a closed-form compound option approach 
was attempted in scientific studies by Cassimon et al. (2002) and Cassimon et al. (2004).339 
They built their study based on the same process breakdown as Brach (2003).  They separate 
a drug development project in the same distinct phases, each of them representing a call 
option on the succeeding project stage.340  The major innovation of the Cassimon et al. (2004) 
study is the fact that it does not evaluate the project by working along a tree model but by 
establishing a closed-form equation that allows the value of the R&D project to be quantified.  
Cassimon et al. (2004) apply the model of Geske (1979)341 to the real option world of drug 
development and extend it into a n-fold compound option model to capture the complexity of 
the drug development process. 
As a first step the model of Geske (1979), which was described above, is transferred into a 










































































and M being a bivariate cumulative normal distribution function342. 
In this context, the following notations are used: 
V : Current value of an asset representing the underlying of a regular call option 
T1 : Maturity date of compound call C1 
T2 : Maturity date of a call option C2 representing the underlying of C1 
                                                 
339 Another good example of compound option valuation in drug development can be found at Gamba 
et al. (1999) who value two closely related product launches as a compound option.  A similar 
approach can be found at Schäfer and Schässburger (2001) who try to evaluate a biotech start-up 
using a compound option approach. 
340 While both studies use the same project phases to break down the entire project, they do start their 
investigation at different stages.  While Cassimon et al. (2004) use basic research activities as the 
first project stage, Brach (2003) does not start her investigation until the phase of pre-clinical trials. 
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X1 : Exercise price of the compound call option 
X2 : Exercise price of the standard call option 
r : Risk-free interest rate 
σ2 : Variance of returns on the underlying asset 
N : Cumulative normal distribution function 
M : Multivariate normal distribution function343 
As S* represented the lowest stock price, at which the compound option is exercised by a 
rational investor at Geske (1979), the real option threshold V  has to fulfill a similar 
condition C1(V ,T1)-X1=0. 
During a second step, Cassimon et al. extend this view and define a series of compound 
options, each granting the right to acquire another option.  While the 1-fold compound option 
is equivalent to a standard call option, the 2-fold compound option is the one described by 
Geske (1979).  For all n>2 the n-fold compound option grants the right on a (n-1)-fold 
compound option.  In such a series of compound options, Cassimon et al. (2004) show that 
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343 In the case of a two-fold compound option M represents a bivariate cumulative normal distribution 
function M(a; b; ρ) with a and b representing normally distributed variables and ρ being the 
correlation coefficient between these two variables. 



































6.4 Simulation in Option Valuation 
In addition to the calculation models described above there is an alternative approach to 
derive the value of a financial option or other derivative securities, which is known as Monte 
Carlo Analysis (MCA).  It is an analytical technique for solving a problem by performing a 
large number of trial runs that simulate potential future environmental developments and 
inferring a solution from the collective results of these trial runs. 
Methodology 
In a Monte Carlo Analysis approach, Boyle (1977)344 derives the value of an option by 
simulating the process generating the return of an underlying asset and uses the assumption of 
risk neutrality to assess the value of this option.  To derive the value of a European call 
option he uses the stochastic process describing future stock price movements until the 
expiration date of the option.  By simulating this process he creates a set of future stock 
prices for the execution date and uses these prices to estimate the option value.  His approach 
has the advantage that it avoids solving highly sophisticated mathematical formulas or 
evaluating integrals with numerical methods. 
Boyle (1977) bases his approach on the assumption that stocks generate the risk-free rate of 
return in a complete market and that the ratio St+1/St is log-normally distributed.  The first 
assumption implies the following relationship (6.27). 
(6.27) 
With the additional knowledge on the properties of the lognormal distribution he derives the 
following formula (6.28)345, with x~  being a standard-normally distributed random variable 
with zero mean and one unit variance. 
(6.28) 
With equation (6.28), Boyle is able to simulate a stock price development path over any 
number of time periods starting at St and resulting in a final stock price ST at the end of the 
simulation path.  Running this simulation n times results in final stock prices STi with 1≤i≤n.  
Also knowing that the value of the European call at maturity T is given by MAX[ST-X;0], he 
approximates the value of a call using (6.29).  
(6.29) 
                                                 
344 There are numerous other examples where MCA is used to value financial options.  A more recent 
example can be found at Menn (2004, p. 111). 
345 For a more detailed description of the approach refer to Boyle (1977, p. 328) or Korn and Korn 
(1999, S. 205). 
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Use in valuation of drug development projects 
According to Bode-Greuel and Greuel (2005) and Bratic et al. (1997), MCA is a 
methodology that can be applied to drug development valuation problems.  This study 
refrains from presenting an individual application case of MCA in drug development because 
these cases are based on individual probability distributions for the relevant parameters and 
therefore such a presentation would not add value to the general understanding of the 
concept, which was already introduced above from a methodological standpoint. 
The general reason why MCA appears appropriate for the valuation of drug development 
projects is the fact that it is a very flexible approach that allows for the incorporation of a 
wide range of environmental parameters.  It also gives the user the opportunity to assign 
various kinds of individual probability distributions to the input parameters of a valuation 
model.  This characteristic is desirable when evaluating pharmaceutical R&D recalling the 
various risk factors presented in chapter 5.1 that can influence the value of a drug 
development project.  Bratic et al. (1997) expect an increasing use of Monte Carlo based and 
other subjective models to value drug development projects in the future.  Because of the 
flexibility of this approach, an adapted MCA approach is used in the quantitative section of 
this study. 
6.5 Applicability of Existing Concepts in Valuation of a R&D Option 
After presenting some of the established option valuation methodologies and how they are 
applied to the valuation of drug development projects, this concluding section of the chapter 
discusses the applicability of these established models.  Since it is not a key objective of this 
study to prove the inappropriateness of financial option models in the valuation of real 
options, only selected key points are highlighted.346  Table 6.2 summarizes the main 
advantages and disadvantages of the major financial option valuation approaches when 
evaluating real options.347 
The increasing use of financial option models to evaluate drug development projects and 
other real options348 appears questionable if one investigates the basic framework 
assumptions that need to be fulfilled for their appropriate use.  One of the main assumptions 
the models for financial options have in common is the concept of arbitrage free pricing.  
Arbitrage free pricing assumes that there is either another market traded asset or a portfolio of 
traded assets that exactly duplicates the payoff structure of the asset to be evaluated.  
                                                 
346 For more details on the limitations of financial option theory in real option valuation one can refer 
to Meise (1998, p. 82), Hilzenbecher (2000, p. 274), Lin (2002, p. 185) or Arnold and Shockley 
(2003) for additional information. 
347 For a detailed survey that investigates reasons why drug developing companies avoid the use of 
real option theory see Hartmann and Hassan (2006, p. 350). 
348 According to Dr. Christa Bähr, Leader Research Team “Life Science” at DZ Bank, in 
Ernst&Young (2002, p. 88). 
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Following the law of one price this duplicating asset or asset portfolio must trade at exactly 
the same price as the evaluated asset otherwise arbitrage opportunities would exist. 
The problem with this concept is that market prices only consider market or shared risk 
factors.  This is not a problem for financial options where the underlying asset is market 
traded but it becomes problematic for real options like pharmaceutical R&D projects where 
there is no market traded underlying asset.  These real options contain a significant amount of 
private risk as discussed in chapter 5.1, which cannot be duplicated with an asset portfolio 
and are therefore not considered by these traditional option valuation techniques.  Banerjee 
(2003, p. 68) already criticized the problem of underlying assets that are not market traded 
and Mello and Pyo (2003, p. 98) even conclude that “in the presence of private risk, the value 
of the option cannot be determined in a risk-neutral framework”. 
In an environment where private risk exists, preference-based subjective approaches must be 
employed to derive estimates of the value of real options.  Such an approach can capture the 
private risk factors impacting the value of a real option.  Since preference functions for 
individual market participants differ from each other and since there is no efficient market for 
real options, the value of complex real options like a drug development project is better 
represented by a range than by one specific value. 
Lin (2002, p. 185) considers the absence of market traded assets to create a duplicating 
portfolio as the biggest problem in applying financial option models to real option problems.  
Arnold and Shockley (2003) on the other hand confirm that the absence of market traded 
assets is a problem in the applicability of financial option theory on real options but they also 
conclude that other traditional valuation models such as NPV analysis are also based on 
critical assumptions making the financial option approach, despite these flaws, still the 
superior valuation method.  In addition to the problem of non-traded underlying assets of a 
real option, other issues also need to be mentioned. 
One of these additional points is related to the sensitivity of financial option prices to changes 
in their input parameters.  In previous chapters it was shown that the value of a European call 
option349 increases as the time to maturity increases, which is not necessarily true for real 
options.  In contrast to standard financial option pricing theory, Garner et al. (2002) 
concluded that the value of certain real options is inversely related to the time to maturity.  
The study conducted by Banerjee (2003, p. 67), which specifically covered drug development 
projects, also concluded that the longer the time to maturity, the higher the option value does 
not necessarily hold true.  The main reason for this adverse behavior of real options in drug 
development is the issue of patent protection and effective patent protection period350. 
                                                 
349 On a non-dividend paying stock. 
350 One of the few scientific sources that considers the effective patent protection period when valuing 
the launch of a new pharmaceutical product is the one of Gamba et al. (1999). 
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An additional point to be criticized is related to the maturity of real options.  While financial 
options have contractually fixed maturity dates that allow a precise modeling from a time 
perspective, real options usually lack this precision.  Instead of a given maturity date, this 
variable is stochastic by nature351 making it more difficult to apply a financial option 
valuation methodology that is based on a fixed lifetime of the option. 
It is also important to note that most of these models do not consider one individual 
characteristic that differentiates drug development projects as real options from financial 
options.  This characteristic is the non-exclusivity of these options.  When discussing the 
applicability of various valuation models it is important to recall the fact that a 
pharmaceutical research project does not represent an exclusive option as most financial 
options do352.  This important difference between the two option types is not explicitly 
considered in any of the financial option models discussed above. 
Besides these general points of concern regarding the applicability of financial option theory 
on real options, there are additional points that should be mentioned on the individual 
methodologies described in the previous sections.  The binomial tree approach has achieved 
high acceptance in the industry353 because it follows an intuitive logic and can easily be 
explained.  Although its simplicity is widely appreciated, the technique also has certain 
drawbacks.  One stage binomial trees can often be considered inappropriate because most real 
options and especially corporate investment projects are multi-staged requiring a valuation 
model to include multiple decision points to better reflect managerial flexibility.354 
The use of multi-stage binomial trees on the other hand appears critical for long-term real 
options such as drug development projects because it does not consider new information 
gathered during the course of one project stage and only changes environmental factors at 
pre-defined decision points.  Recalling that individual project stages in drug development can 
take multiple years to complete, this appears critical when setting up a valuation model.  In a 
setting of ongoing information gathering, continuous time models appear more appropriate.  
The presented continuous time models themselves have to be criticized in certain points when 
it comes to real option valuation.  When recalling the requirements for the applicability of the 
Black-Scholes formula, it becomes clear that an application for real options is critical.  This 
results from the fact that the underlying of a real option is generally not market traded on a 
continuous basis, the value of the underlying does not necessarily follow a geometric 
                                                 
351 Compare to Fischer, Kay M. (1996, p. 142) 
352 The difference between exclusive financial options and shared real option rights was extensively 
discussed in chapter 3.2.2. 
353 Compare to Mun (2002, p. 100) 
354 See also Copeland and Tufano (2004) 
6. Option Theory in the Valuation of Drug Development 
 
116 
Brownian motion355, uncertainty over time is not constant and the relevant markets are 
neither frictionless nor complete. 
The mentioned uncertainty in the BS model is expressed by the volatility factor, which is 
assumed to be constant over time356.  This is unrealistic uncertainty often changes over time 
and therefore it seems impossible to determine a single correct standard deviation for the 
valuation of real option.  This is criticized by Pennings and Lint (1997, p. 92).  Brach (2003, 
p. 48) considers the task of deriving the correct volatility as challenging, “if not impossible”.  
Pennings and Lint (1997, p. 92) considered this such a critical issue that they abandon BS 
approaches altogether while other studies use the volatility of stock prices of comparable 
companies or even industry indices as estimators for the volatility.  Examples of figures used 
for this market volatility in the pharmaceutical industry are 40 to 60 per cent at Nichols 
(1994), 25 per cent at Perlitz et al. (1999), 26 per cent at Kellogg and Charnes (2000), 36 per 
cent at Banerjee (2003) and 102 per cent at Cassimon et al. (2004).  Considering the broad 
range of estimates observed, this emphasizes the difficulties when applying a closed-form 
valuation equation to a real option problem.357 
                                                 
355 See also Gamba et al. (1999) 
356 For a detailed discussion on valuation using stochastic project volatility see Nagel (2001). 
357 A comprehensive study investigating the impact of stochastic volatility in financial option 
valuation can be found at Nagel (2001). 
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 Main Advantages Main Application Problems 
Tree based valuation 
approach 
• Easy to understand approach with 
simple step model 
• Only basic math skills required 
• Intuitive logic of iterative solution 
• Constant risk within a project stage 
• Fixed duration of project steps 




• Objective valuation 
• Closed form approach 
• Few input parameters 
• Underlying has to be market traded 
• Value of underlying has to follow 
Geometric Brownian Motion 
• Does not consider private risk 
• Constant volatility 
• Does not consider project stages 




• Objective valuation 
• Closed form approach 
• More realistic approach compared to 
BS for most real life situations 
• Underlying has to be market traded 
• Value of underlying has to follow 
Geometric Brownian Motion 
• Does not consider private risk 
• Constant volatility 
• Uses fixed time to maturity 
Monte Carlo Analysis 
(MCA) 
• Complex input parameter 
dependencies can be modeled 
• Flexible approach regarding 
distribution assumptions of input 
parameters 
• Well suited to consider subjective 
input parameter estimates 
• Detailed understanding of dependencies 
between input parameters necessary 
• Requires knowledge about distribution 
of input factors 
• Can be complex to model 
• Can be time consuming because of large 
number of simulation runs 
Table 6.2: Applicability of financial option theory in real option valuation 
As a bottom-line, it can be concluded that valuation methods that treat drug development 
projects as real options and apply existing financial option theory for their valuation do have 
significant drawbacks.  The main issue is the fact that by adopting these valuation 
methodologies, the specific market environment and risk factors of the industry are not 
sufficiently considered.  This point has already been criticized by Bahuguna (2000) who 
states that “option pricing – fine for the stock and oil exploration, option pricing models don’t 
work in valuing life science research” and was already indicated on Table 3.3 where risk-
neutral valuation techniques were only considered appropriate for Type 0 Real Options.  
Copeland and Tufano (2004, p. 90) come to the same conclusion that environmental factors 
influencing real option values are not sufficiently considered in traditional financial option 
valuation models.  They conclude that “it would be dangerous to try to reduce those 
complexities into standard option models, such as the Black-Scholes model”358.  This view is 
supported by Hilzenbecher (2000, p. 274) who concludes that especially for complex option 
valuation problems with a mixture of private and market risk factors, subjective valuation 
approaches are the only feasible approach. 
                                                 
358 Copeland and Tufano (2004, p. 90) 
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To take this criticism into account a subjective model to value a R&D option is developed in 
the following part III of this study.  This model considers that the underlying of the R&D 
option is not market traded, that a R&D option does not have a fixed time to maturity, that the 
value of the underlying does not necessarily follow a Geometric Brownian Motion and that 
R&D options do not represent exclusive option rights.  With the developed model 
representing a subjective model its results, as for all models of this type, heavily depend on 
the quality of the input parameters used.  Since a discussion regarding approaches on how to 
select correct input parameters for a subjective model represents a comprehensive study on its 
own, this is not within the scope of this study and the following part III.  Instead, the model is 
developed step by step and its application is explained for the practitioner using an illustrative 
case example. 
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PART III: Quantitative Concept Assessment 
7 Fund Raising Potential of R&D Option in Idealistic Environment 
Within the drug developing industry it is important that a round of financing allows a 
company to either reach breakeven or to achieve the next project milestone, which opens the 
door to additional sources of financing.359  This chapter investigates the financing potential 
that resides in a R&D option in an idealistic market environment.  It represents the base for 
the subsequent chapter where some of these assumptions are relaxed to assess the financing 
potential in a more realistic environment. 
7.1 Basic Assumptions of the Idealistic Market Environment 
In the context of this study the term idealistic market environment is used to describe an 
artificial environment, which is characterized by certain simplifying assumptions.  These 
assumptions are made to reduce modeling complexity and to better describe the thought 
process when assessing the fund raising potential of a R&D option. 
The first assumption is related to the market potential of a drug candidate under development.  
In reality, no company knows with exact certainty which revenues or profits a new drug can 
generate until the development process is finalized and the drug is physically introduced into 
the market.  This future market potential depends on multiple external factors that can vary 
over time and that are highly complex if not impossible to model.  To avoid this problem 
during this assessment phase, it is assumed that in an idealistic market environment the future 
market potential of a new drug is known and constant over time.360 
The second assumption is related to a new drug introduction on the market.  In reality there is 
a chance that regulatory market approval of new drugs will be revoked even after they have 
been introduced on the market361.  For simplification reasons this additional risk is excluded 
from the analysis.  The assumption is therefore that a new drug, once approved by regulatory 
authorities, maintains its approval status at least until the related patents expire. 
An additional factor related to the market potential of a new drug is the field of competition 
in the drug developing industry.  In this first valuation step an assumption is made that is 
                                                 
359 This point is emphasized by Ernst&Young (2003, p. 83). 
360 Working with a constant market potential represents a simplifying assumption because in reality 
product sales and in return total contribution margins generally increase over the lifetime of a 
pharmaceutical product until the end of the patent protection period as shown in Grabowski and 
Vernon (2000a), Banerjee (2003), Brach (2003), Shockley et al. (2003) and multiple others. 
361 Recent examples include the 2001 case, which received large public attention, where Bayer had to 
take its blockbuster Lipobay® from the market.  Other cases of recalls of approved drugs include 
Redux®, Vioxx®, Bextra® and Tysabri®.  On recent drug recalls see also Kutter et al. (2004), 
Handelsblatt (2004a), Handelsblatt (2004b), Handelsblatt (2005), Süddeutsche Zeitung (2005) or 
Lindner (2005). 
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frequently used in scientific literature362.  It is assumed that real options represent exclusive 
option rights because it significantly reduces modeling complexity.  Knowing that this 
assumption is an artificial one and does not represent reality, this assumption is relaxed in 
section 8.1.4.  Until then, the idealistic assumption is used that competition does not exist and 
that a drug development project represents an exclusive right on future cash flows until a 
granted patent expires. 
There is one more assumption related to competition that is made at this point.  This 
assumption is related to the competitive situation after the patent of a drug has expired and 
generic drug manufacturers are allowed to enter the market.  The average sales profile in 
section 2.3 demonstrates the immediate sales drop for branded products after patent 
expiration and therefore it is assumed that the company that initially developed a product 
loses all its sales and profits at the point of patent expiration.  In addition it is assumed that 
the company neither has the opportunity to expand the product lifetime through patent 
extensions nor to establish a new patent by expanding into new therapeutic areas or by 
developing new application formats. 
Summarizing these assumptions related to the patent protection period it can be concluded 
that the life cycle of a drug ends exactly twenty years after a patent was filed with regulatory 
authorities.  At the end of this life cycle, revenues and profits immediately decrease to zero 
and the value of the project also drops to zero because of the lack of related future revenue 
streams and business opportunities. 
With the assumptions above, the idealistic market environment is characterized by: 
• Known and constant market potential over time 
• No competition 
• No technical failure risk after initial regulatory approval of a new drug 
• Immediate total loss of revenues and profits at the end of the patent protection period 
• No opportunity to extend product lifecycle beyond 20-year patent protection period 
• Salvage value of zero at the end of patent protection period 
7.2 Potential R&D Option Buyer Classification 
In chapter 6.5 it is discussed that there is no complete market for drug development projects 
and therefore the value of a project depends on the individual judgment of the market 
participants.  If the R&D project itself does not have one specific value the same holds true 
for the R&D option with the project as the underlying asset.  In the absence of a complete 
                                                 
362 These studies generally do not assume option exclusivity in an explicit way but rather neglect the 
opportunity of others to exercise a similar option right and therefore implicitly assume that the 
option is exclusive by nature.  An example of treating real options that way can be found at 
Cassimon et al. (2004). 
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market, the price and at the same time the related financing potential of the R&D option is 
always negotiated between two parties and depends on their personal expectations.  Lin 
(2002, p. 186) argues that for real option valuation problems where the underlying asset is not 
market traded and investors cannot be assumed to be risk neutral, individual risk preferences 
need to be subjectively considered in the valuation approach. 
For this reason, this section classifies potential buyers of a R&D option into categories to 
identify investors that are potentially willing to pay the highest and the lowest price for such 
an option right.  The classification is carried out along two dimensions.  One dimension is the 
buyers’ ability to diversify unsystematic risk and the second one is the availability of 
financial resources on buyers’ side. 
7.2.1 Buyers’ Ability to Diversify Risk 
Before entering into any risky investment, investors assess their own personal willingness to 
tolerate risk.  They do so to estimate if the expected return justifies taking on the risk 
associated with a specific investment.  The reason for this behavior is the fact that investors 
are generally risk-avers363, which means that they avoid acquiring risky assets unless those 
assets have a higher expected return than assets without risk.  In particular, a risk averse 
investor always prefers a less risky asset over a risky one if they are expected to yield the 
same return.  The assumption that investors are risk avers is generally accepted and widely 
used in economic literature364. 
In an economy with incomplete markets and risk averse investors, one needs to be aware of 
the risk exposure of the individual investor.  This is necessary to draw conclusions about the 
return an investor expects and therefore the price he is willing to pay to enter a specific 
investment.  Taking a closer look at risk itself reveals that there are two different types of 
risks as described above, where the two components private and market risk are introduced.  
With these two types of risk, the common total risk definition can be used: 
Total Risk = Market Risk + Private Risk 
Based on portfolio theory it is known that the combination of two investments, unless their 
risk is perfectly positively correlated, results in a portfolio that is less risky than the weighted 
risk average of the two investments.  Since all investments are somehow influenced by 
market forces, it is impossible to find two investments that are perfectly negatively correlated 
and therefore diversification can reduce some but cannot eliminate all risk associated with an 
investment365.  The theoretical maximum diversification can be achieved by investing in all 
                                                 
363 For a more detailed discussion on risk aversion refer to Perridon and Steiner (2002, p. 107). 
364 According to Brigham et al. (1999, p. 168) 
365 Risk diversification in drug develoment is investigated by Ding and Eliashberg (2002) who build a 
model that allows optimizing the chance of a research development portfolio to contain at least one 
successful product. 
7. Fund Raising Potential of R&D Option in Idealistic Environment 
 
122 
opportunities in the market that are not perfectly correlated366.  Since this study focuses on 
the drug developing industry, players in this industry are expected to only consider 
investments in the same industry and therefore the maximum theoretical diversification is 
represented by an investment in all ongoing drug development projects. 
The remaining risk after establishing such a complete portfolio is the general market risk of 
the drug developing industry.  The risk that is diversified on the other hand is the project risk 
related to the individual drug development projects.  Figure 7.1 illustrates how an increasing 
number of investment projects can reduce the total risk of an investment portfolio.  In chapter 
5.2 it is described, which risk components in drug development can be considered private risk 







Figure 7.1: Risk reduction through diversification 
With the described diversification in mind it can be said that the more investment projects an 
individual or a company holds367, the smaller the total risk to which this entity is exposed368.  
Because of investors’ risk aversion it can also be said that the more investments an entity 
holds, the smaller the total return it expects from these investments relative to the weighted 
risk advantage.  Since the return of an investment decreases as its price increases it follows 
that a well diversified investor is willing to pay a higher price for an investment than one who 
is not able to diversify risk over a multitude of different projects.  An investor fully 
diversified within the industry therefore not only requires the risk-free interest as a return on 
his investment but also a premium to be compensated for the remaining general industry risk. 
                                                 
366 This is called the market portfolio. 
367 Assuming their risk is not perfectly correlated. 
368 This is heavily supported by Hodder and Riggs (1985) who state that “the risk of a particular 
project appears lower from a portfolio perspective than from the perspective of an analyst looking at 
the project itself”. 
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The described risk-value relationship is in line with recent real option literature.  One 
example is the study of Lin (2002) who finds that the higher the diversification in an 
investor’s portfolio, the higher the subjective value of a real option this investor holds369. 
7.2.2 Availability of Financial Resources on the Buyer’s Side 
The second dimension impacting the outcome of price negotiations between a seller of a 
R&D option and a potential buyer is the availability of financial resources.  This point needs 
to be considered because in reality financial resources are limited.  One of the assumptions 
used in a wide range of scientific studies that financial resources are available to an unlimited 
extent therefore does not hold true370. 
Most studies on option pricing are based on risk-neutral valuation and use a risk-free interest 
rate for the valuation.  This approach might be applicable in situations where a general 
market view is applied but not for the purpose of this study.  Kellogg and Charnes (2000, p. 
81) justify the use of risk-neutral pricing by saying “furthermore, because we are interested in 
the market (rather than a subjective or private) value of the project […] the use of risk-neutral 
pricing is justified by the same arguments made by Cox et al. (1979) for pricing financial 
assets that are traded directly in the market.”  For this study, exactly this subjective or private 
value of an individual R&D project is of key interest and therefore it is essential to take a 
closer look at the applicable interest rates if the use of risk-free rates is not appropriate. 
When considering an investment in a R&D option, a potential buyer compares the investment 
opportunity with other investment alternatives and they are therefore in direct competition for 
available funds.  It follows that a risk averse investor makes his first investment into the 
opportunity promising the highest return with all other factors being comparable.  Once the 
first investment opportunity with an expected return of rmax is completed, the investor uses his 
remaining funds to pursue the second best investment alternative with an expected return rexp 
below rmax but above the return of all other remaining investment opportunities available. 
In this situation it becomes clear that the more financial resources an investor has available, 
the more promising investment projects can be completed and the lower rexp.  In case there 
are sufficient resources available to pursue all promising investment opportunities, the 
investor is still able to invest remaining funds in the capital market and to buy investments 
such as governmental bonds, which are always available to an investor371.  The expected 
                                                 
369 Which is caused by the risk reduction effect achieved through risk diversification. 
370 This is also one of the basic assumptions of the fundamental paper on option pricing of Black and 
Scholes (1973) who assume that “it is possible to borrow any fraction of the price of a security to 
buy it or hold it, at the short-term interest rate”, which is not a realistic assumption in a real business 
environment. 
371 Because of the size of this segment of financial markets today, it represents an unlimited 
investment opportunity to the individual investor.  In addition, the investor does not have to be 
concerned about influencing market conditions with his own individual investment because the 
relative size of this investment compared to the market size can always be neglected.  To support 
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return of these investments can therefore be considered the minimum return achievable 
because if an investment is not expected to reach this minimum return rmin, it is not 
considered a viable alternative.  Instead, available funds are directed to the financial market.  
Figure 7.2 shows this relationship between availability of financial resources and the 










































































Figure 7.2: Relationship between availability of funds and expected return 
If an investor has the opportunity to invest funds into a R&D option, this investment 
competes with the next investment he could alternatively pursue.  It is known that the 
expected return rexp of this next investment opportunity fulfills rmax≥rexp≥rmin and is also 
referred to as opportunity cost ropp because it is the cost for not pursuing the next investment 
opportunity. 
With the above explanations it follows that the more financial resources an investor has 
available, the more projects can be completed and therefore the lower ropp becomes372.  With 
these lower return expectations, an investor with more financial resources is willing to invest 
more into a R&D option than an investor with very limited financial resources.  This is 
caused by the fact that a higher initial investment reduces the expected return of an 
investment with all other factors remaining unchanged. 
7.2.3 Buyer Classification Matrix 
Above, two dimensions are discussed that influence the price investors are willing to pay for 
a R&D option and two relations are identified: 
                                                                                                                                                        
this point one should consider that the US Government alone had US$4,580 billion in treasury 
securities outstanding to the public in July 2005 according to BPD (2005) and average daily trading 
of these securities reached a volume of US$535 billion according to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York FEDNY (2005). 
372 Assuming all available projects are of similar risk. 
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• The more research projects a potential investor pursues, the lower his total private risk 
exposure373 due to diversification effects.  This reduces the total risk this investor 
associates with an additional R&D project and therefore the higher the price he is 
willing to pay for this investment or a call option on it. 
• The more financial resources a buyer of a R&D option has available, the higher the 
price he is willing to pay because the lower his expected return. 
Based on these findings, potential buyers of a R&D option can be classified along the two 
dimensions investment structure and availability of financial resources to determine the 
classes of investors that finally determine the financing potential of a R&D option.  Figure 
7.3 illustrates this classification of potential R&D option buyers.  It can be derived, which 
investors are willing to pay the lowest price for a R&D option and which ones are willing to 
only pay the highest price.  With this information, a pricing range can be determined, which 
is limited by these two extreme types of investors. 
With all other environmental factors being the same, an investor with very limited financial 
resources and without other ongoing projects to diversify unsystematic risk exposure is only 
willing to pay a reduced amount of money to acquire a R&D option.  This is caused by the 
fact that this investor is exposed to general market risk and all project-specific risks because 
he does not benefit from diversification effects.  In addition, this type of investor has the 
highest return expectations because the investment competes with a multitude of alternative 
investment opportunities that cannot be pursued if the R&D option is acquired.  An example 
of this type of investor is a small drug developing company with very limited financial 
resources that has to decide between buying a R&D option or to invest the same amount of 
money in internal research to pursue a promising internal research project. 
At the other end of the spectrum one can find an investor who owns a portfolio of a large 
number of different research projects and who still has significant financial resources 
available to be invested.  Such an investor has diversified most or all project-specific private 
risk and is only exposed to general market risk.  This in combination with his financial ability 
to pursue a wide variety of new projects makes him the type of investor who is willing to pay 
the highest price for a R&D option or any other investment. 
Pharmaceutical companies with large research portfolios374 and significant accrued reserves 
to be invested375 are potential buyers of a R&D option that fall into this category.  Bäcker and 
Hommel (2002, p. 510) follow this point of view with their finding that technical or project 
                                                 
373 Compared to the weighted risk advantage of the individual investments. 
374 On the strategic importance and management of research portfolios refer to MacMillan and 
McGrath (2002). 
375 Compare to Lichtenberg (2001, p. 221) who states that “it also seems unlikely that “big pharma” 
firms such as Pfizer and Glaxo SmithKline are constrained in their liquidity”. 
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specific risk is completely uncorrelated with market risk and a fully diversified investor does 
not expect to be compensated for this type of risk. 































High return expectations 
– competition with 
multiple promising 
investment alternatives
Lower return expectations 
– competition with very 
few promising investment 
alternatives
 
Figure 7.3: Potential R&D option buyer classification matrix 
With these explanations it can be said that the financing potential of a R&D option is not a 
fixed number but rather a range, which is limited to both sides by the two types of investors 
described.  In the remainder of this study these two cases are investigated to determine an 
upper and a lower limit of this financing range.  Since all other types of option buyers fall 
into this range, an additional investigation of their investment preferences does not add value 
to this study and therefore only the two most extreme cases are considered. 
7.2.4 Expected Investors’ Return 
To determine the financing range of the R&D option using a subjective valuation approach it 
is necessary to have knowledge of the return investors expect from their investment and 
therefore the discount factor to be applied.  Following Dixit and Pindyck (1995, p. 107), the 
use of opportunity cost as a discount factor would theoretically produce meaningful results 
for the lower pricing limit because it incorporates all the systematic or non-diversifiable risk 
associated with an individual project in the calculations.  In reality, opportunity cost can 
hardly be used as a discount factor because of the criticism mentioned at Perridon and Steiner 
(2002, p. 87) who describe opportunity cost as a waste product of a result rather than an input 
parameter to generate a result and because this factor is extremely difficult to measure.  Dixit 
and Pindyck (1995, p. 107) state that it is appropriate to substitute opportunity cost with the 
weighted average cost of capital of a company as long as a company’s projects are exposed to 
a similar non-diversifiable risk.  For projects with significant private risk, adjustments are 
necessary to appropriately consider these risk factors. 
As shown above, drug development projects do include a significant amount of private risk 
and therefore the unadjusted use of weighted average cost of capital (WACC) appears 
critical.  In addition, Loch and Bode-Greuel (2001, p. 232) limit the appropriate use of 
WACC to cases where funds for R&D are not scarce.  As discussed above, the availability of 
financial resources is one of the factors impacting the willingness to invest in a R&D option 
and therefore the requirements for the use of WACC as a discount factor in the valuation 
approach are not fulfilled to derive the lower financing limit of the R&D option. 
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For the case of the upper financing limit the availability of financial resources is, by 
definition, not critical.  In addition the upper limit is defined by an investor with fully 
diversified private risk.  As long as this type of investor operates within one industry the 
involved non-diversifiable risk appears the same for all investment projects, being equivalent 
to the general industry risk.  To determine the upper financing range of a R&D option the use 
of WACC therefore appears appropriate because it fulfills the requirement of unlimited 
financial resources as well as comparable systematic risk over all investments. 
Nevertheless, WACC represents a factor, which is specific to an individual company and is 
affected by its capital structure376.  To apply a more general view, the expected return of an 
abstract investor determining the upper financing limit of a R&D option is broken down into 
two components.  The first component is represented by the risk-free rate of return applicable 
to any investor.  In addition, an investor fully diversified within the industry requires a return 
premium for the systematic industry risk, which cannot be diversified.  For the purpose of 
this study the following notation is used to describe the two return components. 
 rrf - Risk-free rate of interest 
 α - Return premium for general market risk 
As discussed above, the described expected return (rrf+α) is also relevant for the investor 
representing the lower end of the financing range.  In addition, this type of investor expects to 
be compensated for private risk he is unable to diversify and therefore a risk premium is 
introduced to consider this inability to diversify risk.  The risk premiums are selected in 
accordance with the risk factors involved in drug development projects as described in 
section 5.1.  The following parameters are introduced for the quantitative assessment. 
 β - Return premium for the risk of competition 
 ε - Return premium for potential project failure 
 ρ - Return premium for uncertain project timing 
To reduce modeling complexity throughout the remainder of this work it is assumed that the 
introduced additional risk premiums consider the financial situation of a potential investor as 
opposed to introducing an additional factor to model a premium for the availability of 
financial resources.  With all these premiums being subjective by nature this appears an 
appropriate simplification.  For an investor A with better access to financial resources 
compared to an investor B, this simplification implies that βA<βB, εA<εB and ρA<ρB. 
                                                 
376 The calculation of a firm's WACC includes the financing cost of all corporate capital sources - 
common stock, preferred stock, bonds and any other long-term debt.  WACC is calculated by 
multiplying the cost of each capital component by its proportional weight and then adding all 
components up to derive the corporate WACC. 
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7.3 Upper Pricing Limit of a R&D Option 
This section investigates the maximum amount a seller can expect to receive when offering a 
R&D option.  In chapter 7.2 it is described that potential buyers with an opportunity to 
diversify unsystematic risk and unlimited financial resources are the type of buyer that can be 
expected to pay the highest price for a R&D option.  Modeling the price expectations of this 
buyer therefore results in the upper limit of the pricing range of a R&D option.  The condition 
of a fully diversified investor377 is best fulfilled by large pharmaceutical companies holding 
extensive and diverse product and research portfolios. 
Initially this upper pricing case was intended to be modeled using a risk-neutral valuation 
model because such an approach by definition eliminates unsystematic risk.  While this 
allows a much simpler valuation model, it creates a market view on the situation and does not 
result in a subjective view of the project, which is the relevant perspective in an incomplete 
market.  The price of the R&D option is a result of individual price negotiations because of 
the absence of a liquid market.  Kellogg and Charnes (2000, p. 81) already claim that the use 
of risk-neutral pricing is only appropriate “for pricing financial assets that are traded directly 
in the market”. 
On the other hand, Loch and Bode-Greuel (2001) support the view that large diversified 
companies are the type of investors that can be described as being risk-neutral when making 
an investment378.  While this might be a valid point of view for investments in market traded 
assets, it is not applicable to this study because the requirement of a complete market is not 
fulfilled.  Pennings and Lint (1997, p. 84) discuss this issue in their evaluation of options in 
the high-tech industry. 
To consider a more private and subjective view, a new model for the upper pricing limit is 
developed instead of building a model based on existing risk-neutral valuation approaches. 
7.3.1 Underlying Assumptions 
In addition to the underlying assumption of an idealistic market environment there are several 
points to be clarified before the model to assess the fund raising potential of a R&D option is 
built.  The most important assumptions are related to the drug development project 
representing the underlying asset of the R&D option. 
For the purpose of this study the variable Drug Approval Value (DAV) is introduced.  The 
DAV represents the value of a new drug at the time it is approved by regulatory authorities.  
The point of final drug approval is noted as TA and is measured relative to the point patent 
protection status is requested.  The DAV of an approved new drug at time TA is equal to the 
                                                 
377 Fully diversified in this context always refers to being fully diversified within the industry and not 
across the entire economy as described above. 
378 “A large company […] is typically risk-neutral, as the projects under discussion are small relative 
to the company’s business” Loch and Bode-Greuel (2001). 
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sum of its discounted contribution margins CM(t) being revenues less all running cost such as 
production, marketing and distribution costs over the effective patent protection period.  In 
addition, a drug potentially has a terminal value TV at time TX when the patent expires.  With 
this in mind, the drug approval value can be defined as equation (7.1). 
(7.1) 
DAV : Drug Approval Value at the point of drug approval TA 
CM(t) : Contribution margins from sales of the approved new drug in period t 
TA : Time of final drug approval relative to the point when the application for patent 
protection status is filed with regulatory authorities 
TX : Time of patent expiration relative to the point when the application for patent 
protection status is filed with regulatory authorities 
TVTX : Terminal Value of a drug at the end of the patent protection period 
r : Applied discount factor 
It is defined for the idealistic market environment that the market potential measured in total 
contribution margins379 is constant over time and that a project has no salvage value once the 
related patent expires380.  From these assumptions it can be concluded that CM(t)=MP, with 
MP being a constant and TVTX=0.  In combination with the knowledge that patent expiration 
occurs exactly twenty years after the application for patent protection status and therefore 
TX=20, equation (7.1) can be simplified to equation (7.2). 
(7.2) 
Solving the integral leads to formula  (7.3) for the valuation of the drug approval value DAV. 
 (7.3) 
From  (7.3) it becomes clear that the drug approval value significantly depends on the 
discount factor r used in the calculation.  Finding the appropriate discount factor for valuation 
problems is a challenging task and it is not uncommon in the context of drug development to 
find companies using a wide range381 of discount rates from as low as 8%382 up to 30%383.  
                                                 
379 Banerjee (2003, p. 70) estimate the cash operating margin in the pharmaceutical industry during 
the patent protection period to be around thirty per cent of revenues in a free market environment 
while it is around twenty five per cent of revenues in a price regulated environment. 
380 This is consistent to the drug development valuation approach of Banerjee (2003, p. 68) who does 
not consider revenues from the post-patent protection area for his study. 
381 For the upper range of discount factors the findings of Hodder and Riggs (1985, p. 135) can be 
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The widely respected work of DiMasi et al. (2003, p. 164) on drug development cost uses a 
real discount rate of 11.9% for a fully diversified investor384.  With finding the correct 
discount factor for valuation problems being a study in itself, this work uses generic 
placeholders throughout the discussion.  For demonstration purposes these placeholders are 
filled with exemplary figures.  The assumed magnitude for the risk-free rate of interest and 
the introduced risk premiums are shown in Table 7.1.  For detailed valuable discussions on 
discount rates used in corporate investment decisions one can refer to Schwarz, Horst (1967), 
Brandt (1970), Krause (1973), Brealey and Myers (2000) or Perridon and Steiner (2002). 
Risk free rate of interest rrf = 4% 
Return premium for general market risk α = 7% 
Return premium for the risk of competition β = 5% 
Return premium for potential project failure ε = 5% 
Return premium for uncertain project timing ρ = 5% 
Table 7.1: Assumptions on magnitude of discount factors for valuation examples 
In addition, an exemplary drug development project is introduced to demonstrate the various 
valuation steps presented in this study.  Table 7.2 summarizes the main characteristics of this 
illustrative case example. 
Fixed market potential as total contribution margin per annum  MP = 100 
Upper limit of market potential expectations as total contribution margin per 
annum (95% confidence) MPu = 120 
Lower limit of market potential expectations as total contribution margin per 
annum (95% confidence) MPl = 80 
Initial expected project termination date from time of patent application E(TA) = 11 
Initial uncertainty related to log-normally distributed project duration σln(TA) = 0.20 
Initial lower 95% confidence interval for log-normally distributed project duration LoL95%(TA) = 7.4 
Initial upper 95% confidence interval for log-normally distributed project duration UpL95%(TA) = 16.4 
Minimum initial project termination date for exp. distributed project delay TAmin(0) = 11 
Initial 95% confidence interval for exponentially distributed project delay TAmax(0) = 16.4 
Table 7.2: Underlying assumptions for illustrative case example 
For demonstration purposes, a R&D option on this case example is defined that allows the 
owner to acquire the outcome of the project for 400 mil. monetary units at the time of final 
drug approval.  Additional details on the case example are introduced in the individual 
sections of this work when they become relevant for the presented valuation approach. 
                                                                                                                                                       
382 See Dixit and Pindyck (1995, p. 108) 
383 See Loch and Bode-Greuel (2001, p. 233) 
384 “These technical risks can be diversified away by investors”, DiMasi et al. (2003, p. 170). 
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7.3.2 Time Discrete One Step Binomial Assessment 
This section is intended to summarize some points on option theory and apply them to the 
specific valuation problem of this study.  In the tree based valuation approaches for R&D 
projects, described in chapter 6.1, a company conducting internal R&D is confronted with 
multiple decision points to abandon a project.  While this might be the case for the research 
conducting company itself, it is not the case for a company buying a R&D option.  The owner 
of such a R&D option has exactly one decision point where he can execute his right or can let 
it expire unexercised.  By definition this point is fixed relative to the value chain and always 
occurs at the time a new drug is approved by regulatory authorities.  Should the project fail 
before this point it does not reach this final decision point and also expires unexercised. 
While a research conducting company holds a real compound call option with uncertain time 
to maturity, a R&D option owner holds a European style call option with uncertain time to 
maturity.  This reduces the complexity of the valuation problem as visualized in Figure 7.4 
where the differences between decision points in internal research are directly compared to 
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Figure 7.4: Number of decision points for internal R&D and a R&D option 
The decision rule for the R&D option owner is the same as for a financial call option.  If the 
value of the underlying asset, in this case the research project, exceeds the agreed exercise 
price X at maturity the option is exercised.  In all other cases the option expires unexercised.  
With the value of the project at drug approval being the defined drug approval value DAV, 
the value of the R&D option C at the final decision point can be written as follows. 
(7.4) 
Figure 7.5 illustrates the R&D option exercise decision rule.  It also shows that irrespective of 
t1 the option is bought, the decision rule at TA remains unchanged. 
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Figure 7.5: Decision rule for exercising R&D option 
At this point, all parameters to determine DAV are known and not related to uncertainty 
therefore the exercise decision only depends on the exercise price X of the option.  If the 
exercise price is set too high, the option expires unexercised with a value of zero at TA.  In 
cases where X is fixed low enough for the option to be exercised at TA, the option has a 
known value of C(TA)=DAV-X at the time of expiration.  This relationship always holds true 
at the time of drug approval TA, no matter at which time t1 the R&D option is acquired. 
As defined in chapter 5.3.2, the R&D option can be written any time t1 between the time the 
application for patent protection is filed and the time of final drug approval.  If the process of 
developing a new drug was without additional risk, the R&D option would guarantee an 
amount of MAX[DAV-X;0] at time TA to the option owner.  To have the same amount at his 
disposal at time TA the investor has to invest an unknown amount of money at any time t1<TA 
in an alternative investment that guarantees an equivalent payout at time TA.  Since the 
payout can be predetermined with a given exercise price X the unknown amount of money 
can be quantified.  In cases where X is set high enough to let the R&D option expire 
unexercised the known payout is zero and therefore the value of the option at any time t1 is 
also zero.  For all cases where X is set low enough for the option to be exercised, the know 
value at TA is DAV-X and therefore the value of the R&D option can be expressed as (7.5). 
(7.5) 
This represents the value of the R&D option at time t if there is no uncertainty385 and the 
exercise decision can be predetermined by selecting an appropriate value for the exercise 
price X above or below the exercise threshold DAV.  Without any type of uncertainty at this 
                                                 
385 Except the basic market uncertainty discussed in section 7.3.1 and the related risk premium α. 
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stage of building the valuation model the applicable risk-free rate of interest represents the 
correct discount factor to be applied otherwise arbitrage opportunities would exist. 
7.3.3 Introduction of Continuous Project Failure Risk 
As described in chapter 5.1 the drug development process is far from being free of 
uncertainties.  The first and most important factor of uncertainty investors are exposed to is 
related to the potential failure of a project before a new drug is approved or that final 
approval is not granted by regulatory authorities.  This potential risk is generally modeled 
from the perspective of the research conducting company with a tree structure as indicated in 
Figure 7.4.  This implies that at the end of each project phase a decision is made to either 
continue the project and enter the next project phase or to abandon the project altogether386. 
Such a view is not appropriate from the perspective of the R&D option owner because he 
neither has control over the failure of the project nor does he know when decision points 
occur387.  With this in mind, it appears more appropriate to model the risk of project failure as 
a continuous function of time.  For this purpose a function is introduced that quantifies the 
failure risk of a standard drug development project.  This failure rate function is referred to as 
FR(tS) with ts being the time relative to the start of a new research project. 
FR(tS) = Failure Rate at time tS relative to the start of a development project 
The function to model a project’s failure risk has to fulfill multiple criteria: 
1. The function has to be defined for all tS from the start of the project until final 
approval.  If the R&D project starts at tS=0 and ends at tS=TAS, FR(tS) needs to be 
defined for all tS∈Dts with Dts=[0;TAS]. 
2. It can be assumed that the risk of technical failure of a drug development project 
decreases the more information is acquired over time388.  Since relevant information is 
continuously generated, FR(tS) is a strictly monotonic decreasing function in Dts.  This 
means for all tSa, tSb∈Dts with tSa<tSb that FR(tSa)>FR(tSb). 
                                                 
386 One can argue about the appropriateness of this modeling approach because in reality, a company 
involved in R&D activities not only has the option to abandon a project at the end of a project phase 
but can rather do so at any time.  Information about the prospectives of a project is generated on a 
continuous basis and therefore it appears more appropriate, even from the perspective of the 
research conducting company, to use a model considering potential project termination as a 
continuous function rather than using a few distinct decision points.  This appears even more 
important if one considers that the individual project phases between decision points can take 
multiple years to complete. 
387 This was one of the framework assumptions defined in chapter 5.3.2.  In reality a research 
conducting company will not be able to discontinue a project without a discussion and extensive 
information exchange with the option owner. 
388 Also refer to Boer (2003, p. 52) who states “in a well-managed project, the overall level of risk 
typically decreases”. 
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4. For this study it is assumed that at the time of final drug approval, all risk of technical 





5. Applying the intermediate value theorem it can be concluded that the domain WFR for 
FR(tS) for all tS∈Dts is WFR=[0;1]. 
The function FR(tS) has to approximate the experiences from previous studies shown in Table 
5.1 and therefore should match the data as closely as possible.  Plotting these failure rates 
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Figure 7.6: Results of recent studies on technical failure risk 
A function that fulfills criteria 1-5 and can be adjusted to approximate the plot in Figure 7.6 is 
a shifted and compressed cosine function with one exponent of the form (7.6).  This type of 
function is used for the standard failure risk with tS∈Dts, Dts=[0;TAS] and *+∈Rγ . 
(7.6) 
Using TAS=14 for the standard drug development project as shown on Table 2.1, equation 
(7.6) becomes (7.7) with tS∈Dts, Dts=[0;14] and *+∈Rγ . 
                                                 
389 The rational behind this point is the assumption that no approved drug is discontinued during its 
effective patent protection period.  In reality, a fraction of projects are discontinued even after final 




























To select a factor *+∈Rγ  that most appropriately fits function (7.7) into the plot of Figure 7.6, 
the method of relative least squares is used.  With this method *+∈Rγ  is selected in a way that 
the following relative error function (7.8), with i=[1;15] being the 15 points in Figure 7.6 and 
*
+∈Rγ , is minimized with )( SitFR  being the actual observed failure rates listed in Table 5.1 
and displayed in Figure 7.6. 
(7.8) 
The relationship between γ and Q(γ) is displayed in Figure 7.7, showing a local minimum for 












Figure 7.7: Relative error function of one exponent failure risk approximation 
For this study the rounded figure of γ=0.8 is used.  With the optimized value for γ, equation 
(7.6) can be transferred into the standardized failure risk function  (7.9) quantifying the risk 









































































































Figure 7.8 shows the derived failure risk function in comparison to the other historical studies 










































Figure 7.8: Technical failure risk approximation function 
To ensure a direct comparison between these studies, Table 7.3 shows the expected failure 
rates when entering a new stage of drug development.  For the purpose of this study it is not 
distinguished between different failure reasons because an outside view is applied.  In case 
drug development projects are evaluated internally, Villinger and Bogdan (2005) show that it 
is necessary to distinguish between economic failure390 and safety or efficacy related failure. 
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 CMR International391 VFA
392 Bain & Company393 
Failure Risk 
Proxy FR(tS) 
Pre-clinical Test 89.7% 91.7% 91.7% 91.2% 
Clinical Phase I 81.6% 79.2% 75.0% 67.4% 
Clinical Phase II 71.9% 70.6% 63.0% 57.4% 
Clinical Phase III 34.2% 44.4% 28.6% 36.4% 
Approval Process 9.4% 9.1% 9.1% 9.0% 
Table 7.3: Approx. failure risk entering various stages of drug development 
Although equation  (7.9) is suited to approximate the risk of technical failure during a drug 
development project, it needs an additional adjustment.  The adjustment is necessary because 
of the time factor ts, which models the failure risk relative to the start of the project and not 
relative to the time the application for patent protection is filed.  Since this point is defined as 
the reference point of this study, the following section transfers the failure risk function 
relative to ts to a new function relative to the starting point t. 
7.3.3.1 Approximation of a Standard Technical Risk Function 
In chapter 5.3.2 it is assumed that the first time an option can be written on a drug 
development project is the time an application for patent protection is filed and an intangible 
asset is created.  To take this assumption into account the function FR(tS) is adapted to a 
technical risk function TR(t) with t=0 being the time of patent application, which is equal to 
tS=3 considering the standardized base research period shown in Table 2.1.  This 
transformation is based on the following criteria. 
• TR(t) is independent from the time before filing for patent protection.  The point 
TR(0) marks the end of the base research phase irrespective of its duration. 
• TR(t) is dependent on the time of expected final approval for a new drug E(TA). 
• TR(t) has to be defined for all t∈Dt and Dt=[0;E(TA)]. 
• TR(t) has to be strictly monotonic decreasing in Dt.  This means for all ta, tb∈Dt with 
ta<tb that TR(ta)>TR(tb). 
• Technical risk at the time patent protection is requested is the same for all drug 
development projects therefore TR(0)=FR(3). 
• For this study it is assumed that at the time of final approval all risk of technical 





• Applying the intermediate value theorem it can be concluded that the domain WTR 
for TR(t) for all t∈Dt is WTR=[0;FR(3)]. 
                                                 
391 Source: PAREXEL (2003, p. 184) 
392 Source: FDA (2004, p. 5) 
393 Source: PAREXEL (2003, p. 170) 
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Equation (7.10) shows the derived394 function with TSS being the time period between the 
initiation of a project and the time of patent application of the averaged research project. 
(7.10) 
The technical risk function TR(t) with t∈Dt, Dt=[0;E(TA)] and E(TA)=11 matches exactly the 
path of the standardized failure risk function FR(tS) with tS∈Dts, Dts=[0;TAS] and TAS=14 
from tS=3 to tS=14.  Figure 7.9 shows various technical risk functions TRi(t) with different 















































TRi(t) TR5(t) TR6(t) TR7(t) TR8(t) TR9(t) TR10(t) TR11(t) TR12(t) TR13(t) 
E(TA) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Figure 7.9: Illustrative examples of various technical risk functions 
                                                 
394 Appendix A describes the transformation from the standardized failure risk function FR(tS) to the 
standardized technical risk function TR(t) in detail. 
395 While the technical risk function TR(t) defined by equation (7.10) is expressed relative to t, being 
the time an application for patent protection is filed, it can also be adapted to any later point in time 
during the research process.  This changes TR(t) to TR(t*) with t* being the new reference point 
expressed in time relative to the standard development project.  With this type of referencing TR(t) 
is equivalent to TR3(t3) but as the main formula used in this study, it is kept as TR(t) for readability 
purposes.  Since the derivation of TR(t*) does not add value to the main body of this work, one can 
refer to Appendix C for adjustments to the technical risk function. 
































































































































































To quantify the probability of completion during a research project as opposed to the risk of 
technical failure, a new measure is derived from the standardized technical risk function 
(7.10).  This new function for the expected completion rate CR of a project is defined as  
(7.11).  Alternative approaches to estimate technical risk can be found at Roberts and 
Weitzman (1981)396, Reinhardt (1997, p. 197) and DiMasi (2001b)397. 
(7.11) 
Figure 7.10 illustrates398 the difference between continuous information arrival and an 
approach considering new information arrival at discrete decision points.  The graph shows 
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Figure 7.10: R&D success rates of discrete vs. continuous information arrival 
                                                 
396 The approach of Roberts and Weitzman (1981) is based on the idea that development cost are paid 
to obtain additional information about the outcome of a R&D project.  In their model, uncertainty is 
a function of the remaining cost necessary to complete a project. 
397 DiMasi (2001) indicates in his study that the success rate of drug development projects can be 
predicted with a combination of two probability functions.  He suggests combining a probability for 
project survival with a probability of final drug approval. 
398 The graph is based on the standardized project stage durations defined in Table 2.1 and the failure 
risk proxy shown in Table 7.3. 
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7.3.3.2 Continuous Technical Risk Adjusted Assessment 
Above, the value of a R&D option in an idealistic market environment with known market 
potential and certain time to maturity is quantified.  It is discussed that in such an 
environment the exercise decision only depends on the exercise price and if it is set above or 
below a certain exercise threshold.  This threshold XThres is equal to the drug approval value 
DAV of a drug. 
(7.12) 
At this point it is assumed that X is set below the exercise threshold XThres and the R&D 
option is therefore exercised by the option owner if the drug development process is 
completed.  From (7.5) it can be seen that the value of the option at time t can be quantified 
using (7.13) with X<XThres399. 
(7.13) 
It is known from the discussion on risk in drug development that it is necessary to consider 
the project-specific risk of technical failure in the valuation model.  Recalling the assumption 
that X is set in a way that the option represents a valuable right if the point of final approval 
is reached, the option value is only zero to the owner in those cases where the investigated 
drug proves to be ineffective or dangerous before TA is reached.  This can happen any time 
during the course of the research project.  The probability that it happens is defined as the 
technical risk TR(t), which varies during the project and reflects the risk of technical failure 
throughout the drug development process.  To consider this potential loss of investment, the 
owner of the option is only willing to pay a price to acquire the option that is adjusted by a 
factor representing technical risk.  This risk adjusted upper pricing limit CU at time t can be 
calculated by weighting (7.13) with the expected success rate  
(7.11).  In addition the discount factor is changed to a level appropriate for the investigated 
type of investor.  As discussed above all market participants are exposed to general market 
risk and therefore the risk-free interest rate rrf is supplemented by the premium for general, 
non-diversifiable market risk α.  This results in a technical failure risk adjusted R&D option 
value (7.14) at time t. 
(7.14) 
In full detail it can be expressed as equation (7.15). 
                                                 
399 The opposite case with X≥XThres does not require special attention and can easily be explained.  For 
all X≥XThres the project value always stays below the agreed exercise price and therefore C(t)=0. 
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Figure 7.11 illustrates the upper R&D option value over time considering the risk of technical 















Figure 7.11: R&D option value considering continuous failure risk400 
Equation (7.15) only represents a first step in estimating the upper limit of the fund raising 
potential of a R&D option because it still does not consider uncertain project timing. 
7.3.4 Introduction of Uncertain Time to Maturity 
Equation (7.15) shows the value of the R&D option assuming known market potential and a 
known product development time being equivalent to a fixed maturity date of the R&D 
option.  In this chapter the assumption of a fixed maturity date is relaxed to consider the risk 
of uncertain development progress and uncertain market entry timing.  At the same time, this 
represents a characteristic that differentiates a R&D option from most financial options.  
While financial options generally have fixed maturity dates it is unclear when a project 
representing the underlying asset of a R&D option can b finalized.  The uncertain maturity 
                                                 
400 The plot in the graph is based on the illustrative drug development example defined in Table 7.2. 
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date of a R&D option affects its value through two main levers both impacting the future 
potential of the drug under development. 
The first lever is based on the fact that drug development options are not exclusive.  The 
longer the time to maturity the higher the risk that other companies enter the market for a 
specific indication with a competing product.  The risk of competition is not covered in this 
section because of the assumption that there is no competition in an idealistic market 
environment and the market potential is know and constant over time. 
The second lever is the impact time to maturity has on the total market potential of a new 
drug because of its direct relationship to the effective patent protection period, which is 
essential for profitable sales in the marketplace401.  The relationship between maturity date of 
the R&D option and the effective patent protection period is visualized in Figure 5.5. 
7.3.4.1 Introduction of Uncertain Time to Maturity 
In the previous sections it is assumed that time to maturity is fixed at TA and that technical 
risk is the only type of risk explicitly considered in the valuation model of the R&D option.  
At this point the assumption is relaxed and the Drug Approval Value is redefined as a 
variable directly depending on the time of final drug approval.  Treating the time of final drug 
approval as a variable parameter, DAV is adjusted to a function dependent on this time of 
final drug approval TA as represented by (7.16). 
(7.16) 
With TA∈D2, D2=]0;20] and MP representing the constant annual market potential in terms 
of total annual contribution.  The first derivative (7.17) of this function shows a negative 
relationship between final drug approval and the value of the research project at the time of 
final approval because it only takes on negative values in the relevant range 0<TA≤20. 
(7.17) 
The risk for the R&D option owner is now two-fold, even in an environment with constant 
market potential.  Not only can the project fail to generate any marketable drug at all, the 
development process can also take such a long time that the reduced drug approval value 
does not justify executing the option. 
                                                 
401 Recall the discussion around the sales profile of a new drug introduction in chapter 2.3. 
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Figure 7.12: R&D option decision tree considering two risk dimensions 
Figure 7.12 visualizes this situation by illustrating the two risk factors as consecutive steps in 
a decision tree.  While the first decision point considers the risk of technical failure, the 
second decision point represents the choice to exercise the R&D option if the project is 
completed successfully but takes too long to justify execution economically.  The decision 
rule if final approval is reached remains unchanged. 
From the exercise requirement DAV(TA)>X a threshold for TA can be derived that represents 
the limit for the option owner when to exercise the option right.  Recalling (7.16), setting 
DAV(TA)=X and solving this equation for the relevant value for TA allows the derivation of 
this threshold, which is labeled the execution limit EL.  It can now be said that the option 
owner exercises his option right at maturity if TA does not exceed the execution limit EL 
expressed by (7.18). 
(7.18) 
As a first requirement for executing the option the project has to be completed successfully 
with the probability of the introduced completion rate  
(7.11).  The second requirement is that the project has to be completed faster than the 
execution limit EL.  For this requirement the probability for fast development FD is 
introduced.  FD represents the probability that a research project can be completed faster than 
the exercise limit EL and therefore the R&D option represents a positive value to the owner 
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Figure 7.13: Decision rule of two-step R&D option decision tree 
To quantify the value the R&D option represents to the owner it is necessary to quantify this 
probability of fast development FD and include it into the valuation model.  To achieve this, 
one has to gather information on the expected termination date of the project and the 
distribution of possible alternative distribution dates.  The next section includes timing risk 
into the valuation model by working with a log-normally distributed project duration and 
alternatively working with an exponentially distributed project duration. 
7.3.4.2 Assessment using a Log-normally Distributed Project Duration 
For every R&D project management has an expectation as to when the development process 
of a new drug will be finalized.  This is generally a figure documented in business plans and 
other profitability calculations.  The final approval date is subject to uncertainty until 
approval is physically granted because it is unclear how long it takes to complete the 
individual development steps.  It is also unclear how much time regulatory authorities need 
for the final review process of a new drug. 
Theoretically the time until final approval can take on any value between zero and infinity.  
While it is highly uncertain that a project can be finalized within a very short period of time it 
is also highly uncertain that a project is completed more than twenty years after filing for 
patent protection because this results in no effective patent protection time for the research 
conducting company402.  This risk of non-completion is captured with the introduced function 
FR(t).  With these limitations it is assumed that the time of final drug approval TA follows a 
lognormal distribution.  This means that the natural logarithm of TA is normally distributed.  
Using a log-normal distribution function requires a conservative planning approach because 
the final approval date can take place earlier than expected but can also be delayed. 
 
                                                 
402 In the idealistic market environment it is abandoned because it is assumed that the market potential 
after patent expiration is equal to zero. 
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Following the approach of modeling project duration with a log-normal distribution implies 
the following relationship (7.19) for TA. 
(7.19) 
The two variables E(ln(TA)) and σln(TA) are project and company-specific variables and are 
therefore subject to managerial estimations.  While E(ln(TA)) is generally available from 
company internal strategic planning activities, σln(TA) is more difficult to estimate.  Depending 
on the project to be evaluated and the data available from previous projects, one of three main 
sources of data can be used403.  The value for σln(TA) can be calculated from a set of other 
internal projects of similar kind, can be estimated from industry average figures or can be 
derived using scenario analysis404.  It is important to state that σln(TA) as a measure for 
planning uncertainty is not constant during the course of the project as assumed at this point.  
It can be expected decrease over time with 
ATt→
lim σln(TA)(t)=0.  The assumption of constant 
σln(TA) is relaxed later in this study.  Figure 7.14 visualizes the dependency of the decision to 
exercise the R&D option at maturity on the log-normal distribution function of TA. 






Can project be 
completed fast enough?
NO
Probability of Slow 
Development SD
YES





























Figure 7.14: Log-normal project duration in a two-step R&D option decision tree 
With the assumption that TA follows a lognormal distribution, a density function for TA can 
be derived to estimate the probability of fast development FD.  This density function is 
denoted as (7.20) with TA∈D3 and D3=[0;∞[. 
(7.20) 
                                                 
403 There is no source that allows the extraction of an objectively correct value for σln(TA).  Its value is 
related to subjectivity and therefore it is recommended to conduct a sensitivity analysis on all results 
derived from calculations involving σ to gain an impression over the impact a potentially 
inappropriate value for σ might have on the outcome of the valuation process. 
404 A characteristic of the normal distribution is that 95% of all possible observations fall within a 
range of 2 times its standard deviation.  Since ln(TA) is assumed to be normally distributed, this rule 
can be used to derive a potential value for σln(TA) through a scenario analysis. 
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If ln(TA) follows a normal distribution N(µ;σ) with µ=E(ln(TA)) and σ=σln(TA) it is known that 
the standardized variable 







=  follows the standardized normal distribution 
N(0;1) with density function (7.21) and -∞<z<∞ 
(7.21) 
Knowing the execution limit (7.18), the density function (7.21) and the Drug Approval 
Value, a preliminary value estimate of the R&D option at time t can be established, which is 
denoted as PV(t).  In addition it has to be noted that it is unrealistic to consider potential 
project termination dates TA in the valuation that are smaller than the reference time t and 
therefore the lower integration limit is set at t instead of zero.  Equation (7.22) represents this 
preliminary valuation formula for PV(t). 
(7.22) 
Setting the lower integration limit from 0 to t generates a problem with the probability 
function included in the valuation formula.  As indicated above it is not realistic to allow 
values for TA that occur in the past and even though the correction of the lower integration 
limit to t excludes them explicitly from the formula, they are still part of the probability 
distribution function and are therefore implicitly considered. 
Especially with progressing t there are occurrences of TA, which occur in the past with t>TA 
but do have a probability value assigned to them.  It is explained above that the correct 
probability for these occurrences would be zero.  Excluding them from the integration 
interval does not solve this issue but leads to a violation of the basic requirement (7.23). 
(7.23) 
Instead, by explicitly excluding the lower potential occurrences of TA, this requirement is 
violated because with progressing t the cumulated probabilities do not add up to the required 
value of one as shown in equation (7.24). 
(7.24) 
From equation (7.24) it can be concluded that the probabilities for values for TA are 
underestimated and therefore underestimates the preliminary option value at time t.  Figure 
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Figure 7.15: Probability underestimation with constant lognormal project timing 
This systematic underestimation of PV requires an adjustment to the probability density 
function to satisfy (7.23).  For this adjustment the probability term in equation (7.22) is 
substituted using the probability term p(TA) expressed by (7.25) for the probabilities related 
to the potential project termination timing. 
(7.25) 
Using this adjusted probability term ensures that the requirement (7.23) is fulfilled and the 
cumulated probability over all theoretically possible TA is equal to one405.  Figure 7.16 
visualizes the impact of this adjustment on the probability density function of the illustrative 
case example at t=8 and t=10.  The probability functions on the right hand side of the figure 
after adjustment do satisfy the basic requirement (7.23).  As indicated, the adjustment 
becomes more important with increasing t because more potential occurrences of TA are 
excluded by the requirement TA>t. 
                                                 
405 ( ) 1=∂∫
∞
t
AA TTp  
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Figure 7.16: Probability adjustment for log-normal timing distribution 
Using the adjusted term p(TA) changes the preliminary upper limit of the option value PV(t) 
to (7.26). 
(7.26) 
The significance of the described probability adjustment becomes clear directly comparing 
the preliminary option value in its previous form with the probability adjusted equation 
(7.26).  Figure 7.17 visualizes the impact of the two different probability functions for 
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Figure 7.17: Probability adjustment for preliminary option value 
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Although both methods generate the same results during early project stages the graph 
demonstrates the importance of using the adjusted formula for later stages of the project 
because the indicated undervaluation of the option value becomes larger as t approaches 
E(TA).  In addition, both graphs show a maximum during the last third of the expected 
research period before the option value decreases towards the end of the expected research 
period.  This phenomenon can be explained by the reduced opportunity that the research 
project is completed ahead of schedule.  Early during the project there is a chance that the 
project is completed significantly before E(TA) and therefore the value of the project is 
increased in those cases.  As t progresses and approaches E(TA) there is less chance to 
complete the project ahead of schedule and therefore this additional element of value to the 
option owner is reduced.  As t reaches E(TA), the opportunity of faster project completion is 
eliminated entirely. 
What is classified as the preliminary value above and expressed by (7.26) is the value a R&D 
option represents to the owner in cases where he does not have to be concerned about 
technical failure of the research project.  This risk needs to be considered when estimating the 
upper pricing limit of the R&D option.  This adjustment can be made by including the 
completion rate function  
(7.11) and substituting the constant E(TA) with the variable parameter TA.  The resulting 
upper pricing limit of the R&D option can be written as (7.27). 
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With the probability function p(TA) being defined as (7.25). 
(7.25) 
7.3.4.3 Approx. using fixed Log-normal Timing Risk 
In this section, the developed model is applied to the illustrative case example to demonstrate 
its implementation and to investigate characteristics of the resulting pricing limit.  As a first 
step it is necessary to model the density function f(TA) represented by (7.20).  To achieve 
this, an understanding of the two parameters σln(TA) and E(ln(TA)) needs to be developed.  In 
cases where a research conducting company has completed multiple similar projects and 
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captured the data related to development times, the two parameters can be estimated based on 
historical data.  Assuming a company has completed n similar projects with corresponding 
development times TAi, the required parameters can be estimated using the natural log of the 
individual development times TAi and their arithmetic average (7.28). 
(7.28) 
With the natural logarithm of the historical development times and the calculated average, the 
variance of the distribution function can be derived. 
(7.29) 
Using fundamental characteristics of a normal distribution function406 N(µu;σu), ranges can be 
defined that include a random observation ux with a certain probability P.  Expressing this 
range in multiples of σu around µu it is known that a random observation ux falls with 
probability P into an interval [µu-kσu;µu+kσu)].  The probability P for a specific observation 
range can be defined using 
(7.30) 
For a basic understanding of a normal distribution function it is helpful to calculate the 
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To illustrate the characteristics of log-normally distributed project durations, an illustrative 
sample D of 25 random drug development times TADi with [ ]25;1∈i  is used.408  Based on the 
assumption that development times follow a lognormal distribution it can be derived that the 
values ln(TAD) in this example are normally ND(µD;σD) distributed with µD=E(ln(TAD))=2.4 
and σD=σln(TAD)=0.2.  Figure 7.18 shows the shape of the function ND(2.4; 0.2) for ln(TAD) 
including the probability range P(2)=95%. 
                                                 
406 More details on the normal distribution function can be found at Bamberg and Baur (1993, p. 109). 
407 For the explanations and illustrative figures in this study the k=2 range for P = 95% is displayed 
unless otherwise specified. 
408 The illustrative sample contains 25 random development times TAi = (9.9; 8.6; 7.5; 11.3; 12.2; 
13.3; 9.9; 11.8; 11.5; 10.3; 8.5; 6.9; 8.9; 13.1; 10.9; 15.3; 13.1; 11.7; 14.3; 10.7; 14.9; 9.2; 10.7; 
11.6; 14.7) 
( ) 1)(2)( −Φ=+≤≤−= kkukPkP uuxuu σµσµ
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Figure 7.18: Example of normal dist. of natural log of drug development times 
The corresponding lognormal distribution function for TAD can be derived with 
( ))(ln)( ADTEAD eTE =  and a 95% P(2) interval as represented by (7.31). 
 (7.31) 
Figure 7.19 represents the lognormal distribution for the random drug development time 
sample D with E(TAD)=11.0 and a 95% interval [7.4; 16.4]. 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
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Figure 7.19: Example of log-normally distributed drug development times 
In real-life applications it is difficult to obtain estimates for the variables σu and µu.  The 
variables contain a certain amount of subjectivity because only a few drug developing 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]ADTADADTAD TETE eeP lnln *2ln*2ln ;2 σσ +−=
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companies409 are in the situation to own databases of historical projects that allow deriving 
statistically valid results.  Such a database not only has to be sufficient in terms of number of 
entries but also has to contain projects that are comparable in terms of scope and objective to 
a project to be evaluated.  This is the case because there are differences in the development 
times of certain drugs.  Depending on the therapeutic area, average development times can 
differ by more than three years.410  Especially for young companies it is not an opportunity to 
estimate the parameters based on historically completed projects because their R&D activities 
are generally related to their first generation of drug development projects. 
Using the two parameters σln(TA)=0.20 and E(TA) = 11.0 derived from the illustrative sample 
above, the probability term (7.25) becomes the following equation (7.32). 
 
(7.32) 
Using (7.32) and including the figures of the illustrative example, equation (7.27) can be 
completed to the following valuation formula (7.33) for the upper pricing limit of the R&D 
option value on the illustrative case example over time. 
































































































It is difficult to find an analytical solution to the integration problem (7.33) therefore an 
alternative method to estimate the upper pricing limit is applied.  The approach used in this 
study to approximate a solution for the previous and other upcoming complex integration 
problems is the method of discrete summation.  The continuous variable TA is for this 
purpose transferred into a discrete variable with increments of size ∆TA=0.1.  Applying 
discrete summation to equation (7.33) for the illustrative case results in Figure 7.20.  It shows 
                                                 
409 In an interview summarized by Nichols (1994, p. 90), Merck´s CFO Judy Lewent stated that 
Merck possesses a database that allows the company to estimate risk and volatility of their research 
projects. 
410 PAREXEL (2003, p. 134) shows that a sample of NCEs in the area of Immunology had a time 
from IND filing to FDA approval of only 5.5 years while NCEs affecting the Central Nervous 
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the approximation for CU(t) of the illustrative R&D option deal411 compared to the same case 
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Figure 7.20: Upper pricing limit with tech. risk and stochastic development times 
For the interpretation of Figure 7.20 it is essential to distinguish between three price effects.  
The first effect is represented by the impact of the risk of technical failure, the second one 
being the time value of money and the third one being the uncertainty in project timing. 
The technical risk reduces the value and therefore the upper pricing limit of the R&D option 
because it represents a one-sided risk.  One-sided in this context means that it can only drive 
the value of the option down without a corresponding opportunity to increase its value.  This 
downward risk is the total failure of the project leading to a zero value of the related project.  
This is the reason why a higher failure risk reduces the value of the R&D option.  Recalling 
the technical risk function from section 7.3.3.1 reveals that especially in early phases of the 
drug development process this type of risk is high and therefore both curves in Figure 7.20 
are negatively impacted early in the project progress on the left hand side of the graph. 
The second factor determining the shape of the graph in Figure 7.20 is the basic economic 
principle of time value of money.  It concludes that money received today is worth more than 
the same amount received in the future and therefore the longer an expected payout occurs in 
the future the lower its value today with all other factors remaining unchanged.412 
As opposed to technical risk, the third component represented by the uncertainty in project 
timing increases the value of the R&D option because it includes not only a risk but also a 
                                                 
411 The graph is based on the standard assumptions defined in chapter 7.3.1 with E(TA)=11, MP=100, 
X=400, and (rrf+α)=11%. 
412 Since this represents a fundamental principle of finance it is not explained in more detail.  
Background information on this principle can be found in introductory literature to financial theory 
and management like Brealey and Myers (2000), Brigham et al. (1999) or various other sources. 
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potential upside to the owner.  In cases where approval of the new drug turns out to occur 
later than expected, the effective patent protection period is reduced and also the resulting 
total value of the drug development project.  On the other hand there is an opportunity that 
the project is completed faster than expected.  In this case the project value increases because 
of the increasing effective patent protection period.  Since the R&D option owner has the 
opportunity to participate in such a favorable development without having to participate in 
the unfavorable movement, he is willing to pay an additional premium to acquire the option. 
With timing uncertainty being the only difference between the two graphs in Figure 7.20, the 
interpretation of the shape difference between them becomes straightforward.  Early during 
the project the R&D option with the higher uncertainty in project timing is of higher value to 
the owner because it includes the potential that the project is completed significantly ahead of 
time and the owner can benefit from an extended effective patent protection period.  The 
other case with known time to maturity and therefore known effective patent protection 
period is less valuable during that time of the project. 
The situation changes if t approaches E(TA).  Now the opportunity for the option owner in 
case of high timing volatility decreases because the risk of delay still exists while the upside 
of the option disappears.  This effect causes the upper pricing limit in case of high timing 
volatility to decrease significantly as t approaches E(TA).  This effect does not occur in the 
case of certain project timing because there is still neither an up- nor a downside potential 
related to the project timing in the valuation formula. 
This can serve as an argument as to why an option owner would prefer certainty in project 
timing later during the research project while he would be willing to pay a premium for the 
opportunity related to this uncertainty during early stages of a project.  At this point one 
could argue that the use of a constant risk factor σ for the timing volatility even with the 
conducted probability adjustment is not a realistic assumption.  To account for this criticism 
timing uncertainty is modeled in an alternative way in the following section. 
7.3.4.4 Status Dependent Log-Normal Timing Risk 
It is an unrealistic assumption that the uncertainty of the final approval timing of a new drug 
remains constant over the expected course of a drug development project.  A more realistic 
view is to model this uncertainty as a decreasing function relative to the progress of the 
project.  To achieve this objective, the constant parameter σln(TA) is transformed into a time 
dependent variable σln(TA)(t).  The characteristic of decreasing σln(TA)(t) depending on the 
progress of the project is achieved by multiplying the σln(TA) with a factor expressing the 
expected remaining project development time in relation to the entire expected drug 
development time.  The following equation (7.34) is used to model this relationship. 
(7.34) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Figure 7.21 visualizes the impact progress dependent timing uncertainty has on the 95% 
probability range of possible approval dates.  It can be seen that the size of the probability 
range is decreasing as the project progresses and approaches zero as t approaches E(TA).413 
( ) 11=ATE
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Figure 7.21: 95% range of approval date with progress dependent uncertainty 
To include progress dependent timing uncertainty into the model, parameter σln(TA) is 
substituted with σln(TA) and the valuation formula can be rewritten as (7.35)414. 
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To demonstrate the impact of this change the illustrative example is adapted from constant to 
progress dependent timing risk and (7.33) is adapted to the following equation (7.36). 
                                                 
413 In this situation where an „ex ante“ view is applied, E(TA) is kept constant over time because it 
represents the best estimator for project completion. 
414 In this case it is not necessary to include a probability adjustment as required in the previous 
section.  Setting the lower integration limit to time t does not cause a significant bias because the 
probability that TA<t can be neglected for the demonstrated case.  This can be seen in Figure 7.21 
where the 95% confidence interval is visualized over time.  The line TA=t is for any time instances t 
far below the illustrated 95% probability range and therefore no adjustment is necessary. 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
With Volatility at t=0 (Factor = 0.211) Without Volatility (Factor = 0.00001)  
Figure 7.22: R&D option value with progress dependent timing risk 
Figure 7.22 visualizes the upper pricing limit based on the adapted valuation formula using 
the illustrative example compared to a case without timing uncertainty.  It also reveals an 
interesting finding.  It is intuitively clear that the two cases with and without initial timing 
risk converge over time as time reaches the expected project termination date E(TA) because 
of the following relationship (7.37). 
(7.37) 
The more interesting finding from this analysis is the fact that the two graphs do not differ 
significantly during any stage of the project.  The rational explanation for this behavior is the 
dominance of the technical failure risk and the time value of money effect during the early 
part of the analysis.  During times when timing uncertainty does represent an additional value 
to the option owner the value is discounted significantly to adjust for the risk of technical 
failure and the time value of money.  As technical risk and discount period decrease over 
time, the positive opportunity related to timing uncertainty decreases as well therefore these 
two opposite developments eliminate each other, resulting in a timing risk adjusted pricing 
level that is close to the one not considering timing uncertainty. 
( ) ( )
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To take a closer look at the impact of progress dependent timing risk, a second case example 
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With extreme Volatility at t=0 (Factor = 1.25) Without Volatility (Factor = 0.00001)  
Figure 7.23: R&D option with progress dependent extreme timing risk 
Figure 7.23 illustrates more descriptively that uncertainty adds value to the R&D option 
owner and therefore increases the price of the option during early stages of a project.  With 
the selected extreme uncertainty the option price early during the project is significantly 
higher than for the other case due to the higher chance of completing the project ahead of 
schedule.  With timing uncertainty being time dependant this effect decreases over time and 
therefore the graphs merge towards the end of the expected project duration.415 
7.3.4.5 Assessment using Exponentially Distributed Project Delay 
During the previous sections timing uncertainty is modeled using a log-normal distribution 
allowing project delays as well as earlier than expected project termination dates.  Such a 
two-sided uncertainty occurs if initial project planning is done carefully following a 
conservative planning approach.  Historical observations and expert interviews show that 
research planning is rather carried out aggressively from a timing perspective with very little 
if any chance of projects being completed ahead of schedule416.  This planning approach is 
                                                 
415 The reason why the graph of the additional case with extreme uncertainty is below the initial case 
towards the end of the expected project duration is the missing adjustment in the probabiliy term for 
potential TA<t.  As discussed in chapter 7.3.4.2 for the case of constant uncertainty over time an 
adjustment in the probability function has to be made to eliminate value underestimations resulting 
from eliminating irrealistic cases with TA<t.  Since it does not add conceptual value to the study, 
this adjustment is not presented for time dependent project uncertainty.  In addition it also has to be 
stated that such an adjustment is only necessary for extremely high uncertainty factors. 
416 This view is supported by Brach (2003, p. 113) who concludes that “bumps that delay the 
development are likely, and potentially less likely are “eureka” moments that advance and speed up 
the development”. 
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modeled by replacing the log-normally distributed project termination with a function 
considering exponentially distributed project delay. 
Drug development projects have to go through clearly defined project stages having 
minimum timing requirements that have to be extended depending on individual project 
needs.  The sum of these minimum requirements can be considered a lower limit for the total 
project duration.  A log-normal distribution does not consider any lower limit and allows 
values between zero and infinity, which is not appropriate for the case described. 
A more realistic representation of risk in project duration is a model that fixes a minimum 
project duration TAmin and considers the difference between the minimum timing requirement 
and the actual project termination date as a stochastic variable.  This difference [TA-TAmin] 
represents the project delay and can be modeled using an exponential distribution function.  
The assumption that a project is never completed before its minimum timing requirement 
TAmin and that project delay follows an exponential distribution implies the relationship 
TA≥TAmin and [TA-TAmin] ~ ExpDist(λ).  Equation (7.38) shows the probability density 
function of the project delay [TA-TAmin] with parameter λ and with TA∈D4 and D4=[TAmin;∞[. 
(7.38) 
Figure 7.24 shows an illustrative example of two exponentially distributed probability density 
functions.  One function shows an exponentially distributed project delay while the second 
one shows the resulting probability for the duration of the illustrative case example.  This 
second example with its minimum project duration being fixed and the potential delay being 
exponentially distributed with parameter λ, represents a delay as defined by (7.38). 






Figure 7.24: Probability function of exponentially distributed project delay 
For the probability density function of the duration of the entire project, (7.38) can be 
expanded to become equation (7.39). 
(7.39) 
At this point, λ is treated as being constant over the course of the project, which represents a 
simplifying assumption.  This assumption is relaxed later to account for the fact that 
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uncertainty decreases over time and therefore λ is more accurately represented by a 
monotonously decreasing function λ(t). 
The existence of an execution limit for an investor holding a research option remains 
independent from the way project durations are distributed.  As for the log-normally 
distributed case with constant market potential, equation (7.18) to derive the execution limit 
is also valid for the exponentially distributed case with constant market potential. 
With the defined technical risk function it is clear that the research option is only exercised in 
those cases where the project is successful and also completed in a timeframe that does not 
exceed the execution limit EL.  Figure 7.25 visualized this relationship similar to Figure 7.14 
but assuming a different distribution function for the final project termination date. 









































Figure 7.25: Exponential project delay in two-step R&D option decision tree 
With these similarities in the execution tree from the perspective of the option owner the case 
under investigation can build on the discussion above and uses equation (7.27) as a starting 
point.  This equation is adapted to the exponentially distributed case by carrying out two 
adjustments.  The first change is a replacement of the distribution for project timing and the 
second is a change of the lower limit of the relevant observation period for TA from zero to 
TAmin.  This change is justified by (7.39), which eliminates all TA<TAmin by setting their 
probability to zero by definition.  The equation for the upper limit therefore becomes (7.40). 
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7.3.4.6 Approximation using Constant Exp. Distributed Timing Risk 
For a practical approximation of the upper pricing limit of a R&D option with exponentially 
distributed development timing uncertainty the case is investigated where risk of delay is 
constant over the course of the project.  This simplifying assumption is relaxed in the next 
section.  Recalling (7.39) it becomes clear that it is necessary to estimate the two parameters 
TAmin and λ that define the density distribution for project durations. 
(7.39) 
As in chapter 7.3.4.2 for the case of log-normal project durations, the parameters 
characterizing the distribution function of the expected development times cannot be 
observed objectively and are subject to managerial expectations.  While TAmin is generally 
available as a best case planning scenario, the parameter λ is more difficult to estimate.  It 
can be interpreted as a measure for planning accuracy and reliability of a company’s R&D 
departments.  The parameter for planning accuracy has to be estimated based on historical 
evidence and experiences. 
An approach similar to that used for estimating the parameters of the lognormal distribution 
above can be used where a 95% confidence interval is estimated to derive the necessary 
distribution parameters.  If management can agree on an interval [TAmin;TAmax], in which the 
project can be completed with 95% certainty then the missing distribution parameter can be 
derived from the probability function (7.41). 
(7.41) 
With this relationship λ can be derived using (7.42). 
(7.42) 
With the knowledge of an expected 95% interval, the distribution density function for TA can 
be rewritten as (7.43). 
(7.43) 
Figure 7.26 shows an example of a distribution density function with TAmin=11.0 and the 
assumption that in 95% of all cases a project is terminated until TAmax=16.4. 






























































































Figure 7.26: Example of exponentially distributed project delay 
If such an agreement on the 95%-interval for project completion can be reached, the model 
for the upper pricing limit of the R&D option becomes (7.44). 
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For the illustrative case displayed in Figure 7.26, λ takes on the value 0.55 and equation 
(7.44) becomes (7.45). 





























































































For the approximation of function (7.45) one encounters the problem of an integral that 
cannot be solved numerically and therefore the method of discrete summation is used to 
approximate the solution to this integration problem.  Figure 7.27 visualizes the result of a 
discrete summation with steps for TA of size ∆TA=0.1.  Displayed are the illustrative case 
7. Fund Raising Potential of R&D Option in Idealistic Environment 
 
162 
with λ=0.55 and an additional case without volatility around the same expected value E(TA), 
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Figure 7.27: Upper pricing limit considering exponential timing risk 
There is an intuitive explanation as to why the value of the R&D option for the case 
involving volatility exceeds the value of the other R&D option especially as time approaches 
TAmin.  Uncertainty in this case includes the opportunity for the option owner that a project is 
terminated ahead of schedule with E(TA)>TA>TAmin.  Those occurrences are very valuable for 
the option owner because they are related to a longer effective patent protection period.  In 
the case of known project duration E(TA) this opportunity to participate in a longer effective 
patent protection period does not exist and therefore, the owner cannot benefit from a positive 
development and assigns no value to it. 
Realistically there is also a potential downside related to uncertainty because the project can 
also be delayed as opposed to the case with known project duration.  With the option owner 
not being required to participate in this downside, the value of the opportunity exceeds the 
value of the potential risk.  This results in the graph with the case including uncertainty being 
above the one with known project duration although both cases have the same E(TA). 
7.3.4.7 Status Dependent Exponential Timing Risk 
As for the discussion on log-normally distributed project durations it also holds true for the 
exponentially distributed project delay that uncertainty in a real-life project is not a constant 
parameter.  It is safe to assume that with project progress and the generation of additional 
information, this type of uncertainty decreases.  Considering this, timing risk is more 
appropriately modeled using a risk factor that is monotonously decreasing over time.  In this 
section the assumption of constant planning accuracy is relaxed and the constant λ is replaced 
by a time dependent variable λ(t). 
The expectation on the range, in which there is a 95% chance of project completion is subject 
to a large degree of managerial subjectivity and cannot be measured objectively.  This does 
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not prevent the use of this parameter for valuation purposes but should be kept in mind.  In 
addition, it emphasizes the necessity for sensitivity analysis to check the impact of potentially 
incorrect factor estimates.417 
The management estimate for the initial confidence interval at time t=0, during which there is 
a 95% chance of project completion, is denoted as [TAmin(0);TAmax(0)].  With this initial 
confidence interval an expected project duration E(TA) can be derived using (7.46).  At an 
“ex ante” investigation of a drug development project, E(TA) represents the constant best 
estimator for the completion date of the project and is therefore treated as a constant factor. 
(7.46) 
In addition, there is remaining uncertainty at the time of expected drug approval when 
production and marketing can start418.  This remaining 95% range, which in a best case 
scenario could be close to zero, is denoted as [TAmin(E(TA));TAmax(E(TA))]. 
At this point it is assumed that the boundaries of the confidence interval [TAmin(t);TAmax(t)] 
from t=0 to t=E(TA) are linear decreasing functions of time.  With a final expected potential 
delay of FD=[TAmax(E(TA))-TAmin(E(TA))] and the estimated constant E(TA), the decreasing 
95% probability range can be derived using the following equations. 
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Figure 7.28 shows the decreasing 95% probability interval of project delay over the expected 
lifetime E(TA) of the illustrative project419. 
                                                 
417 Detailed sensitivity analyses are conducted in chapter 9 after a valuation model in realistic market 
environment has been developed. 
418 This is related to potential additional requirements from regulatory authorities that have to be 
fulfilled before a product can be sold in the market even though it is technically approved. 
419 With TAmin(0)=11, E(TA)=12.8, TAmax(0)=16.4 and FD=0.25 






















Figure 7.28: Linear decreasing timing risk over project duration 
With the established relationships, one can change the previously constant parameter λ into a 
time dependent parameter λ(t) defined as (7.47). 
(7.47) 
Using the initial expected probability interval ID=[TAmin(0),TAmax(0)] and the expected FD, 
λ(t) can be rewritten as (7.48). 
(7.48) 
For the valuation of the R&D option in this framework with exponentially distributed project 
delay and linear decreasing 95% probability range, adjustments to the valuation equation are 
necessary.  Substituting the constant parameter λ with a time dependent variable λ(t) changes 
(7.40) to equation (7.49) with the probability function p(t;TA) being represented by (7.50). 
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Reapplying discrete summation to the upper pricing limit (7.49) results in Figure 7.29.  It 
illustrates the upper R&D option value in case of exponentially distributed project delay with 










0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




Figure 7.29: Upper pricing limit R&D option - linear decreasing timing risk 
The figure shows that uncertainty in project timing increases the upper pricing limit of the 
R&D option.  This effect is relatively small in absolute terms early during the drug 
development period because technical failure risk and the time value of money represent the 
predominant valuation criteria during that stage of the process.  As the risk of technical 
failure and the discounting for TVM decreases over time, the potential benefit of early project 
termination becomes more significant and the absolute gap between the two data plots in the 
graph widens.  As project progress approaches the expected termination date TAmin of the 
project, this difference continuously decreases as the chance for early project termination 
becomes very slight. 
While modeling uncertainty in project timing as a decreasing function of time can be 
considered a realistic assumption one could criticize that using a linear decreasing 95% 
probability range is not realistic.  The drug development process consists of a series of 
activities that contribute differently to the elimination of timing uncertainty. 
To consider this aspect of non-linear reduction of timing uncertainty, this section uses an 
alternative approach to model it.  This approach allows overweighting certain parts of the 
value chain that contribute most to the reduction of timing uncertainty.  This is done by 
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investigation as to which processes realistically are the ones that contribute most to the 
elimination of timing uncertainty, the model is kept in a general form. 
Starting point of this approach is the previous situation where management fixes assumptions 
“ex ante” on the 95% probability range for project delay at the start of the project and at the 
expected project termination date represented by ID=[TAmin(0),TAmax(0)] and 
FD=[TAmin(E(TA)),TAmax(E(TA))] respectively.  Based on these 95% probability ranges the 
corresponding time dependant lambda parameters λ(0) and λ(E(TA)) are calculated using 
(7.47).  With the introduction of the learning factor κ, the time dependant factor λ(t) for the 
exponential distribution function is introduced by the following relationship (7.51) with 
t∈D5, D5=]0;E(TA)[ and *+∈Rκ . 
(7.51) 





( ) ( ) ( )tTEtT AA λ
1
min −=  
To visualize the impact of this learning factor on the probability expectations for project 
timing, equation (7.47) is solved for TAmax(t) and the required factor λ(t) is replaced by (7.51).  
The resulting equation for the upper range for the expected project delay TAmax(t) at time t is 
therefore represented by formula (7.52). 
(7.52) 
Figure 7.30 illustrates the impact of the learning factor κ on the 95% range of project 
completion over the expected course of a project.  The three cases for different values of κ 
represent conceptually different situations.  The case with a low value for κ represents the 
case where learning about project timing takes place early during the project and therefore the 
width of the 95% probability range becomes smaller during the first third of the process.  In 
the second illustrative case where κ is set at a value of five, learning about project termination 
predominantly takes place around half-way trough the development process420.  The last case 
with κ=15 considers learning effects about project timing predominantly at the very end of 
the drug development process. 
                                                 
420 In the average drug development project this corresponds to the project stage of clinical trial II.  
Compare to Figure 2.1 on page 23. 
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Figure 7.30: Impact of learning factor κ on project timing risk 
To investigate the impact of this learning factor κ on the upper pricing limit of the R&D 
option it is necessary to adjust the valuation formula CU(t).  In the first part of the valuation 
formula represented by (7.49), only the probability part p(t; TA) is affected by the 
introduction of κ and therefore only the relevant parts using λ(t) in the equation for the 
probability distribution (7.50) are adjusted to (7.53). 
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Figure 7.30 illustrates the impact learning about project timing has on the upper limit of the 
R&D option pricing range.  Displayed are the three illustrative cases with early-, mid- and 
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Early Learning (kappa=2) Mid-Learning (kappa=5) Late Learning (kappa=15)  
Figure 7.31: Upper pricing limit – various exp. timing uncertainty scenarios 
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Learning in this context represents the reduction of possible project termination dates earlier 
and after the expected E(TA).  Since all analyses are conducted “ex ante” this value is kept 
constant for all three scenarios over the course of the project as the best estimator for project 
completion.  With all three functions having the same initial 95% confidence interval and the 
same E(TA) it is intuitively clear that the three graphs have the same starting point at t=0 and 
converge to the same value as t approaches E(TA).  However, learning about project 
termination timing reduces the value of the R&D option.  This is the case because learning 
deprives the option owner of the valuable chance to take advantage of earlier than expected 
project completion dates.  Although at the same time the risk is reduced that the project is 
delayed this is not of comparable relevance because as with all option rights, the owner is not 
required to participate in these negative developments. 
The longer the chance exists that a project is completed before the expected E(TA) the longer 
the seller of the R&D option can expect to raise a financial premium with the sale of the 
R&D option compared to a scenario where this opportunity is already eliminated.  Comparing 
the upper pricing limit where timing risk is reduced in a linear way with the case where 
intense learning occurs half way through the project421 results in the scenario presented in 
Figure 7.32.  Although starting and ending point of both graphs displayed are the same, the 
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Figure 7.32: Upper pricing limit R&D option – linear vs. non linear timing risk 
Rational for this slight difference is the same as discussed above.  During the early project 
stage the scenario with intense learning longer includes the opportunity for early project 
termination therefore the financing potential in this case exceeds the case with linear 
uncertainty reduction.  The situation changes towards the end of the expected timing when 
intense learning about project timing has eliminated most of the opportunities favorable for 
                                                 
421 Learning factor being set at κ=5. 
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the option owner.  This is why the linear scenario holds greater financing potential during 
later project stages. 
7.3.5 Approximation of Upper Financing Potential 
Over the previous sections a model has been developed to assess the upper pricing limit of a 
R&D option over the expected course of a drug development project.  The model is based on 
the idea of an idealistic market environment and on certain underlying assumptions defined in 
section 7.3.1.  All specific calculations and examples are based on the illustrative drug 
development project defined in Table 7.2. 
The model represents the case if a R&D option is sold to a company or to an investor who is 
able to diversify all private risk involved in drug development.  This investor does not require 
compensation for this risk and is therefore willing to pay the highest price of any market 
participant.  In addition, the model is based on constant market potential over time but 
includes monotonously decreasing risk of project failure.  Finally, uncertainty in project 
duration is represented by an exponentially distributed project delay function with an 
expected intense learning phase about mid-way through the project422.  Figure 7.33 represents 















Figure 7.33: Upper financing limit of R&D option during illustrative project 
The results illustrate some interesting characteristics of a R&D option sale, which are 
discussed in detail after the lower pricing limit of a R&D option has been investigated and 
therefore the financing range of a R&D option deal can be assessed. 
                                                 
422 Being about the time period of clinical trial II studies. 
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7.4 Lower Pricing Limit of a R&D Option 
From the discussion on investors’ classification in chapter 7.2 it can be said that the pricing 
limit established in the previous section only applies to one specific group of investors 
representing one extreme end of the potential pricing range.  This section investigates the 
price expectations of the other extreme group of investors who are not able to diversify 
private risk and therefore require a higher expected return.423 
Because of these increased return expectations this second extreme group of investors is 
willing to pay the lowest price and therefore limits the pricing range to the lower end.  
Combined with the results from the previous chapter the outcome of this section is a pricing 
range for a R&D option that represents the “ex ante” financing potential of the R&D option 
in an idealistic market environment. 
7.4.1 Starting Point to Assess Lower Pricing Limit 
The starting point to assess the lower pricing limit of the R&D option is represented by the 
valuation approach for the upper pricing limit described in equations (7.49) and (7.53).  With 
the risk exposure of potential investors being the key price determining factor it is first 
discussed how different exposure to technical risk, uncertain market entry timing, uncertain 
product lifetime424, general market uncertainty and potential competition change in the 
scenario investigated.  While competition is excluded by definition in the idealistic market 
environment, this point does not require further investigation in this chapter. 
During the discussion above it is shown that general market uncertainty is a risk factor, which 
is systematic by nature and cannot be diversified.  In addition, no industry player accepts any 
return lower than the risk-free rate of interest plus the premium for general market risk.  With 
this in mind the two risk premiums rrf and α introduced above are as relevant for the 
quantification of the lower pricing limit as they are for the upper pricing limit. 
7.4.2 Model Adjustment to Include Private Risk Premium 
This section discusses differences in private risk exposure of potential investors in a R&D 
option deal.  In the case of the idealistic market environment there are two risk factors 
remaining, which fall into this category.  These two factors are the risk of potential project 
failure and the uncertainty related to project timing.  Because these two risk factors represent 
private risk factors, the above model for the upper pricing limit does not consider any risk 
compensation for these types of risk. 
                                                 
423 In addition, their general return expecations are higher following the opportunity cost approach 
described in section 7.2.2.  To limit modeling complexitiy this effect is assumed to include the 
magnitude of the risk premium factors applied. 
424 Implicitly covered when discussing uncertain market entry timing because these two types of 
uncertainty are directly linked over the known twenty year patent protection period and the resulting 
effective patent protection period.  This relationship is discussed in section 5.1.3. 
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Adjusting the model to consider the related private risk compensation is a simple step that 
requires additional risk premiums to be included in the model.  As a notation for these risk 
premiums the Greek symbols ε and ρ are introduced in section 7.2.4.  These symbols 
represent the premium for the risk of potential project failure and the risk of uncertain project 
timing.  Since these types of uncertainty are only relevant for the time period preceding the 
point of drug approval TA, ε and ρ are only considered in the discounting factor affecting the 
drug development period but not the marketing period following TA.  As discussed, the 
introduced risk premium α for general market uncertainty as well as the risk-free rate of 
interest rrf still remain relevant for the adapted model.  The resulting formula for the lower 
pricing limit of the R&D option over the expected course of a project in an idealistic market 
environment is therefore represented by (7.54).  The exponentially distributed probability 
function (7.53) is not affected by this adjustment and remains unchanged. 
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As for the integration model of the upper pricing limit this equation cannot be solved 
numerically but can be approximated using discrete summation. 
7.4.3 Approximation of Lower Financing Potential of R&D Option 
By introducing the risk premium for a project’s potential technical failure and for the 
uncertainty related to an unknown project termination date, the resulting lower pricing limit 















Figure 7.34: Lower pricing limit of a R&D option 
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Solving the valuation equation (7.54) using discrete summation results in Figure 7.34 for the 
illustrative case example.  Basically, the resulting lower pricing limit of the R&D option is of 
similar shape but on a lower level compared to the final upper pricing limit as shown in 
Figure 7.33. 
7.5 Quantification of R&D Option Financing Range 
A direct comparison between the two pricing limits is displayed in Figure 7.35 for the time 
period t<TAmin=11.  The upper and the lower pricing limits model the price expectations of 
extreme types of investors that cannot be found in the market.  It is extreme to assume that 
there is an investor who is diversified to an extent that he can entirely eliminate the impact of 
private risk.  In reality, investors can diversify risk to some degree and therefore the price a 
company can achieve by selling a R&D option can be expected to reside within the displayed 
financing range.  If the final price and therefore the short-term financing potential lies at the 
upper or the lower end of the range depends on the type of investor representing the buying 
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Figure 7.35: R&D option pricing range – idealistic market environment 
The graph visualizes that the gap between the upper and the lower financing limit and 
therefore the bidding advantage of a fully diversified investor is not constant during the 
expected course of the drug development project.  To visualize this finding, Figure 7.36 
displays the absolute magnitude of this pricing gap for the illustrative case example. 
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Figure 7.36: Width of expected R&D pricing range – idealistic environment 
The graph shows that the pricing spread CU(t)-CL(t) in the illustrative case example increases 
over the early stage of the expected project duration until it reaches a maximum about two-
thirds through the project.  During this period, the bidding advantage of a large diversified 
investor with unlimited financial resources is the largest.  After this point, the upper and the 
lower pricing limit converge over time reducing the bidding advantage during the final stages 
of the expected project duration.  In the illustrative case example, the bidding advantage of a 
highly diversified investor with sufficient financial resources is at peak level of the expected 
project duration approximately 50% above the level at the point TAmin.425 
 
                                                 
425 At this point it would be beneficial to investigate to which extent the model depends on the 
individual input parameters required.  Since a detailed sensitivity analysis is conducted in chapter 9 
after the model is expanded in a realistic market environment this question is not further investigated 
at this point. 
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8 Fund Raising Potential of R&D Option in a Realistic Environment 
The discussion in the previous chapter is based on assumptions of an idealistic environment 
with known and constant market potential of a drug under development and the absence of 
market competition.  These assumptions are relaxed in this chapter to create a more realistic 
view of the situation.  Once the framework is changed from an idealistic to a realistic market 
view the impact of these changes on the previously derived R&D option financing range is 
investigated. 
8.1 Description of Realistic Market Environment 
To create a more realistic market view, the constant market potential is substituted by a 
variable following a stochastic process.  Starting from an initial estimate of today’s market 
potential MP(0), the future potential of a new drug is modeled as a stochastic process with 
five main factors influencing its development over time.  These five factors are market trends, 
general uncertainty, potential project expansions, potential competition from other market 
participants and an uncertainty in the initial market estimate. 
8.1.1 Market Trends 
Up to this point the market potential of a new drug was treated as a constant parameter MP, 
which does not change between time t=0 as the point of patent application and time t=20 
when the patent for this new drug expires and generic competition takes over the entire 
market.  From now on the market potential is treated as a time dependent variable MP(t), 
which has a starting point MP(0) and is subject to changes between t=0 and t=20. 
In reality there are trends that constantly influence the market potential of a new drug.  These 
factors are continuous by nature and permanently cause the market potential to develop in a 
certain way.  Real-life root causes that can be responsible for a trend in market potential for a 
specific drug can include: 
• General demographic developments 
• Increasing penetration of the population with a certain condition 
• Diagnostic improvements increasing the number of patients diagnosed with a certain 
condition or disease 
• Therapeutic drug replacements gradually making patients switch from one drug to a 
superior product over time 
• Various other reasons 
Irrespective of the cause of a trend it can be modeled using the following stochastic 















8.1.2 General Uncertainty 
In addition to a predictable market trend there is uncertainty related to the extent to which this 
trend finally materializes.  There are always small and unpredictable occurrences that have an 
impact on the future market potential of a drug under development.  This can be considered 
the general uncertainty in trend forecasting.  To include general uncertainty into the 
investigation the stochastic process U(t) with 0≤t≤20 is defined as a standard Brownian 
motion with the following characteristics: 
• U(0)=0 
• The mapping t→U(t) is a continuous function on [0;20] 
• The increments [U(t1)-U(t0), U(t2)-U(t1), …, U(tk)-U(tk-1)] are independent for any k 
and any 0≤t0<t1<…<tk≤20426 
• U(t)-U(s) is normally distributed with N(0,t-s) for any 0≤s<t≤20 
As a consequence one can follow that ( ) ( )tNtU ,0~  for 0<t≤20. 
With this process U(t) the future market potential MP of a drug can be modeled as a 
stochastic process following a geometric Brownian motion (GBM)427.  With this definition, 
MP~GBM(µ,σ2) fulfills the stochastic differential equation (SDE) (8.2). 
(8.2) 
If MP~GBM(µ,σ2) it can be concluded that the ratio MP(t)/MP(0) is log-normally distributed 
with (MP(t)/MP(0))~LN([µ-½σ2]t,σ2t)428 and therefore 
( )[ ] ( )0MPetMPE tµ=  and ( )[ ] ( )( )10 222 −= tt eMPetMPVar σµ . 
With the described Brownian motion of MP and an initial market potential MP(0), MP(t) can 
be written as (8.3)429. 
(8.3) 
                                                 
426 This is called the no-memory concept of a stochastic process and implies that historic events are 
irrelevant for the future development of the process.  This is a concept often used in option theory 
but can also be criticized because many investors and businessmen object to the idea that history is 
irrelevant.  For a discussion on this point see Boer (2002, p. 113). 
427 Because of its characteristics the geometric Brownian motion represents the most widely used 
model to approximate stock price movements Franke et al. (2004, p. 64). 
428 For details behind this conclusion see Glasserman (2004, p. 94) or Ikeda et al. (1996). 
429 Compare to Bingham and Kiesel (2004, p. 197) 
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Figure 8.1 displays three illustrative sample paths for the future market potential MP(t) of a 











Figure 8.1: NCE market potential development – trend with diffusion 
8.1.3 Potential Project Expansions 
While the previous two sections describe the future market potential of a drug under 
development as a continuous trend diffusion process there are also randomly occurring events 
that have an impact on a project’s market value.  As Lampard (2001) states“… there are 
enormous opportunities to exploit the market, perhaps by product enhancements, new 
indications, new dosage forms or new drug delivery systems”.  These are all opportunities 
that have the potential to significantly increase the market potential of a new drug under 
development as they occur.  As opposed to market potential developments described above, 
these potential project expansions do not take place on a continuous basis but rather on 
individual random occasions.430 
As an example one can consider a project where a substance to cure high blood pressure is 
developed.  With this indication the drug has a certain expected future market potential.  Now 
the research team discovers that the same substance is also beneficial in the treatment of 
diabetes.  This discovery immediately increases the total market potential of the drug and 
therefore the value of the development project.  For the development of the future market 
potential this implies that there is not only a trend with diffusion but also the chance of 
positive jumps.  To include this potential project expansion into the model of the future 
market potential an additional term is added to the stochastic differential equation (8.2) to 
form equation (8.4). 
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With JP being a piecewise constant sample path representing the jump process and MP(t-) 
being defined as the instance just before a positive jump formalized as (8.5)431. 
(8.5) 
The positive jump process Jp(t) is given by the following equation (8.6) where the individual 
Yj are random variables representing the size of a jump and N(t) is a simple counting process 
that counts the number of positive jumps in the time interval [0;t]. 
(8.6) 
This implies that there is an undefined number of random arrival times 0<τ1<τ2<…<t.  The 
placeholder ∂ Jp(t) used in equation (8.4) represents the jump in Jp occurring at time t.  The 
respective size of this jump is given by (Yj-1) at instances where t=τj and 0 in all cases where 
t does not coincide with any of the jump instances τj.  The jump size can be derived using the 
market potential ratio just after and just before an occurring jump.  This means that Yj is 
defined as (8.7). 
(8.7) 
Before this process can be modeled it is necessary to impose a distribution function to the 
occurrences and the potential sizes of these jumps.  For the purpose of this study it is assumed 
that if a positive jump occurs, it increases the annual market potential of a new drug up to 
40% without any value being more probable than others.  This simply implies that Yj is an 
evenly distributed variable over the interval [1; 1.4]432. 
                                                                                                                                                        
430 Another one-time occurrence that can be considered a positive jump in the value of a drug 
development project is a simple patent extension granted by regulatory authorities at some point 
during the project. 
431 This specific notification of MP(t-) is essential because the simple use of MP(t) would be 
ambiguous due to the potential jump occurring at t.  If there is an opportunity for MP to jump at t it 
needs to be specified if MP(t) refers to the value of MP just before or just after the jump at t.  In this 
study the convention also used by Glasserman (2004) is used assuming that stochastic processes are 
continuous from the right therefore MP(t) already includes the jump occurring at t while MP(t-) 
represents the value of the MP just before a potential jump occurs at time t. 
432 Jump sizes are very project-specific parameters.  Selecting 40% as the maximum jump size can 
therefore not being considered a suggested factor to be generally used in real-life examples.  This 
figure is simply selected for illustrative purposes.  For every real case assessed, this parameter has 
to be investigated based on individual project characteristics. 
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To model the occurrences of the potential positive jumps the study builds on a simple Poisson 
process.  This type of arrival process is in detail explained at Cinlar (1975, p. 78).433  Under 
this assumption the time periods between two consecutive jump occurrences (τj+1-τj) are 
independent from each other and also independent from the counting process N(t).  For the 
time from one jump occurrence to the next one noted as P(τj+1-τj≤t) the simple exponential 
distribution density function (8.8) can be used. 
 (8.8) 
With exponentially distributed time periods between positive jumps of size [1; 1.4], MP(t) is 
represented by a jump-diffusion model using a compound Poisson process434 to model 
positive jumps.  Figure 8.2 shows three illustrative examples for MP(t) building on the initial 
starting expectations MP(0)1, MP(0)2 and MP(0)3 for the expected annual market potential of 











Figure 8.2: NCE market potential – single jump diffusion process 
                                                 
433 This is in line with the work of Merton (1976) who considered jumps in stock prices when 
evaluating financial derivative securities and also used a Poisson process to model the occurrences 
in stock price jumps. 
434 For details on compound Poisson processes see Cinlar (1975, p. 90). 
0,1 1 ≥− − te tλ
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8.1.4 Competitive Market Environment 
To complete the modeling of the market potential of a new drug it is considered that research 
activities are conducted in a competitive environment.  While the R&D option represents an 
exclusive right on the outcome of a development project the underlying project itself does not 
represent an exclusive right.  Others can seize some of the future cash flows by introducing 
alternative drugs on the market.435 
The introduction of a competitive drug instantaneously reduces the market potential of a drug 
and therefore, competition can be interpreted as external negative shocks on the market 
potential.  To include these shocks in the valuation model the jump diffusion process is 
expanded by another jump factor representing the risk of negative jumps.  The resulting 
double-jump-diffusion process has to satisfy the stochastic differential equation (8.9), which 
represents the previous equation (8.4) expanded by the negative jump factor ∂ JN(t). 
(8.9) 
JN in this context also represents a piecewise constant sample path to model the negative 
jump process.  The negative jump process JN(t) is similar to the introduced positive jump 
process.  It is defined by the following equation (8.10) where the individual Vv are random 
variables and M(t) is a simple counting process that counts the number of negative jumps in 
the time interval [0; t]. 
(8.10) 
This implies that there is an undefined number of random arrival times for negative jumps 
0<υ1<υ2<…<t.  The placeholder ∂ JN(t) used in equation (8.9) represents the jump in JN 
occurring at time t.  The respective size of this jump is given by (Vv-1) at instances where 
t=υv and 0 in all cases where t does not coincide with any of the negative jump instances υv.  
The only difference between the positive and the negative jump process lies in the size of the 
allowed jumps.  While definition (8.11) of the negative jumps is similar to the positive ones, 
the allowed sizes are not. 
(8.11) 
Negative jumps can only reduce the value of MP(t) with a lower limit of zero because MP(t) 
can, under no circumstances, become a negative figure.  This implies for the allowed jump 
size that [ [1;0∈VV . 
                                                 
435 This is discussed in detail in chapter 5.1.5.  On the issue of non-exclusivity of real options see also 
Freihube (2001, p. 140) or Kilka (1995, p. 117). 
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For the distribution of negative jumps over time another compound Poisson process is used.  
This second compound Poisson process makes the time period between two consecutive 
negative jumps occurrences (υv+1-υv) independent from each other and from M(t).  With this 
Poisson process the time between two negative jump occurrences is characterized by the 
following distribution density function (8.12). 
(8.12) 
Figure 8.3 shows the illustrative examples for MP(t) following the developed double-jump-
diffusion-process with trend, building on the three initial expectations MP(0)1, MP(0)2 and 











Figure 8.3: NCE market pot. – double jump diffusion process 
8.1.5 Uncertainty in Initial Market Estimate 
The last factor influencing the future market potential of a new drug is the uncertainty related 
to the starting point MP(0) of the described stochastic process.  For the development of the 
upper and lower pricing limit in an idealistic market environment it is assumed that the 
market potential of a drug is known and constant over time.  In the previous sections of this 
chapter the assumption of constant market potential over time is relaxed and the market 
potential development is described using a double-jump-diffusion process with trend with a 
known starting point MP(0). 
In this section the assumption of a known starting point of the valuation process is relaxed 
and the known initial market potential MP(0) is substituted by a stochastic variable.  The 
probability function of this initial market potential has to fulfill certain requirements: 
• It can only allow positive values for MP(0).  A negative market potential does not 
represent a realistic starting point. 
• It should be a one peak function that assigns the highest probability to a market 
potential management considers most appropriate. 
0,1 2 ≥− − te tλ
8. Fund Raising Potential of R&D Option in a Realistic Environment 
 
181
A probability function fulfilling these criteria is the lognormal distribution function, which is 
a one peak function that cannot take on negative values.  From this point on, the lognormal 
distribution is used as a probability function for the initial market potential MP(0).  This 
assumption appears appropriate considering that Copeland and Tufano (2004) already 
consider this kind of distribution function as “fairly standard”436 for real-life issues.437 
Instead of working with a single expected value for MP(0) at the beginning of the 
development project it is more appropriate to work with a range in which one expects the 
initial value of MP(0) to be.  This expectation range is framed by a lower limit MPl and an 
upper limit MPu for the market potential MP(0) at the time of project valuation t=0. 
Using this range as a probability interval and knowing that the natural log of the expected 
market potential is normally distributed allows the distribution parameters to be derived from 
the initial expectation range [MPl; MPu].  For a normally distributed stochastic variable it is 
known that 95% of all possible values can be observed within a range of two standard 
deviations around the expected mean value438.  If the 95% interval is defined as [MPl; MPu] 
and MP(0) is log-normally distributed, the 95% interval for the natural log becomes: 
(8.13) 
With the lognormal distribution assumption and the 95% boundary condition of (8.13) a 
probability distribution function of the natural logarithm of the future market potential can be 
established.  To do so, the estimator for the volatility439 ( )0ln MPσ  and the expected mean value 
of the initial market potential ( )0MP  can be derived from (8.13) using the following formulas 
(8.14) and (8.15). 
(8.14) 
(8.15) 
By definition it is known that the natural logarithm of MP(0) follows a normal distribution 
N(ln ( )( ) ( )0ln;0 MPMP σ ) with the density function (8.16). 
                                                 
436 And use it to estimate the value of a plant to be built. 
437 It needs to be emphasized that the use of the log-normal distribution has to be evaluated for 
appropriateness before it is applied on a real project.  Other distribution functions might prove more 
effective in specific cases. 
438 One can refer to Bol (1993, p. 83) or any other source on basic statistics for more details. 
439 On the importance of cash flow volatility in forecasting see Minton et al. (2002) 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]00 ln0ln0 2ln;2lnln;ln MPMPul MPMPMPMP σσ +−=
( )( )
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For the illustrative case example the 95% probability range is defined in Table 7.2 with 
[MPl;MPu]=[80; 120] and therefore [ln(MPl);ln(MPu)]=[4.38; 4.78].  Figure 8.4 shows the 
probability density function of the natural logarithm of the initial market potential ln(MP(0)) 
in the illustrative case example. 










Figure 8.4: Illustrative distribution of natural logarithm of initial market potential 
The lognormal distribution function of MP(0) corresponding to the normal distribution 
function displayed above is shown in the following Figure 8.5.  The figure demonstrates the 
typical characteristics of the lognormal distribution function, which does not have any 
negative occurrences and is skewed towards the y-axis. 









Figure 8.5: Illustrative lognormal distribution of initial market potential 
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The above discussion on the initial market potential is essential as a basis for the market 
potential simulations conducted in section 8.2.1. 
8.2 R&D Option Financing Range in Realistic Environment 
In the previous chapter the transformation from an idealistic to a more realistic market 
environment is described.  In this chapter the focus is back on the financing potential of the 
R&D option and the impact the change in market environment has on its financing range. 
Recalling the integration problem in the valuation of the financing range in an idealistic 
environment it becomes clear that substituting the constant parameter MP with a stochastic 
process adds complexity to the valuation problem.  While the above model could be assessed 
using discrete summation, this approach is not sufficient for the valuation in the realistic 
environment.  Another approximation technique is used to incorporate stochastic processes in 
the valuation.  A method capable of assessing complex integrals in high dimensions and 
including stochastic process into the analysis is Monte Carlo Analysis (MCA). 
MCA simulation is a powerful440 tool well-suited when performing economic valuations for 
complex problems especially with a long time horizon.441  An approach based on MCA is 
therefore the method of choice to approximate the financing potential of a R&D option in a 
realistic market environment.  In chapter 6.4 it is shown how simulation or Monte Carlo 
analysis can be used to evaluate financial options.  At this point, an adapted approach is used 
to derive the pricing limits of a R&D option. 
Generally Monte Carlo simulation follows a six step process consisting of: 
1. Identify uncertain input parameters 
2. Determine probability distributions of uncertain input parameters 
3. Model interrelations and dependencies between different input parameters 
4. Model underlying stochastic processes influencing input parameters 
5. Conduct simulation runs 
6. Evaluate and interpret simulation results 
In the previous sections of this study the first three steps are completed.  While some input 
parameters and probability distributions are defined during the discussion of the fund raising 
potential in an idealistic market environment, the remaining parameters are identified and 
discussed in section 8.1. 
                                                 
440 Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) consider Monte Carlo analysis such a powerful tool that they use it 
to investigate early exercise decisions of American options, which is, based on their comments, 
“one of the most challenging problems in derivative finance”. 
441 An application in the pharmaceutical industry, for example, is the simulation of long-term cost 
effectiveness of new drugs as shown in Henriksson (2002) and Skaer et al. (2000) or clinical trial 
simulations at Hughes and Walley (2001). 
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The interrelations between the various parameters are also defined in the approximation 
formulas for the upper and the lower pricing limit in the idealistic market environment.  The 
next step is to model the stochastic processes that substitute the market potential parameter 
MP(t) in the established valuation approach based on the discussion in chapter 8.1. 
By knowing the underlying market potential of a new drug and therefore the value of the 
R&D project for one specific simulation run, one can derive the corresponding value of the 
R&D option for this specific case.  Conducting the process of simulating a specific random 
sample path for the underlying asset and solving the valuation model for this specific case 
multiple times generates over time a close estimate of the final solution.  This is the case 
because the law of large numbers eventually makes the average of all simulation runs 
converge to the solution of the underlying valuation problem. 
8.2.1 Simulation of Future Market Potential 
To describe the simulation process and to show indicative results for the valuation problem, 
this chapter is built around the introduced illustrative case example.  In this simulation 
section the time continuous underlying stochastic process is approximated by a time discrete 
process with steps of size ∆t.  A total of n=1,000 simulation runs are conducted to allow the 
derivation of meaningful results.442  At this point, the stochastic process (8.9) is recalled. 
(8.9) 
This stochastic differential equation is transformed into the time discrete approximation 
(8.17) that allows the simulation of the process for MP(t) using standard spreadsheet 
calculation software. 
(8.17) 
From this approximation the market potential at any time step MPi(t+∆t) during the 
individual simulation runs follows (8.18) with [ ]1000;1∈i . 
(8.18) 
While some of the components of equation (8.18)are independent from the conducted 
simulation run, others are not and are simulated individually to obtain the final n=1,000 
simulations for MPi(t).  Another presentation of (8.18) demonstrates this for the first time 
step starting at MPi(0) with step size ∆t for all MPi, [ ]1000;1∈i . 
(8.19) 
                                                 
442 Regarding methods on how to improve the efficiency of Monte Carlo Simulations refer to 
Glasserman (2004, p. 185) 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tJtJtUttMPttMP NiPiiii ∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆+ σµ1*
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tJtJtUtMPtMP iNiPiii ∆∆+∆∆+∆∆+∆+=∆ σµ1*0
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Starting point of the simulation is the expected initial market potential MPi(0), with the 
distribution characteristics defined in section 8.1.5.  The n=1,000 simulation runs for MPi(0) 














































Figure 8.6: Simulation results for n=1,000 initial market potentials MP(0) 
Starting from these MPi(0) the different components of (8.19) that depend on the individual 
simulation runs i are modeled.  The first element that requires simulation is the term for 
general market uncertainty.  To model a process with the characteristics described in chapter 
8.1.2 the increments ∆Ui(t) can be easily calculated using (8.20)443. 
(8.20) 
With Zi(0), Zi(∆t), Zi(2∆t), …, being independent standard normally distributed random 
variables.  To complete [ ]1000;1∈i  market potential simulations over the entire patent 
protection period for [ ]20;0∈t  it is necessary to generate the following set of random 
variables (8.21), which can be done easily using standard spreadsheet software. 
(8.21) 
With the generated set of random variables and the knowledge that U(0)=0, the processes 
Ui(t) can be described.  For the initial time step ∆t equation (8.19) can be rewritten as (8.22) 
for all [ ]1000;1∈i . 
                                                 
443 As proposed for financial option valuation at Glasserman (2004, p. 81). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ttZttUttUtU iiii ∆+∆=−∆+=∆ *
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Figure 8.7 shows the distribution of n=1,000 random numbers for Zi(∆t) with the framework 
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Figure 8.7: Result of n=1,000 random standard normally distributed parameters 
Based on this set of random numbers the factor representing general uncertainty can be 











































































Figure 8.8: Distribution of n=1,000 general market uncertainty factors 
After the initiation points MPi(0) are generated and the trend and market uncertainty factors 
are quantified, the remaining two jump factors for potential positive and negative jumps in 
market potential have to be simulated.  The positive jump process JP(t) is defined as (8.6) and 
therefore the factor ∆JiP(t) relevant for the simulation is only dependent on whether a jump 
occurs between t and (t+∆t). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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If a jump occurs between t and (t+∆t) can be represented as a random variable and so can the 
size of this potential jump.  The resulting positive jump factor ∆JiP(t) can be interpreted as the 
product of a jump occurrence factor Pi(t)∈[0;1] and a jump size factor Yi(t) for all 
i∈[1;1000] as shown in (8.23). 
(8.23) 
Since it is assumed that the occurrence of positive jumps follows a Poisson process with 
parameter λ1, one can define a random variable Ri(t) that is evenly distributed in [0;1] so that 
each Pi(t) takes on either 0 or 1 depending on the following relationship. 
( ) 0=tPi  if ( )ti etR ∆−−> 11)( λ  
( ) 1=tPi  if ( )ti etR ∆−−≤ 11)( λ  
To assess the second factor Yi(t) a maximum size Ymax is defined setting an upper limit to the 
size of positive jumps.  Parameter Y is defined in (8.7) as the ratio between the market 
potential after a jump and the market potential before a jump.  In addition it is assumed for 
the illustrative example that a positive jump can, in a best case scenario, increase the market 
potential by 40% therefore it is known that Yi(t)∈[1;1.4].  As a second restriction it is 
assumed that the size of the positive jumps is evenly distributed444 within their occurrence 
range [1;Ymax]. 
With the ability to generate Pi(t) and Yi(t) over the entire observation period [0;20] using 
standard spreadsheet software, equation (8.22) for the market potential after the initial time 
step ∆t with [ ]1000;1∈i  can be rewritten as (8.24). 
(8.24) 
The following Figure 8.9 visualizes how n=1,000 random variables for Yi(∆t) are combined 
with Poisson distributed random variables Pi(∆t) for the occurrence of positive jumps at the 
first time step t=∆t.  The figure is based on the jump range Yi∈[1;1.4] and on a Poisson 
process with λ1=0.02, which can be interpreted as if a positive jump is on average expected to 
occur every 1/λ1=50 time periods ∆t. 
                                                 
444 The type of probability distribution used has to be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on 
the research project investigated. 
( ) ( ) ( )tYtPtJ iiiP *=∆
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]tJtYtPtZtMPtMP Niiiiii ∆∆+∆∆+∆∆+=∆ *1*0 µ
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Figure 8.9: Simulation results for n=1,000 potential positive jumps 
In order to simulate the second jump process representing potential negative jumps in market 
potential caused by market competition, a different approach is taken to consider the 
signaling effect of product entries into the market.  To consider market competition in the 
simulation model three assumptions are made: 
In light of the small number of industry players developing products in direct competition to 
each other, the number of market entrants is limited by definition.  For the illustrative case 
the maximum number of competitors is set to one, which means that none or one other 
company is developing a substitute product and the counting process M(t) of equation (8.10) 
is limited to Mmax(t)=1. 
As long as no product is approved in a market, the probability that a negative shock occurs is 
larger compared to the time after a product is already on the market.  Rational behind this 
assumption is that other companies are aiming more intensively to enter a new market than a 
market that is already occupied by competitors.  This means that two different factors λ2E and 
λ2L are used to model the Poisson distributed occurrences of negative jumps with λ2E≥λ2L.  
The first factor λ2E applies to all t<E(TA) and λ2L for all t≥E(TA). 
To reflect the first mover advantage of the company introducing a product into the market 
before all competitors do, the sizes of the potential negative jumps also differ before and after 
E(TA).  To reduce complexity in the simulation model the negative jump sizes are fixed as 
opposed to stochastic variables as used for the positive jumps445.  In case another company 
enters the market before the drug development process is expected to be completed at E(TA) a 
fixed market share of 50% is assumed to be lost and therefore VE=0.5.  In case the research 
conducting company captures the first mover advantage itself, the lost market share is 
assumed to be lower because it makes it more difficult for others to capture customers in the 
                                                 
445 If more appropriate for an individual valuation case the constant factor can be replaced with a 
stocjastic parameter as done for the positive jump sizes above. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ][ ]5.0**1*0 −∆+∆∆+∆∆+∆+=∆ tNtYtPtZttMPtMP iiiiii σµ
market446.  In this case when a competitor enters the market after E(TA), the lost market share 
accounts for only 25% and therefore VL=0.75. 
To incorporate these assumptions in the negative jump factor ∆JiN(t) of equation (8.18), the 
factor ∆JiN is modeled in a way similar to that of the positive jumps.  The jump factor ∆JiN(t) 
to be used is also a product of two factors following equation (8.25). 
(8.25) 
In this equation the first part Ni(t) represents the negative jump occurrence whereas the 
second part Vi(t) determines the size of the negative jump being the market share competitors 
take away if they enter the market at a certain time.  Similar to the occurrence of positive 
jumps these negative jumps follow a Poisson distributed arrival process.  To include the 
assumption that the chance of competitive market entry is higher before t=E(TA), the Poisson 
arrival process is broken down into two sub-processes with individual parameters λ2E and λ2L 
with λ2E≥λ2L. 
To simulate the occurrence of negative jumps, a random variable Ri(t) is generated that is 
evenly distributed on [0;1] so that each Ni(t) can be defined as either 0 or 1 depending on the 
following relationship. 
( ) 0=tNi  
if ( )[ ])(1)( 2 Ati TEtetR E <∧−> ∆−λ or ( )[ ])(1)( 2 Ati TEtetR L ≥∧−> ∆−λ or 1)( =tM  
( ) 1=tN i
 if ( )[ ]0)()(1)( 2 =∧<∧−≤ ∆− tMTEtetR Ati Eλ or ( )[ ]0)()(1)( 2 =∧≥∧−≤ ∆− tMTEtetR Ati Lλ  
With M(t) being a counting process of the following form 
(8.26) 
The above definitions change the general factor ∆JN from (8.25) to (8.27). 
(8.27) 
For the calculation example of the first time step of the market potential simulation, equation 
(8.24) can be refined to (8.28). 
(8.28) 
The spreadsheet simulation of the factor Ni(∆t)*[-0.5] returns the following parameters for 
i∈[1;1000] simulation runs shown in Figure 8.10. 
                                                 
446 Compare to Hitt et al. (1999, p. 170) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1* −=∆ tVtNtJ iiiN
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Figure 8.10: Simulation result for n=1,000 potential negative jumps 
Up to this point it is demonstrated how the market potential simulation for the fist time step 
t=∆t can be completed.  Based on this knowledge the simulation for the future market 
potential for the entire observation period [0; 20] can be completed.  Building on the known 
relation (8.18), the future potential of a new drug can be calculated at every time step (k*∆t) 
using equation (8.29) for all i∈[1,1000] and all k∈[1;20/∆t]. 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ][ ][ ]1**1*1 −∆∆+∆∆+∆∆+∆+∆−=∆ tkVtkNtkYtkPtkZtttkMPtkMP iiiiiii σµ  
(8.29) 
With Vi(k∆t)=0.5 for all k∆t<E(TA) and Vi(k∆t)=0.75 for all k∆t≥E(TA). 
Random examples of the n=1,000 simulations i of the market potential of the illustrative drug 
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Figure 8.11: Selected MP(t) simulations following double jump diffusion process 
It is important to recall that for the buyer of a R&D option it is irrelevant, which market 
potential a new drug has today.  The relevant time period for the buyer of a R&D option and 
therefore also for the R&D option valuation is the period t∈[TA;20] after the drug is 
approved until the patent expires at t=20. 
8. Fund Raising Potential of R&D Option in a Realistic Environment 
 
191
The approval date TA and therefore the starting point for the relevant market potential is 
related to uncertainty.  As for the approximation of the R&D option financing range in the 
idealistic market environment, this uncertainty has to be considered in the upcoming 
valuation section for the realistic market environment.  Figure 8.12 visualizes the market 
potential distribution of the n=1,000 simulation runs at the best case project termination date 























































Figure 8.12: Distribution of simulation runs for MP(t) at t=11 and t=20 
It can be seen that the density function of MP at t=TAmin=11 has a high peak and few 
occurrences at very high MP levels.  This is different for t=20 where the multiple factors 
impacting the development of MP cause the peak of the density function to be lower but at 
the same time allows more occurrences with very high and therefore valuable MP levels. 
Figure 8.13 visualizes four random examples out of the n=1,000 simulation runs for the 
future market potential relevant for approximating of the value of the R&D project and 
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Figure 8.13: Valuation relevant future market potential (selected simulations) 
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Now, with the market potential of a new drug being simulated in a realistic market 
environment the next sections investigate how this change in market environment impacts the 
upper and the lower limit of the financing range of the R&D option. 
8.2.2 Impact on Upper Pricing Limit 
In this section it is discussed how the transformation from an idealistic to a realistic market 
environment affects the upper pricing limit of a R&D option.  As a first step the significance 
of the time to final approval TA is assessed.  For any TA∈[0;20] the value of the project, 
represented by the shaded areas in Figure 8.13 for four examples, at the time of approval can 
be expressed as (8.30). 
(8.30) 
DAVU represents the value a fully diversified investor assigns at final drug approval to the 
market potential of a drug over the entire effective patent protection period.  Since this type 
of investor only requires a risk premium for general market risk the relevant discount factor is 
set at (rft+α).  With this drug approval value it is known that the R&D option represents a 
value of (8.31) at the time of drug approval for this type of investor. 
(8.31) 
For any time during the research process the value of the R&D option assuming the point of 
drug approval is reached can be written as (8.32). 
(8.32) 
Incorporating the adjustment potential for technical project failure447 changes (8.32) to (8.33). 
































































Taking a closer look at equation (8.33) shows that the value of the R&D option now depends 
to a large extent on the approval time TA and on the future development of the market 
potential MP(t) of the new drug over time.  In the previous section it was shown that the 
future market potential can develop in a wide variety of ways depending on a multitude of 
                                                 
447 Potential technical project failure is discussed in detail in section 7.3.3 of this study. 
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different input factors therefore representing a complex part of the R&D option valuation 
problem.  It is also shown in chapter 7.3.4.7 that the final approval date TA of a drug 
development project is related to uncertainty and can change over time.  To express this 
timing uncertainty in equation (8.33), the constant TA is replaced by TA(t)448, which changes 
the model to (8.34). 
































































With the uncertainty in TA(t) and the stochastic processes behind MP(t) this complex 
valuation problem cannot be solved analytically.  To approximate a solution, Monte Carlo 
Simulation is applied.  With a given discount factor449 and a given exercise price X, each 
simulation run i∈[1;1000] is conducted with a different TiA(t) and a different future 
development path for MPi(t).  These parameters TiA(t) and MPi(t) are generated for each 
simulation run i based on the described underlying stochastic processes.  The valuation 
problem (8.34) is solved to derive a possible solution for each simulation CUi(t) i∈[1;1000]. 


































































Every CUi(t) represents a different scenario and not every CUi(t) is necessarily close to the 
solution of the initial valuation problem (8.34).  Since some outcomes overvalue and others 
undervalue the correct solution for CU(t), the average over all conducted simulation runs is 
calculated to approximate the value for CU(t). 
(8.36) 
The law of large numbers ensures that the estimate (8.36) converges to the correct value of 
CU(t) as the number of simulation runs n increases.  For the valuation problem discussed in 
                                                 
448 As opposed to E(TA). 
449 Which is assumed to be constant over time. 
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this study a sample of n=1,000 simulations is used and therefore the approximation for CU(t) 
can be written as (8.37). 
(8.37) 
Before the individual simulations for CUi(t) can be conducted it is necessary to model all 
interrelations and dependencies.  While the previous section describes the modeling of the 
simulation run specific future market potential MPi(t) it is still necessary to model the 
development of TiA(t). 
For the approval time TA it is said that starting from an expected best case scenario with 
approval time TAmin there is a risk of delay, which is exponentially distributed.  Now it 
appears very interesting to estimate a value TAmax to limit a 95% confidence interval, generate 
a single constant TiA based on the resulting distribution function and use this value over the 
entire valuation period.  By doing so, one excludes learning effects over the lifetime of a 
project and over all simulation runs timing uncertainty at t=E(TA) would still be the same as it 
is at t=0.  As a result, an incorrect value is assigned to CU(t) as E(TA) is approached because 
the gained knowledge about project termination timing is neglected.  To avoid this problem a 
random initial project duration TiA(0) is generated for every simulation run using (8.38) with 
Zi being a random evenly distributed variable from the interval [0;1], which is then adapted 
over the expected course of the project. 
(8.38) 
The distribution parameter λ0 and the parameter λE(TA), which is used below, are derived as 
described in chapter 7.3.4.7.  In this section the learning effect over the lifetime of a project 
is discussed and a factor κ for learning speed is introduced.  Building on this discussion, the 
termination date over the lifetime of a project follows (8.39) for TiA(t) with t∈D5, 
D5=]0;E(TA)[ and *+∈Rκ . 
(8.39) 
Figure 8.14 visualizes the development of two random simulation runs for TiA(t) with 
Z1=0.840 and Z2=0.220 in relation to [TAmin(t); TAmax(t)]450 and the constant E(TA). 
                                                 
450 Representing the 95% confidence interval for project timing. 
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Figure 8.14: Simulation runs for expected project termination TA(t) 
With this model for TiA(t) the last component of equation (8.35) is defined and the actual 
simulation process can be initiated.  Once the n=1,000 simulation runs are conducted the final 
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Run#1 Run#2 Run#3 Run#4 Run#5
Run#6 Run#7 Run#8 Run#9 Total Average  
Figure 8.15: Selected simulations of upper pricing limit of R&D option 
Figure 8.15 shows the results of nine individual simulations for CUi(t) and the final estimate 
for CU(t) over the total of n=1,000 simulation runs451. 
8.2.3 Impact on Lower Pricing Limit 
After showing how the upper pricing limit can be approximated in a realistic market 
environment, this section shows an approximation of the lower pricing limit to quantify the 
financing range of the R&D option.  In chapter 7.4 the necessary adjustments to transform the 
                                                 
451 The detailed results represent time discrete approximations of the continuous processes with time 
increments of ∆t=0.1. 
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upper pricing limit to the lower limit are shown.  Although the section refers to an idealistic 
market environment the adjustments to transform the upper to the lower pricing limit are 
analogous for the realistic market environment. 
It also holds true in the realistic market environment that perfectly diversified investors do 
not require risk premiums for private risk factors while investors not able to diversify this risk 
do.  This means that the two introduced risk premiums ε and ρ also have to be considered in 
the realistic environment when assessing the lower pricing limit. 
A private risk factor, which is by definition excluded from the idealistic market environment, 
is the potential competition from alternative products.  Consistent with the definition of 
private risk, highly diversified investors do not to require a return premium for taking on this 
type of risk.  To consider that other investors who are not able to diversify their private risk 
exposure do require a return premium for this type of risk an additional risk premium β is 
introduced.  Since competing products can enter the market at any time, the risk premium β 
has to be applied to the preceding research period as well as to the marketing period 
following TA. 
Considering this, equation (8.35) represents the valuation formula for the individual 
simulations to quantify the lower R&D option pricing limit in a realistic market environment. 


































































To demonstrate the valuation approach for the case example, the premium for potential risk 
of competing products β is set at an illustrative level of 5%.  With this assumption and the 
developed valuation formula (8.35), a new set of n=1,000 simulations is conducted.  Figure 
8.16 shows the results of nine individual simulation runs for CLi(t) in addition to the final 
CL(t) to which the average of n=1,000 simulation runs converges.452 
                                                 
452 As for the upper pricing limit above, the demonstrated results represent time discrete 
approximations of the continuous processes with time increments of ∆t=0.1. 
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Figure 8.16: Selected simulations of lower pricing limit of R&D option 
8.2.4 R&D Option Financing Range 
During the previous sections it is demonstrated how much two extreme types of investors are 
theoretically willing to pay when acquiring a R&D option.  Since market players do not 
represent these extreme types of investors, these expectations can be considered a theoretical 
upper and lower boundary of the financing range.  As real-life investors generally have some 
opportunity to diversify risk and some level of financial resources available, their price 
expectations reside between the described extreme cases CU(t) and CL(t).  Figure 8.17 
visualizes this expected pricing range for the illustrative case example.  It is limited on the 
upper end by the average of n=1,000 simulation runs for the upper pricing limit and limited 
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Figure 8.17: R&D option pricing range – realistic market environment 
In considering the path of the financing range’s boundaries a few points need to be 
mentioned.  The first point is the fact that an undiversified investor is only willing to pay a 
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very low price to acquire a R&D option very early in the drug development process.  Despite 
the early stage, the totally diversified investor is willing to pay a premium compared to the 
one-project investor at this time.  In the illustrative case this premium amounts to 
approximately 7.5 million or over 900% at the time of patent application.453 
Figure 8.18 shows the expected maximum premium a fully diversified investor is willing to 
pay for the acquisition of a R&D option in comparison to the lowest price in absolute and in 
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Figure 8.18: Width of R&D option pricing range – realistic market environment 
From the very early stage of the R&D project the absolute difference between the pricing 
boundaries constantly increases towards the end of the minimum expected development 
period.  At the end of this period it reaches an absolute premium of about 133 million in the 
illustrative case.  Although the premium in absolute terms increases over the expected course 
of the project it does not in terms relative to the lower pricing limit.  The relative premium is 
high early in the development process but decreases over time to a final premium of 88% for 
the illustrative case example at the end of the minimum project duration t=TAmin=11. 
8.2.5 Total Financing Potential of a R&D option 
In a R&D option deal, the option premium is only one part of the total cash flows the 
research conducting company potentially receives.  In addition to the sales price the research 
conducting company also receives the exercise price X in those cases where the project is 
completed successfully and the prospects are promising enough for the option buyer to 
exercise his option right.  Some young drug developing companies are interested in the 
                                                 
453 Being t=0. 
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exercising of the R&D option454 and therefore the second potential payment at maturity is of 
strategic importance to these companies.  For the option buyer, the second payment 
represents an insurance against the case that the option seller discontinues the development 
process while it serves as a final reward for the option seller for successful R&D efforts. 
At this point it becomes necessary to include the exercising cash flow into the discussion.  It 
becomes even more important if one considers the relationship between the exercise price 
and the achievable selling price of a R&D option.  The lower the exercise price is set in a 
R&D option deal, the higher the expected selling price of the option and the higher the short 
term financing potential.  While this increases the short-term cash flow it also gives the 
option owner the right to exercise his right with a smaller additional payment on the exercise 
date.  The extreme case is represented by setting the exercise price to zero455.  While this 
maximizes the short-term cash-flow achievable through the option sale it also eliminates any 
additional payment on the exercise date.  This shows that it is necessary to investigate how 
short-term financing potential and exercise payment are interdependent.  It should be 
discussed whether a strategy exists that can optimize the situation for the R&D option seller 
by ensuring a sufficient upfront payment to finance operations and also guaranteeing a 
significant exercise payment at the end of the research period. 
With this in mind the questions arises as to whether an optimal exercise price can be found 
that maximizes the expected total cash flow from the R&D option deal.  To investigate this 
question the term total financing potential is introduced.  This total financing potential TF(t) 
is defined as the combination of the selling price C(t) of the R&D option plus the time 
adjusted expected final payment FP(t) at the end of the research and development activities. 
TF(t)=C(t)+FP(t) 
Since C(t) can only be represented as a range rather than one single value it is obvious that 
TF(t) is also represented by a range.  After discussing the selling price of the R&D option in 
the previous chapters it is necessary to take a closer look at the time adjusted expected 
maximum final payment FPU(t), which can be defined as equation (8.40). 
(8.40) 
While the first two components of the formula discount the exercise price of the option back 
from the time of final drug approval TA to the relevant valuation time t, the last term ωU(t) 
determines if the payment takes place or if the option expires unexercised. 
                                                 
454 This can be the case if the young company does not want to or is not able to set up its own large-
scale production, marketing and distribution organization. 
455 This is not a realistic setting because it would eliminate any incentive for the research conducting 
company to complete the research and development process.  The example is only of illustrative 
value to demonstrate the theoretical impact of this scenario. 
( )( ) ( )teXtFP UtTrU Arf ωα **)( −+−=
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This decision factor ω(t) is set to zero if the option expires worthless and set to one if a 
rationale investor exercises the option at final drug approval, which is the case if the project 
value exceeds the exercise price.  Equation (8.41) formalizes this relationship. 
(8.41) 
Similar to the valuation approach for the selling price of the R&D option, equation (8.41) 
depends on the uncertain market potential as well as on the uncertain time of final drug 
approval.  Therefore it also depends on the previously conducted simulation runs for the 
market potential development.  To demonstrate this dependency, equations (8.40) and (8.41) 
are adapted to become (8.42) and (8.43). 
(8.42) 
(8.43) 
With these definitions and the simulation equations developed above, an upper limit for the 
total financing potential TFUi(t) can be defined as (8.44). 









































































By knowing the decision factor ωi(t), the two simulation formulas for the upper and the lower 
limit of the total financing potential TFUi(t) and TFLi(t) can be written as (8.45) and (8.47). 
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With the relevant decision factor ωUi(t) being defined as (8.46). 
(8.46) 





























































ωLi(t) being defined as. 
(8.48) 
After setting up the simulation formulas for the total financing potential, a new set of n=1,000 
simulation runs is conducted to investigate the expected development of the total financing 
potential over time.  Doing so for the illustrative case example used throughout this study 
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Figure 8.19: R&D option total financing range – realistic market environment 
With regard to the pricing range of the R&D option discussed above, certain characteristics 
of this total financing range need to be highlighted.  An analysis of the total financing 
potential instead of only the expected price of the R&D option favors closing the R&D option 
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deal with a highly diversified investor as expected.  In the illustrative example it can be 
expected that closing the deal with this best case investor results in a 14 million advantage in 
total financing potential if the deal is closed right at the time a company applies for patent 
protection status.  This advantage mainly results from the fact that at this research stage, the 
project is of only little value to the one-project investor. 
Figure 8.20 shows the absolute and relative advantage of closing a R&D option deal with a 
highly diversified investor with ample financial resources as opposed to a one-project 
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Figure 8.20: Width of option total financing range – realistic market environment 
The behavior of the gap between the best and worst case investor for the total financing 
potential over time is similar to that of the R&D option price.  Closing the R&D option deal 
with the best case investor results at any time in an advantage for the seller of the option.  If 
measured in absolute terms, this advantage increases from about 14 million to a maximum of 
225 million shortly before the end of the minimum expected drug development period in the 
illustrative case.  After this peak is reached, the advantage measured in absolute terms starts 
to decrease as the expected end of the minimum drug development period is approached.  If 
the R&D option deal is closed right before the minimum expected development period of a 
new drug, there is still an expected total benefit of 220 million in closing it with the best case 
investor.  This is related to the fact that the final product itself represents a higher value to 
this investor than it does for the one-project investor and therefore the probability of 
receiving the final exercise payment is higher. 
While the absolute advantage of closing the deal with the highly diversified investor shows a 
maximum, this is different if measured in relative terms.  In relative terms a fully diversified 
investor loses his advantage over other investors over the course of the project.  Early during 
the project there is a large relative benefit in closing the R&D option deal with the best case 
investor because the percentage premium amounts to over 750% at the start of the project for 
the illustrative case.  This advantage decreases as the project progresses.  Right before the 
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expected minimum project termination date the relative total advantage of closing the R&D 
option deal with the best case investor is expected to be reduced to about 66%. 
With this in mind it can be said that the chances of a less diversified investors to enter a R&D 
option deal increase as the underlying project progresses because the relative premium a 
diversified investor is willing to pay decreases over time.  Although the chances of the less 
diversified investor theoretically increase they are still limited because in absolute terms it is 
always more appealing for a research conducting company to close a R&D option deal with a 
highly diversified investor. 
This conclusion is in line with the tendency in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry 
towards large research conducting entities with extensive research portfolios.  If R&D 
options were a frequently applied financing tool in the market, these large entities would be 
most likely to win bidding contests for these options due to their indifference towards private 
risk.  With the acquisition of each R&D option the risk diversification increases further 456 
resulting in an even higher willingness to pay a premium compared to less diversified 
investors.  This can serve as an argument for concentration processes in the drug developing 
industry. 
In return it shows that small companies have difficulties in such an environment to acquire 
new projects by purchasing R&D options.  This is because the funds they are willing to invest 
are always smaller compared to those of diversified companies and therefore the R&D seller 
is likely to exclude them from a R&D option bid. 
Until this point the indications and conclusions from the analysis are drawn from one 
illustrative example.  To avoid that this example represents a special, non-representative case, 
it is essential to investigate how sensitive the results are towards changes in the individual 
input parameters of the simulation model.  In the following chapter, sensitivity analyses are 
conducted to investigate how variations in input factors change the results of the valuation 
approach. 
                                                 
456 Assuming that risks of individual projects are not perfectly correlated. 
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9 Sensitivity Analysis of Valuation Approach 
In the previous section, a model was developed to asses fund raising potential and total 
financing potential of a R&D option in a realistic market environment.  The derived model 
does not represent a closed-form valuation formula but depends on input parameters that 
cannot objectively be derived from market sources and are therefore subject to managerial 
estimations.  For such cases, Loch and Bode-Greuel (2001) recommend457 investigating how 
changes in individual input parameters affect a model’s valuation results.  This type of 
investigation can be conducted from a strictly economical point of view as a comparative 
static458 or from a more pragmatic standpoint as a one-dimensional sensitivity analysis. 
In the first approach economists investigate how the output of a model changes if the 
valuation environment develops in a certain way.  To perform this task it is necessary to 
model all interrelations and dependencies between input parameters.  This is necessary 
because if one parameter of the valuation environment changes, others might depend on this 
parameter and react in a certain way.  Especially for valuation models with multiple 
interdependent parameters, this type of sensitivity analysis can be highly complex as factor 
dependencies are often difficult to model. 
The more pragmatic approach targets the question of how the result of a valuation model 
reacts if a single factor is over- or underestimated by the entity conducting the analysis.  This 
type of analysis clearly indicates where closest focus should be placed when defining input 
parameters.  To develop an answer to this question a one-dimensional sensitivity analysis is 
conducted that treats each input factor as an independent parameter.  This approach has the 
advantage that only one input factor is changed at a time and the corresponding output 
changes are analyzed.  As this entire study is written from a pragmatic and implementation 
focused standpoint, the second approach is selected for this section on model sensitivity. 
Starting from the illustrative example, the parameters exercise price, development speed, 
probability and size of negative jumps, initial market uncertainty and the probability and size 
of positive jumps are adjusted to investigate the resulting change in the pricing and total 
financing potential of the R&D option.459 
                                                 
457 They explicitly stress the importance of sensitivity analysis in their study on evaluating growth 
options as sources of value for drug developing companies.  “In addition, sensitivity analysis should 
be performed to see how much the risk profiles and expected profits change when key parameters 
are varied”, Loch and Bode-Greuel (2001, p. 242). 
458 Compare to Hoy et al. (2001) or Chiang and Wainwright (2005). 
459 At this point it is important to state that a sensitivity analyses based on the illustrative case example 
does not allow the derivation of generally valid conclusions.  It does give indications about the 
general behaviour of the model but especially the magnitude of the observed effects strongly 
depends on the individual project case, which serves as a starting point for the sensitivity analysis.  
For this reason, it is emphasized that for every real-life valuation problem with different baseline 
parameters an individual sensitivity analysis should be conducted. 
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9.1 Exercise Price 
One of the most important parameters when discussing the pricing of an option is its exercise 
price.  In section 3.1.3 it is shown that for the case of a European call option an increasing 
exercise price reduces the option’s value.  This relationship also holds true for a R&D option 
on a drug development project.  Figure 9.1 simulates in the top two charts how changes in the 
parameter X impact the pricing limits of the R&D option for the illustrative case example.  
Two conclusions can be drawn from these simulations.  Firstly, the negative impact of 
exercise price increases on the option price can be confirmed and secondly, that the later the 
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Figure 9.1: Sensitivity of valuation model to changes in exercise price 
With this relationship it can be said that the largest cash generation potential of a R&D option 
exists if the exercise price is set to X=0.  Although this is theoretically sound, it is not a 
realistic setting due to multiple reasons.  Setting X=0 cannot be considered an option deal 
because it does not involve any exercise payment and is therefore from a cash flow 
perspective equal to selling the entire project.  Without an exercise payment to be earned at 
the end of the research period there is no incentive for the research conducting company to 
continue its research activities and therefore no option buyer is willing to accept such a very 
low exercise price.  The opportunity to earn a significant exercise payment can be considered 
“an insurance” for the buyer that the underlying project is pursued by the option seller. 
This emphasizes the importance of taking a closer look at the behavior of the total financing 
potential if a different exercise price is selected.  The two lower charts in Figure 9.1 illustrate 
the impact of a changed exercise price on the total financing potential for selected cases.  It 
can be noted that a reduction of the exercise price causes a smaller percentage change than it 
does for the option price.  As long as the exercise price is not increased to a very large figure, 
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changes in the total financing potential are relatively small.  This results from the relation that 
if the exercise price is reduced, the probability that the research conducting company receives 
the exercise price increases even though the amount to be expected is smaller.  The opposite 
development takes place for small increases of X.  Such increases reduce the probability that 
the company receives the agreed exercise payment.  The final payment itself increases 
compensating the company to a certain degree for the reduced probability.  In total the 
resulting reduction is relatively small for the simulation where X is increased by +20% to 
X=480.  This increase only reduces the upper and the lower total financing potential by about 
6% at the beginning of the research period. 
The situation changes if the exercise price is raised to a very large figure.  This results in a 
reduced total financing potential.  The following two figures, Figure 9.2 and Figure 9.3, 
illustrate this behavior for the total financing limits based on the four examples X=240, 
X=400, X=480 and X=1,000 with all other parameters remaining unchanged.  The two 
figures demonstrate that the total financing potential is similar for the cases X=240, X=400 
and X=480 but the ratio between option price and expected exercise value changes.  The total 
potential is reduced significantly at the case where X is set to X=1,000.  In this case 









0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10









0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10









0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10









0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Option Low 240 Exercise Value 240
Exercise Price = 240
Exercise Price = 1,000Exercise Price = 480
Exercise Price = 400
 
Figure 9.2: Impact of exercise price changes on lower total financing limit 
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Figure 9.3: Impact of exercise price changes on upper total financing limit 
Table 9.1 shows the impact of changes in the exercise price X for seven different cases 
compared to the illustrative example with all other factors remaining unchanged. 






Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
High Pricing +61.7% +61.7 +63.1 
Low Pricing +96.3% +93.7 +86.9 
High Total Fin. +4.8% +4.9 +3.3 
160 - 60% 
Low Total Fin. +12.7% +12.5 +11.2 
High Pricing +40.6% +40.6% +41.6% 
Low Pricing +61.9% +60.3% +56.3% 
High Total Fin. +4.6% +4.8% +3.9% 
240 - 40% 
Low Total Fin. +11.9% +11.7% +10.7% 
High Pricing +19.8% +19.8% +20.3% 
Low Pricing +29.1% +28.4% +26.6% 
High Total Fin. +3.5% +3.8% +3.6% 
320 - 20% 
Low Total Fin. +7.0% +7.1% +7.0% 
High Pricing -17.9% -17.9% -18.3% 
Low Pricing -26.1% -25.5% -23.9% 
High Total Fin. -6.1% -5.3% -5.0% 
480 + 20% 
Low Total Fin. -6.2% -6.0% -5.5% 
High Pricing -34.0% -34.2% -35.1% 
Low Pricing -48.5% -47.6% -44.9% 
High Total Fin. -10.8% -9.9% -8.9% 
560 + 40% 
Low Total Fin. -18.1% -17.3% -15.0% 
High Pricing -48.6% -48.9% -50.1% 
Low Pricing -66.0% -65.1% -62.1% 
High Total Fin. -17.9% -17.3% -16.2% 
640 + 60% 
Low Total Fin. -34.7% -33.7% -30.4% 
High Pricing -88.5% -88.9% -89.8% 
Low Pricing -97.3% -97.0% -95.7% 
High Total Fin. -65.1% -65.4% -67.1% 
1,000 + 150% 
Low Total Fin. -90.4% -89.6% -86.3% 
Table 9.1: Model sensitivity to changes in exercise price 
Apart from the direct impact on price and total financing potential of the R&D option, a 
change in exercise price also has an impact on the magnitude of the investigated ranges as 
illustrated in Figure 9.4.  The charts demonstrate that the absolute range between upper and 
lower pricing limit of the R&D option increases during the first part of the project to reach a 
peak just before the minimum expected project duration.  At this peak the advantage of 
selling the R&D option to a fully diversified investor is maximized.  The smaller the selected 
exercise price, the larger the absolute magnitude of this financing range and therefore the 
greater the advantage of selling the option to a fully diversified investor.  This relationship is 
illustrated in the two charts on the left-hand side of Figure 9.4. 
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Because of the relation between option price and expected exercise payment, the situation is 
more complex for the gap between upper and lower total financing limit, which is displayed 
on the two right hand graphs of Figure 9.4.  Here it does not automatically hold true that the 
lower the exercise price the larger the gap between the upper and the lower total financing 
limit of the R&D option deal.  It can be seen that the difference in premiums to be generated 
by closing the option deal with different exercise prices is relatively small throughout the 
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Figure 9.4: Range sensitivity to changes in exercise price 
Table 9.2 shows in more detail how a change in exercise price impacts the width of the 




Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
Pricing Premium +58.0% +52.5% +35.2% 
160 - 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +3.7% +2.1% -8.2% 
Pricing Premium +38.3% +35.0% +24.4% 
240 - 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +3.6% +2.2% -6.1% 
Pricing Premium +18.8% +17.3% +12.8% 320 - 20% Tot. Fin. Premium +3.0% +2.6% -1.4% 
Pricing Premium -17.0% -15.8% -11.8% 480 + 20% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -6.1% -5.0% -4.2% 
Pricing Premium -32.5% -30.3% -23.6% 560 + 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -9.8% -7.3% +0.1% 
Pricing Premium -46.7% -44.2% -36.1% 
640 + 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -15.7% -11.4% +4.5% 
Table 9.2: Range sensitivity to changes in exercise price 
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9.2 Development Speed 
The second key parameter driving the value of options is time to maturity.  For a European 
call option on a non-dividend paying stock it is known that increasing time to maturity 
increases the value of the option.  By definition460, the R&D option does not have a fixed 
time to maturity but expires when the underlying development project reaches final drug 
approval.  Since this time period is not fixed but depends on the development speed of the 
project, this parameter is investigated as a time to maturity equivalent. 
For the project used for illustrative purposes throughout this study the expected minimum 
time to final regulatory approval is expected to be eleven years and therefore TAmin=11.  For 
the purpose of the sensitivity analysis in this section it is investigated, which impact a change 
in development speed to TAmin=4.4, TAmin=6.6, TAmin=8.8, TAmin=13.2, TAmin=15.4 and 
TAmin=17.6 has on the pricing range and the total financing potential with all other input 
parameters remaining unchanged.  For each of these scenarios a new set of n=1,000 
simulation runs is conducted for the time period [ ]min;0 ATt∈ .  Figure 9.5 shows the impact a 
change in development speed has on the expected pricing range of the R&D option in 
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Figure 9.5: Sensitivity of valuation model to changes in project duration 
The results are contrary to what one would expect from financial option theory on the 
behavior of European call options.  The figure above shows a negative relationship between 
R&D option price and time to maturity represented by the expected drug development speed.  
The longer the time to maturity, the lower the pricing limits of the R&D option.  Although 
                                                 
460 Compare chapter 5.3.2. 
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this behavior is not what one would expect, there is a rational explanation for it.  The 
described R&D option sensitivity is different from the behavior of traditional stock options 
because of a structural difference of these two types of options.  While the underlying asset of 
a stock option has a theoretically unlimited lifetime, the underlying of the R&D option does 
not.  The lifetime of the R&D project, which represents the underlying of the R&D option, is 
limited by the lifetime of the related patents461.  Since patents are granted for a total period of 
twenty years, a longer time to maturity decreases the value of the R&D option because it 
reduces the effective patent protection period462 between the time of final drug approval and 
the expiration of the granted patent rights.  Since the effective patent protection period is one 
of the main drivers of the total value of the underlying R&D project the decreasing option 
value can be explained by the reduction of this period.  Each year time to maturity is 
decreased the underlying project gains an additional year of patent protection with high 
margin revenues that add value to the project.  One source in scientific literature that gives 
first indications about a negative relationship between time to maturity and the value of a 
drug development project can be found at Banerjee (2003).463 
Investigating the detailed data for the figures above confirms that time to maturity is a 
significant driver of the R&D option’s expected pricing range.  Details on differences 
between the standard project example and the six additional scenarios investigated for this 
sensitivity analysis can be derived from the following Table 9.3.   
Apart from the absolute level of the R&D option pricing and total financing limits, changes to 
the time to maturity also affect the difference between the upper and lower limit of these 
ranges.  Figure 9.6 shows the expected pricing and total financing range of the alternative 
case scenarios TAmin=6.6 and TAmin=15.4.  Besides the expected fact that the graphs are 
compressed or stretched over time depending on TAmin, it can also be observed that the width 
of the initial difference between upper and lower limits increase as the maturity of the R&D 
option decreases. 
                                                 
461 Assuming generic competition takes over the entire market after patent expiration. 
462 For a more detailed discussion on the effective patent protection period one can refer to chapter 
5.1.3 and chapter 5.3.2. 
463 Other studies (e.g. Mitchell and Hamilton (1988, p. 18)) conclude that a longer time to maturity 
increases the value of a R&D option but do not consider the decreasing effective patent protection 
period in their study. 





Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
High Pricing +219.3% -- -- 
Low Pricing +619.5% -- -- 
High Total Fin. +175.5% -- -- 
TAmin=4.4 - 60% 
Low Total Fin. +579.5% -- -- 
High Pricing +131.8% +240.2% -- 
Low Pricing +299.0% +514.5% -- 
High Total Fin. +105.6% +201.7% -- 
TAmin=6.6 - 40% 
Low Total Fin. +274.2% +453.9% -- 
High Pricing +60.8% +91.3% -- 
Low Pricing +111.3% +156.1% -- 
High Total Fin. +48.5% +77.2% -- 
TAmin=8.8 - 20% 
Low Total Fin. +100.5% +139.5% -- 
High Pricing -48.9% -56.1% -57.0% 
Low Pricing -61.9% -67.5% -68.2% 
High Total Fin. -41.8% -49.8% -44.8% 
TAmin=13.2 + 20% 
Low Total Fin. -55.9% -61.9% -61.6% 
High Pricing -82.8% -87.1% -90.9% 
Low Pricing -91.0% -93.4% -95.3% 
High Total Fin. -74.4% -80.6% -79.8% 
TAmin=15.4 + 40% 
Low Total Fin. -86.0% -89.4% -91.4% 
High Pricing -98.9% -99.3% -100% 
Low Pricing -99.7% -99.8% -100% 
High Total Fin. -97.1% -98.2% -99.7% 
TAmin=17.6 + 60% 
Low Total Fin. -99.1% -99.4% -100% 
Table 9.3: Model sensitivity to changes in project duration 
The lower section of the figure shows the development of the absolute and relative premium 
an investor willing to pay the highest price for the R&D option can be expected to invest in 
the R&D option in comparison to the investor willing to pay the lowest price.  It not only 
visualizes the stated point that a reduction in time to maturity increases the initial premium, it 
also shows that the maximum level of this pricing premium throughout the project is higher 
for those cases where time to maturity is short. 
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Figure 9.6: Range sensitivity to changes in project duration 
For the alternative case with TAmin=6.6, the pricing premium of the R&D option can be 
expected to grow by 114% compared to the standard case with TAmin=11 whereas the total 
financing premium grows by 83%.  The other comparisons later during the expected drug 
development period are not as meaningful because alternative project scenarios are at 
different stages of the pharmaceutical value chain at one specific point in time, which makes 
those comparisons misleading and less meaningful.  Table 9.4 summarizes the magnitude of 
these changes for the alternative scenarios in comparison to the case example with TAmin=11. 
New 
Timing 
Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
Pricing Premium +176.6% -- -- 
TAmin=4.4 - 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +122.3% -- -- 
Pricing Premium +113.9% +161.4% -- 
TAmin=6.6 - 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +83.4% +110.5% -- 
Pricing Premium +55.4% +72.7% -- TAmin=8.8 - 20% Tot. Fin. Premium +41.7% +54.7% -- 
Pricing Premium -47.7% -52.8% -43.9% TAmin=13.2 + 20% Tot. Fin. Premium -40.0% -45.4% -20.3% 
Pricing Premium -81.9% -85.3% -85.7% TAmin=15.4 + 40% Tot. Fin. Premium -72.9% -77.4% -62.9% 
Pricing Premium -98.8% -99.2% -99.9% 
TAmin=17.6 + 60% Tot. Fin. Premium -96.9% -97.7% -99.2% 
Table 9.4: Range sensitivity to changes in project duration 
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9.3 Threat of Substitute Products and Competition 
The third input factor of the valuation model to be potentially under- or overestimated is the 
factor of negative jumps in market potential.  This factor for potential negative jumps 
representing the threat of substitute products and competition can change in two different 
ways.  On the one hand, the factor can be misinterpreted that quantifies the probability of 
negative jumps and on the other hand, the expected change in market potential can be 
misjudged that occurs if a negative jump actually take place.  Both of these cases are 
investigated in comparison to the illustrative case example464. 
As a first step the impact of a change in the lambda factor is investigated.  The results are 
straightforward and are displayed in Figure 9.7.  The higher the probability of negative jumps 
in market potential the lower the value of the R&D option and vice versa.  The same holds 
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Figure 9.7: Sensitivity of valuation model to changes in negative jump probability 
Table 9.5 summarizes the magnitude of the resulting changes on the pricing limits and on the 
total financing limits for six jump scenarios compared to the standard case. 
                                                 
464 For the standard case it is assumed that the occurrence of negative jumps follows a Poisson process 
with factor λ.  This factor is set at λ=0.0025 for the time before and at λ=0.002 for the time after the 
expected project termination to account for potential first mover advantages.  For the size of 
negative jumps it is assumed that if a competitor enters the market as a first mover it takes away 
50% market share while a market entrant after expected drug approval is only able to capture 25% 
market share.  To account for the oliopolistic market structure in most biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical market segments the number of direct competitors is artificially limited to one for 
the standard project.  This means that a maximum of one negative jump in market potential is 
allowed to occur. 





Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
High Pricing +17.6% +17.7% +18.2% 
Low Pricing +19.5% +19.5% +19.8% 
High Total Fin. +11.7% +12.1% +12.3% 
0.001/ 
0.0008 - 60% 
Low Total Fin. +16.5% +16.7% +16.1% 
High Pricing +7.7% +7.7% +8.1% 
Low Pricing +8.0% +8.0% +8.7% 
High Total Fin. +4.8% +5.1% +5.6% 
0.0015/ 
0.0012 - 40% 
Low Total Fin. +7.5% +7.7% +7.9% 
High Pricing +1.8% +1.8% +1.9% 
Low Pricing +1.2% +1.3% +1.7% 
High Total Fin. +1.2% +1.4% +1.3% 
0.002/ 
0.0016 - 20% 
Low Total Fin. +2.5% +2.8% +3.2% 
High Pricing -6.0% -6.1% -6.5% 
Low Pricing -7.5% -7.4% -7.1% 
High Total Fin. -4.6% -4.1% -4.6% 
0.003/ 
0.0024 + 20% 
Low Total Fin. -5.2% -5.0% -5.7% 
High Pricing -10.0% -10.1% -10.2% 
Low Pricing -11.5% -11.4% -10.9% 
High Total Fin. -7.8% -7.8% -7.5% 
0.0035/ 
0.0028 + 40% 
Low Total Fin. -8.8% -8.7% -8.2% 
High Pricing -15.0% -15.2% -16.1% 
Low Pricing -17.4% -17.4% -17.7% 
High Total Fin. -10.7% -10.7% -10.5% 
0.004/ 
0.0032 + 60% 
Low Total Fin. -13.0% -12.5% -13.0% 
Table 9.5: Model sensitivity to changes in probability of negative jumps 
In addition it is worthwhile to investigate how factor adjustments change the magnitude of 
the resulting pricing and financing ranges.  The graphs in Figure 9.8 illustrate the pricing and 
financing ranges of the two cases where lambda is increased and decreased by 40%.  It can be 
seen that early during the drug development process the impact of a factor change on the two 
ranges is relatively small but increases as the project progresses.  The lower graphs confirm 
this point and also show that the relative size of the premium to be expected from a fully 
diversified investor is only affected to a small degree by a change in this input parameter. 
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Figure 9.8: Range sensitivity to changes in negative jump probability 




Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
Pricing Premium +17.4% +17.2% +16.3% 0.001/ 
0.0008 - 60% Tot. Fin. Premium +11.1% +10.5% +6.7% 
Pricing Premium +7.7% +7.6% +7.4% 0.0015/ 
0.0012 - 40% Tot. Fin. Premium +4.5% +4.2% +2.2% 
Pricing Premium +1.9% +2.0% +2.1% 0.002/ 
0.0016 - 20% Tot. Fin. Premium +1.0% +0.9% -1.6% 
Pricing Premium -5.9% -5.7% -5.8% 0.003/ 
0.0024 + 20% Tot. Fin. Premium -4.5% -3.8% -3.2% 
Pricing Premium -9.9% -9.7% -9.3% 0.0035/ 
0.0028 + 40% Tot. Fin. Premium -7.7% -7.5% -6.4% 
Pricing Premium -14.7% -14.6% -14.1% 0.004/ 
0.0032 + 60% Tot. Fin. Premium -10.4% -10.0% -6.9% 
Table 9.6: Range sensitivity to changes in negative jump probability 
After investigating the impact of changes to the probability of negative jumps the sensitivity 
of the model towards changes in negative jump size is investigated.  As for the probability, 
the impact of changes in the size of negative jumps behave as one would expect.  The pricing 
as well as the total financing limits of a R&D option deal are negatively impacted by an 
increase in the size of potential negative jumps.  Figure 9.9 shows how the pricing and total 
financing limits react to changes in the size of negative jumps in market potential with all 
other parameters remaining unchanged. 
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Figure 9.9: Sensitivity of valuation model to changes in size of negative jumps 
The resulting relative changes of the pricing and financing limits are only affected to a small 
degree over the course of the project.  Table 9.7 shows the details of the sensitivity analysis 
for the six investigated adjustments in negative jump size. 





Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
High Pricing +17.7% +17.8% +18.1% 
Low Pricing +17.8% +17.9% +18.4% 
High Total Fin. +13.8% +14.4% +14.8% 
20 / 10 - 60% 
Low Total Fin. +20.5% +20.7% +19.9% 
High Pricing +11.4% +11.5% +11.7% 
Low Pricing +10.3% +10.5% +11.1% 
High Total Fin. +10.3% +10.7% +11.0% 
30 / 15 - 40% 
Low Total Fin. +15.4% +15.8% +15.1% 
High Pricing +5.4% +5.4% +5.5% 
Low Pricing +4.1% +4.2% +4.6% 
High Total Fin. +5.9% +6.2% +6.7% 
40 / 20 - 20% 
Low Total Fin. +7.5% +7.5% +8.3% 
High Pricing -3.6% -3.6% -3.5% 
Low Pricing -2.2% -2.2% -2.4% 
High Total Fin. -7.3% -7.1% -7.2% 
60 / 30 + 20% 
Low Total Fin. -3.7% -3.5% -4.3% 
High Pricing -5.4% -5.3% -5.2% 
Low Pricing -3.2% -3.3% -3.6% 
High Total Fin. -10.5% -10.3% -10.3% 
70 / 35 + 40% 
Low Total Fin. -5.3% -5.2% -6.1% 
High Pricing -6.2% -6.1% -6.0% 
Low Pricing -4.0% -4.1% -4.5% 
High Total Fin. -11.9% -11.5% -11.3% 
80 / 40 + 60% 
Low Total Fin. -5.8% -6.7% -7.9% 
Table 9.7: Model sensitivity to changes in size of negative jumps 
Analyzing the impact of a change in the size of a potential negative jump results in a similar 
picture as described for a change in the probability of negative jumps.  Figure 9.10 visualizes 
two illustrative pricing and total financing ranges and shows how the size of these ranges 
compares to the standard case example.  It reduces the size of these ranges if the potential 
size of negative jumps increases.  This holds true for the size of the pricing range as well as 
for the total financing range. 
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Figure 9.10: Range sensitivity to changes in negative jump size 
The magnitude of these size changes is shown in Table 9.8 for the six investigated cases in 
comparison to the standard case example. 
New Jump 
Size 
Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
Pricing Premium +17.7% +17.8% +17.8% 
20% / 10% - 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +12.9% +12.0% +7.2% 
Pricing Premium +11.6% +11.8% +12.4% 
30% / 15% - 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +9.6% +8.9% +5.2% 
Pricing Premium +5.5% +5.7% +6.5% 40% / 20% - 20% Tot. Fin. Premium +5.6% +5.8% +4.2% 
Pricing Premium -3.8% -4.0% -4.9% 60% / 30% + 20% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -7.7% -8.4% -11.3% 
Pricing Premium -5.6% -5.9% -7.0% 70% / 35% + 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -11.2% -12.2% -16.5% 
Pricing Premium -6.5% -6.7% -7.9% 
80% / 40% + 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -12.7% -13.6% -18.0% 
Table 9.8: Range sensitivity to changes in negative jump size 
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9.4 Initial Market Uncertainty 
In chapter 8.1.5 the assumption of a known initial market potential is relaxed and the initial 
market potential is introduced as a stochastic variable following a lognormal distribution 
function.  When evaluating the pricing and total financing limits of a R&D option the 
characteristics of the distribution of the initial market potential are of high relevance because 
they represent the starting point for the double-jump-diffusion process the market potential is 
expected to follow.  Setting up the initial market potential distribution is related to managerial 
subjectivity and therefore it is investigated how changing uncertainty in the initial market 
potential affects the pricing and total financing limits of the R&D option. 
As a starting point for the sensitivity analysis the illustrative case of this study is used465.  To 
investigate how the pricing and total financing limits react to changes in uncertainty in the 
initial market potential three different cases are investigated.  For the first case the changing 
uncertainty is expressed by modifying the volatility factor ( )0ln MPσ  to become ( )0ln* MPa σ .  
The second case investigates the more intuitive case where management adjusts the initial 
95% interval symmetrically in absolute terms.  This means that the initial range [MPl; 
MPu]=[80; 120] is adjusted by a factor b.  The modified initial range therefore becomes 
[MPl+b; MPu-b].  These two cases are investigated separately because case one does not 
affect ( )0ln MP  while the second case does.  The third case does not investigate a change in 
uncertainty itself but a misinterpretation of the entire market potential level.  To model this 
case the initial range [MPl; MPu] is shifted by a factor c to become [c*MPl; c*MPu]. 
Case 1: 
For this case the uncertainty related to the initial estimate expressed by the standard deviation 
σln(MP0) of the distribution function is adjusted.  This is done through an adjustment factor that 
modifies the standard deviation to become a*σln(MP0).  Six alternative cases are investigated 
with factors increasing or decreasing the standard deviation by 20%, 40% or 60%.  The mean 
of the underlying lognormal distribution function ( )0ln MP  is not affected by this type of 
adjustment. 
Figure 9.11 shows the impact of the adjustments in standard deviation on the pricing and total 
financing limits of the R&D option.  The graph indicates that even significant changes in the 
standard deviation only have a minor impact on the pricing and total financing limits of the 
R&D option. 
                                                 
465 For this case management of the research conducting company expects the current market potential 
of a new drug with 95% certainty to be between a lower market limit MPl and an upper market limit 
MPu with [MPl; MPu]=[80; 120].  With the assumed lognormal distribution it is known that the 
natural logarithm of this market potential follows a normal distribution with ( ) ( )( )0ln0 ;ln MPMPN σ  in this 
case N(4.59; 0.10). 
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Figure 9.11: Sensitivity of valuation model to changes in initial market volatility 
Summarizing the data displayed reveals that even if standard deviation is increase by 60%, 
the changes to the pricing limits do not exceed 3%.  The corresponding changes to the total 
financing potential are even smaller with all other factors remaining unchanged. 
The observable changes for the opposite case where standard deviation is decreased differ in 
terms of direction and magnitude.  Decreasing the standard deviation also decreases the 
financing limits as well as the total financing potential but to an extent below the case of the 
respective standard deviation increase. 





Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
High Pricing -1.5% -1.5% -1.6% 
Low Pricing -2.0% -2.0% -1.9% 
High Total Fin. -1.1% -0.9% -0.9% 
0.041 - 60% 
Low Total Fin. -1.0% -0.8% -1.0% 
High Pricing -0.9% -0.9% -1.0% 
Low Pricing -1.2% -1.1% -1.1% 
High Total Fin. -0.8% -0.7% -0.8% 
0.061 - 40% 
Low Total Fin. -0.2% +0.1% -0.3% 
High Pricing +0.1% +0.1% +0.2% 
Low Pricing -0.1% -0.1% +0.2% 
High Total Fin. -0.1% -0.1% +0.2% 
0.081 - 20% 
Low Total Fin. +0.1% +0.6% +1.1% 
High Pricing +0.1% +0.1% +0.2% 
Low Pricing -0.1% -0.1% +0.2% 
High Total Fin. -0.1% -0.1% +0.2% 
0.122 + 20% 
Low Total Fin. +0.1% +0.6% +1.1% 
High Pricing +0.9% +0.9% +0.9% 
Low Pricing +0.9% +0.9% +1.0% 
High Total Fin. +0.1% +0.7% +0.4% 
0.142 + 40% 
Low Total Fin. +0.8% +1.5% +1.6% 
High Pricing +2.4% +2.4% +2.5% 
Low Pricing +3.0% +3.0% +2.9% 
High Total Fin. +1.0% +1.2% +1.7% 
0.162 + 60% 
Low Total Fin. +1.4% +1.5% +1.6% 
Table 9.9: Model sensitivity to changes in initial market volatility 
These findings are in line with financial option theory where an increase in volatility 
increases the value of a call option.  As for the other sensitivity analyses conducted, the 
impact of the parameter change is also investigated.  Since observed changes on the pricing 
and financing limits above are minor it is expected that the changes on the observable range 
sizes are minor as well.  The following Figure 9.12 and Table 9.10 confirm this expectation. 
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Figure 9.12: Range sensitivity to changes in initial market volatility 
New Initial 
Uncert. 
Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
Pricing Premium -1.5% -1.4% -1.3% 
0.041 - 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -1.1% -0.9% -0.7% 
Pricing Premium -0.8% -0.8% -0.9% 
0.061 - 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -0.9% -1.0% -1.6% 
Pricing Premium +0.1% +0.1% +0.2% 0.081 - 20% Tot. Fin. Premium +0.1% +0.3% -1.1% 
Pricing Premium +0.1% +0.1% +0.2% 0.122 + 20% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -0.1% -0.3% -1.1% 
Pricing Premium +0.9% +0.9% +0.8% 0.142 + 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -0.1% +0.4% -1.4% 
Pricing Premium +2.3% +2.3% +2.0% 
0.162 + 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +0.9% +1.1% +1.9% 
Table 9.10: Range sensitivity to changes in initial market volatility 
Case 2: 
The second case of sensitivity analysis on the initial market estimate investigates uncertainty 
in a way that is more intuitive to the practitioner when estimating initial market ranges.  
Instead of modifying the standard deviation of the lognormal distribution function, which is 
more of an abstract figure for the practitioner, this case considers the impact of changing the 
initial range of the relevant market potential.  To achieve this, the width of the initial range 
[MPl; MPu]=[80; 120] is adjusted, modifying the range to become [MPl+b; MPu-b].  The 
factor b therefore narrows or widens the initial range symmetrically.  As opposed to the 
previous case, this adjustment affects both, the mean of the log-normal distribution function 
as well as the relevant standard deviation. 
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For the purpose of this analysis the impact of the six different factors for b∈[-12;-8;-
4.4;8;12] are investigated.  These factors lead to an increase or a decrease of the initial range 
of 20%, 40% or 60%.  The impact of these different adjustment factors are displayed in 
Figure 9.13.  The figure shows that the smaller the uncertainty expressed by the size of the 
initial range, the higher the pricing limits as well as the total financing limits.  Although this 
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Figure 9.13: Sensitivity of valuation model to changes in initial market range 
This could lead to the conclusion that in this case the value of the R&D option behaves 
differently from what can be expected from financial option theory.  If uncertainty is 
measured by the width of the initial range for the market potential it appears as if the larger 
the uncertainty, the lower the value of the option, which would not comply with financial 
option theory and the previously considered case 1.  The detailed results from the various 
simulation scenarios shown in Table 9.11 appear to support this conclusion. 





Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
High Pricing +2.2% +2.2% +2.2% 
Low Pricing +2.7% +2.6% +2.6% 
High Total Fin. +1.3% +1.5% +1.5% 
92-108 - 60% 
Low Total Fin. +1.7% +1.9% +1.8% 
High Pricing +1.6% +1.5% +1.3% 
Low Pricing +1.9% +1.9% +1.6% 
High Total Fin. +0.9% +1.1% +1.3% 
88-112 - 40% 
Low Total Fin. +1.2% +1.3% +1.2% 
High Pricing +1.7% +1.7% +1.5% 
Low Pricing +2.0% +2.0% +1.7% 
High Total Fin. +0.9% +1.0% +1.0% 
84-116 - 20% 
Low Total Fin. +1.7% +1.6% +1.9% 
High Pricing -0.9% -1.0% -1.1% 
Low Pricing -0.8% -0.8% -1.0% 
High Total Fin. -1.8% -1.7% -1.7% 
76-124 + 20% 
Low Total Fin. -0.5% -0.1% -0.3% 
High Pricing -3.6% -3.6% -3.1% 
Low Pricing -4.5% -4.4% -3.6% 
High Total Fin. -3.4% -3.2% -2.6% 
72-128 + 40% 
Low Total Fin. -3.4% -2.8% -1.7% 
High Pricing -3.7% -3.6% -3.6% 
Low Pricing -4.1% -4.0% -3.7% 
High Total Fin. -3.7% -3.4% -3.5% 
68-132 + 60% 
Low Total Fin. -3.3% -3.1% -2.7% 
Table 9.11: Model sensitivity to changes in initial market range 
This is misleading because it is not the width of the initial market range that drives the limits 
of the option pricing range and the ranges for the total financing potential down but the mean 
of the log-normal distribution function.  It is important to consider how the underlying 
distribution function changes if the scenario is changed by adapting the initial market 
potential range using [MPl+b; MPu-b].  If b takes on a negative value it appears as if 
uncertainty increases because the 95% range is widened.  Although this is true a second effect 
caused by the assumption of a lognormal distribution of the market potential has a larger 
impact on the option’s value. 
Because of the assumption of a lognormal distribution, which is not a symmetric distribution 
function, a change in b also changes the mean of the market potential distribution and this 
effect is more relevant than the width of the range for the initial market potential.  The case 
where b takes on a negative value also decreases ( )0ln MP , which is the more important driver 
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of the option value.  Figure 9.14 visualizes how widening the initial 95% range from a width 
of 20 (b=10) to a width of 80 (b=-20) decreases ( )0ln MP . 
3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1
Range 80 Range 60 Range 40 Range 20
( ) 200ln RMP
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Figure 9.14: Impact of initial market range on expected level of ln(MP) 
As shown in the preceding paragraphs, this intuitive way of increasing uncertainty related to 
the initial market potential represents in reality a combination of two different parameter 
changes.  In addition to a change in the standard deviation of the normal distribution function 
of the natural logarithm of the initial market potential it also changes the mean of this 
function.  The change in the mean of the function can be considered a change in the level of 
the market potential and therefore this case is not suited for a one-dimensional sensitivity 
analysis of the individual factor market uncertainty.  Although not suited for the sensitivity 
analysis the described case gives practitioners a valuable indication on things to consider 
when setting up and changing initial market potential estimates. 
Case 3: 
The last case investigated in relation to the initial market potential is the one where the 
magnitude of the initial market potential is under or overestimated.  To investigate the impact 
such an under or overestimation has on the pricing and total financing ranges, multiple 
scenarios are evaluated where the initial market range [MPl; MPu] of the illustrative project 
example is shifted by a factor c to become [c*MPl; c*MPu].  In particular the six cases c∈[0-
4;0.6;0.8;1.2;1.4;1.6] are investigated with all other input factors remaining unchanged.  
Figure 9.15 illustrates the pricing and total financing limits of these cases in comparison to 
the illustrative project example. 
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Figure 9.15: Model sensitivity to changes in level of initial market potential 
The above figure shows the intuitive positive relation between market range shifts and the 
pricing and total financing limits.  Increasing the initial expectations increases the pricing 
level of the R&D option as well as the total financing potential while decreasing expectations 
reduces them.  This result is in line with financial option theory where an increase in the 
observable stock price, as the equivalent to the magnitude of the initial market potential, 
increases the value of a call option on a non-dividend paying stock.  How large this impact of 
market level shifts becomes for the various scenarios investigated can be derived from Table 
9.12. 





Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
High Pricing -95.4% -95.5% -96.0% 
Low Pricing -98.8% -98.7% -98.2% 
High Total Fin. -86.4% -86.4% -87.2% 
32-48 - 60% 
Low Total Fin. -95.9% -95.6% -94.2% 
High Pricing -71.7% -72.0% -72.8% 
Low Pricing -82.1% -81.5% -79.9% 
High Total Fin. -51.9% -51.6% -51.8% 
48-72 - 40% 
Low Total Fin. -63.9% -62.8% -60.8% 
High Pricing -37.5% -37.6% -38.2% 
Low Pricing -45.5% -45.0% -43.8% 
High Total Fin. -25.4% -24.8% -24.4% 
64-96 - 20% 
Low Total Fin. -27.6% -26.9% -26.1% 
High Pricing +39.1% +39.1% +39.8% 
Low Pricing +48.1% +47.5% +46.1% 
High Total Fin. +23.0% +23.5% +23.6% 
96-144 + 20% 
Low Total Fin. +26.8% +27.2% +26.6% 
High Pricing +80.9% +80.9% +82.0% 
Low Pricing +100.9% +99.4% +95.8% 
High Total Fin. +45.8% +46.3% +45.8% 
112-168 + 40% 
Low Total Fin. +53.9% +53.9% +53.3% 
High Pricing +121.6% +121.6% +122.6% 
Low Pricing +153.5% +151.1% +144.5% 
High Total Fin. +67.5% +68.0% +66.5% 
128-192 + 60% 
Low Total Fin. +78.8% +78.7% +76.9% 
Table 9.12: Model sensitivity to changes in level of initial market potential 
In addition to the direct impact a misinterpretation of the initial market potential level has on 
pricing and total financing limit it is also investigated how the size of these range behaves.  
The following Figure 9.16 shows the pricing and total financing range for the two cases c=0.6 
and c=1.4.  In addition, the two lower graphs of the figure show how the sizes of these ranges 
behave over the expected course of the project in comparison to the illustrative project 
example. 
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Figure 9.16: Range sensitivity to changes in level of initial market potential 
The graphs show that both the absolute and the relative premium of the upper limits are 
significant.  They show that an increase in market potential level of 20% increases the size of 
the gap between upper and lower pricing limits by 38%.  A 20% decrease in market potential 
level on the other hand decreases the gap size of the pricing range by 37%.  These figures are 
lower for the total financing premium where the impact is 23% for the 20% increase and -
25% for the respective decrease.  Additional results for the six investigated cases can be 
derived from Table 9.13. 
New MP 
Level 
Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
Pricing Premium -95.1% -94.6% -93.4% 
32-48 - 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -85.1% -83.1% -77.0% 
Pricing Premium -70.6% -69.2% -64.5% 
48-72 - 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -50.3% -47.5% -38.7% 
Pricing Premium -36.6% -35.4% -31.7% 64-96 - 20% Tot. Fin. Premium -25.1% -24.0% -22.1% 
Pricing Premium +38.2% +36.7% +32.5% 96-144 + 20% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +22.5% +22.1% +19.2% 
Pricing Premium +78.7% +75.6% +65.8% 112-168 + 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +44.7% +43.6% +34.8% 
Pricing Premium +118.2% +113.2% +97.0% 
128-192 + 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +66.1% +64.2% +51.4% 
Table 9.13: Range sensitivity to changes in level of initial market potential 
Apart from the positive relationship between initial market potential and R&D option price as 
well as total financing potential, the table shows that the level of initial market potential is a 
key input factor for the valuation model.  When evaluating a R&D option, special attention 
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should therefore be paid to this input factor because a misinterpretation has a major impact on 
the results of the analysis. 
9.5 Ability to Broaden Product Market 
The last factor influencing the valuation model is the probability that a product market can 
potentially be expanded.  This potential occurrence of positive jumps is introduced and 
discussed in chapter 8.1.3.  It is shown that two input factors need to be considered that can 
potentially be misinterpreted.  On one hand there is the probability that positive jumps occur 
and on the other hand the size of these potential jumps. 
During a first step the sensitivity to changes in positive jump probability is investigated while 
a second step covers the sensitivity to expected positive jump sizes.  Similar to the previous 
sections all changes are reported in comparison to the illustrative project example466.  For the 
sensitivity of the model to changes in the positive jump probability six scenarios are 
investigate with lambda factors λ∈[0.0012;0.0018;0.0024;0.0036;0.0042;0.0048].  As 
one would expect there is a positive relationship between the probability of positive jumps 
and the pricing and total financing limits of the R&D option.  Figure 9.17 visualizes the 
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Figure 9.17: Model sensitivity to changes in probability of positive jumps 
                                                 
466 For this project example the arrival time between positive jumps is assumed to follow a Poisson 
distribution with a Lambda factor λ=0.003 and the size of the jumps is assumed to be within the 
interval [+/-0%; +40%]. 
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In terms of magnitude this factor is not one of the key value drivers of the R&D option price 
and the total financing potential.  Table 9.14 shows the detailed results of the six alternative 
scenarios in comparison to the standard case example. 
New 
Lambda 
Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
High Pricing -11.8% -11.9% -12.1% 
Low Pricing -14.6% -14.5% -13.8% 
High Total Fin. -7.4% -7.5% -7.6% 
0.0012 - 60% 
Low Total Fin. -7.2% -7.0% -7.1% 
High Pricing -8.1% -8.2% -8.3% 
Low Pricing -10.0% -9.9% -9.6% 
High Total Fin. -8.1% -8.2% -8.3% 
0.0018 - 40% 
Low Total Fin. -4.4% -4.2% -4.5% 
High Pricing -5.3% -5.4% -5.9% 
Low Pricing -6.4% -6.4% -6.9% 
High Total Fin. -3.4% -3.3% -3.4% 
0.0024 - 20% 
Low Total Fin. -2.5% -2.5% -2.6% 
High Pricing +1.3% +1.3% +1.6% 
Low Pricing +1.5% +1.5% +1.8% 
High Total Fin. +0.1% +0.3% +0.6% 
0.0036 + 20% 
Low Total Fin. +1.6% +1.8% +1.7% 
High Pricing +6.8% +6.7% +6.8% 
Low Pricing +7.6% +7.5% +7.6% 
High Total Fin. +3.4% +3.8% +4.0% 
0.0042 + 40% 
Low Total Fin. +5.4% +5.6% +6.0% 
High Pricing +7.6% +7.6% +8.0% 
Low Pricing +8.7% +8.7% +9.1% 
High Total Fin. +4.4% +4.4% +4.6% 
0.0048 + 60% 
Low Total Fin. +6.2% +6.8% +6.7% 
Table 9.14: Model sensitivity to changes in probability of positive jumps 
As for the other sections on model sensitivity, the impact of changes in the probability of 
positive jumps on the size of the pricing and total financing range is investigated.  Similar to 
results for the ranges themselves, there is also a positive relationship between the size of the 
ranges and the probability that positive jumps in market potential are expected to occur.  
Figure 9.18 shows the ranges of two alternative case examples and the absolute and relative 
premium of the upper pricing and total financing limit in comparison to the illustrative case 
example.  The positive relation between the probability of positive jumps and the width of the 
pricing and financing range can be observed in the lower two graphs.  In these graphs the 
absolute difference between the upper and the lower limit of both ranges increases as the 
lambda factor as a measure for the probability of positive jumps increases. 
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Figure 9.18: Range sensitivity to changes in probability of positive jumps 
The following Table 9.15 shows the magnitude of these changes for the alternative lambda 
factors in comparison to the standard case example. 
New 
Lambda 
Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
Pricing Premium -11.5% -11.2% -10.1% 
0.0012 - 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -7.4% -7.8% -8.4% 
Pricing Premium -7.9% -7.7% -6.8% 
0.0018 - 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -5.1% -5.4% -5.1% 
Pricing Premium -5.2% -5.1% -4.7% 0.0024 - 20% Tot. Fin. Premium -3.6% -3.7% -4.5% 
Pricing Premium +1.2% +1.2% +1.3% 0.0036 + 20% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -0.1% -0.3% -1.1% 
Pricing Premium +6.7% +6.4% +6.0% 0.0042 + 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +3.2% +3.1% +1.1% 
Pricing Premium +7.5% +7.2% +6.8% 
0.0048 + 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +4.1% +3.5% +1.4% 
Table 9.15: Range sensitivity to changes in probability of positive jumps 
The second aspect to be investigated when discussing the impact of positive jumps is the 
potential size of these jumps if they occur.  To demonstrate the impact of input factor changes 
on the valuation model for this parameter, the maximum limit is changed in six scenarios 
with the maximum jump sizes being set to 16%, 24%, 32%, 48%, 56% and 64%.467 
                                                 
467 For the illustrative project example the market potential of a new drug can be expanded through a 
positive jump by about [+/-0%; +40%]. 
9. Sensitivity Analysis of Valuation Approach 
 
233
Figure 9.19 visualizes the effect these modifications of the maximum size of a potential 
positive jump have on the pricing limits of the R&D option on the one hand and on the 
expected total financing range on the other.  Allowing a larger maximum jump size drives 
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Figure 9.19: Model sensitivity to changes in size of positive jumps 
To validate this observation and to demonstrate the magnitude of the changes in pricing and 
total financing limits, the following Table 9.16 shows the changes that can be observed 
between the illustrative project example and the different alternative scenarios investigated. 





Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
High Pricing -6.8% -6.9% -7.5% 
Low Pricing -6.4% -6.5% -7.1% 
High Total Fin. -7.5% -7.2% -7.7% 
16% - 60% 
Low Total Fin. -8.7% -8.1% -7.9% 
High Pricing -3.2% -3.3% -3.8% 
Low Pricing -2.0% -2.2% -2.9% 
High Total Fin. -5.2% -5.1% -5.2% 
24% - 40% 
Low Total Fin. -6.3% -5.5% -5.4% 
High Pricing 0.5% +0.4% +0.1% 
Low Pricing 2.4% +2.2% +1.6% 
High Total Fin. -3.2% -2.9% -3.0% 
32% - 20% 
Low Total Fin. -3.8% -2.8% -2.9% 
High Pricing 8.2% +8.2% +8.2% 
Low Pricing 11.8% +11.6% +10.8% 
High Total Fin. 1.3% +1.7% +1.2% 
48% + 20% 
Low Total Fin. 0.8% +1.9% +2.0% 
High Pricing 12.2% +12.2% +12.4% 
Low Pricing 16.7% +16.4% +15.7% 
High Total Fin. 3.5% +3.9% +3.8% 
56% + 40% 
Low Total Fin. 3.8% +4.9% +4.8% 
High Pricing 16.3% +16.3% +16.7% 
Low Pricing 21.8% +21.5% +20.7% 
High Total Fin. 5.8% +6.2% +6.1% 
64% + 60% 
Low Total Fin. 6.6% +7.3% +7.5% 
Table 9.16: Sensitivity of valuation model to changes in size of positive jumps 
The demonstrated positive relation between maximum positive jump size and pricing and 
total financing range also holds true for the width of the observed ranges.  Figure 9.20 shows 
these ranges for two of the alternative case scenarios and the development of the premium of 
the upper limit in comparison to the lower limit.  It shows that increasing the maximum jump 
size widens the absolute gap between upper and lower pricing limit as well as the range of the 
total financing potential although to a smaller extent.  It is also interesting to note that the 
peak just before the expected minimum project duration is less distinct in cases where the 
maximum allowed jump size is lower. 
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Figure 9.20: Range sensitivity to changes in size of positive jumps 
The magnitude of the changes in width of the pricing and financing ranges are displayed in 
detail for the investigated cases in the following Table 9.17. 
New Jump 
Size 
Parameter change vs. 
standardized case 
example (SCE) 
Output Output change vs. SCE at t=0 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=1/2*TAmin 
Output change 
vs. SCE at 
t=TAmin 
Pricing Premium -6.8% -7.0% -7.9% 
16% - 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -7.4% -6.9% -7.3% 
Pricing Premium -3.3% -3.6% -4.8% 
24% - 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium -5.1% -4.9% -5.0% 
Pricing Premium +0.3% -0.1% -1.6% 32% - 20% Tot. Fin. Premium -3.2% -2.9% -3.1% 
Pricing Premium +7.8% +7.2% +5.1% 48% + 20% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +1.4% +1.6% +0.1% 
Pricing Premium +11.7% +11.0% +8.5% 56% + 40% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +3.5% +3.5% +2.4% 
Pricing Premium +15.7% +14.8% +11.9% 
64% + 60% 
Tot. Fin. Premium +5.7% +5.7% +4.1% 
Table 9.17: Range sensitivity to changes in size of positive jumps 
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9.6 Sensitivity Space of Valuation Approach 
Based on the sensitivity analysis above the resulting sensitivity space of the developed 
valuation model can be constructed.  A sensitivity space allows the direct visual comparison 
of the impact input parameter changes have on the output of a model.  This enables the 
identification of the most critical input parameters users should investigate carefully when 
applying a valuation model.  Figure 9.21 shows the sensitivity space of the developed pricing 












-60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Exercise Price Time to Mat. Negative Jump Prob. Negative Jump Size
Initial Market Uncert. Initial Market Range Initial Market Level Positive Jump Prob.
Positive Jump Size Interest Rate Diffusion  
Figure 9.21: Sensitivity space lower R&D option price at t=0 
The sensitivity diagram shows that input parameters can be separated into two classes.  One 
class consists of parameters that have a major impact on the outcome of the model while 
those of the other class that only have a minor impact.  The class of input parameters with a 
predominant impact have to be determined carefully when the model is applied.  Over- or 
underestimating them can cause a significant over- or undervaluation of the R&D option. 
Parameters having a predominant effect are the expected duration of the R&D project being 
equivalent to the option’s time to maturity, the applied discount rate, the expected initial 
market potential of the drug under development and the exercise price.  As opposed to the 
other major parameters the exercise price cannot be over- or underestimated because it is 
fixed in the option contract.  However, selecting an appropriate exercise price has an 
important impact on the expected price of the R&D option. 
The second class of parameters are factors of minor relevance.  Over- or underestimating 
them causes the expected price to change to a significantly smaller relative extent than the 
input parameter change.  Parameters falling into this category in the illustrative case are the 
size and probability of negative as well as of positive jumps and the uncertainty related to the 
initial market potential. 
9. Sensitivity Analysis of Valuation Approach 
 
237
Conducting the same analysis for the total financing potential of the R&D option at the time 
of patent application generates a similar result with the main difference being the effect of the 
exercise price applied.  Figure 9.22 visualizes the sensitivity space for the total financing 
potential of the R&D option in the illustrative case example.  While the significance of most 
input parameters remains similar as determined for the option price above, the role of the 
exercise price becomes less significant for the total financing potential.  This is related to the 
two contrary effects exercise price changes have on the total financing potential, which were 
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Figure 9.22: Sensitivity space lower R&D option financing limit at t=0 
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10 Concluding Remarks 
Chapter 10 completes the main body of this study with two concluding sections.  The first 
one summarizes the main findings from this work and emphasizes its primary contributions.  
The second section highlights selected issues that are not covered in this study but represent 
valuable topics for additional future research. 
10.1  Summary and Main Findings 
The objective of this study is to investigate the idea of selling option rights on ongoing drug 
development projects as a potential tool for young biotechnology companies to raise funds to 
finance ongoing operations.  Three aspects represent the main focus areas of this study: 
1. An investigation of the practical demand for an innovative financing tool like a R&D 
option within the biotechnology industry. 
2. A description of the characteristics of a potential R&D option deal and how the 
underlying drug development project compares to financial and to other types of real 
options. 
3. The development of a subjective valuation model to “ex ante” estimate the financing 
potential of a R&D option deal over the expected duration of a drug development 
project and to identify the key parameters that represent the main value drivers of the 
option. 
The following approach is taken to cover these main areas of interest.  In an introductory 
chapter the situation of the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry is described to 
create an understanding of the environment that builds the framework for this study.  It is 
demonstrated that the main problem of major players in the pharmaceutical industry is 
product innovation to ensure future growth and profitability.  The key issues for the younger 
biotechnology industry are shown to be different by nature and mainly center around the 
problem of insufficient corporate funding and the necessity to raise additional funds to 
finance ongoing and future research and development activities. 
As important background information for the remainder of this study, the second chapter 
describes in detail how the standard research and development process for an innovative new 
drug is structured.  The cost structure related to this average R&D process is described and 
the resulting financing requirements for the research conducting company are derived.  It is 
shown that drug development is a lengthy and costly process, which involves significant 
technical failure risk.  The average drug development project takes 14 years from project 
initiation until final drug approval and requires financial resources on a pre-tax level of about 
US$800 million including the cost of failed projects.  Only one out of several thousand tested 
10. Concluding Remarks 
 
239
compounds finally reaches the point of final drug approval and only three out of ten468 having 
reached that point finally recover their own research and development cost. 
The third chapter introduces some key concepts of financial option theory and their practical 
applications to build the theoretical foundation for the main part of this study.  In addition, 
the main factors influencing the value of a basic financial option are discussed.  The 
remainder of this chapter deals with real options and how they are generally classified in 
scientific literature.  In addition, a more practical approach to classify real options is 
introduced.  This approach classifies the different types of real options based on how close 
their characteristics are compared to basic financial options.  The concluding remarks in this 
chapter show that a drug development project represents a real option of the most complex 
type.  The characteristics of this type of real option differ significantly from the more widely 
known and scientifically more extensively investigated financial options.  The most critical 
differences often neglected in studies on this topic are the lacking exclusivity, the fact that 
they are not traded on complete markets and the problem that they generally do not have 
fixed maturity dates.  These differences have a significant impact on the valuation of this type 
of real option and make the use of established risk-neutral valuation methods inappropriate.  
Instead, they require the development of a subjective model for their valuation. 
Chapter four discusses the availability of different sources of financing to young 
biotechnology companies in the current market environment.  It is explained that internal 
financing is not an option for these companies and also external financing is often difficult 
and only available during later stages of the R&D process when final drug approval is 
foreseeable.  However, availability and conditions of external financing are dependent on the 
existing market environment and sometimes the financing window is closed for multiple year 
periods.  It is also shown that external non-debt financing is not necessarily the fund raising 
method of choice for young companies because it can lead to an unwanted loss of ownership 
and control.  Public grants represent an exception but their decreasing availability and a focus 
on late stage financing makes them less available for the majority of young biotech 
companies.  As a conclusion of this chapter it is found that there is a need among young 
biotechnology companies for innovative fund raising methods, especially during early stages 
of clinical trials when cash requirements increase significantly. 
The subsequent chapter five describes the general concept of how selling option rights on 
ongoing research projects can theoretically be used for financing purposes.  It is demonstrated 
that from a theoretical standpoint such a concept has multiple advantages for the research 
conducting company as the option writer as well as for large pharmaceutical companies, 
which are most likely to act as the buying side of a R&D option deal.  The main advantage 
for the writer is the fact that such a deal does not involve any transfer of ownership in the 
company and therefore ensures independence from third parties.  A second key advantage is 
the reduced risk related to future cash flows because the expected exercise price and therefore 
                                                 
468 See Figure 1.5. 
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the final payoff of the project in case of option execution is already known at the point an 
option deal is closed.  For large pharmaceutical companies the main advantage is the ability 
to secure access rights on future product innovations with a reduced upfront investment 
compared to internal R&D.  This allows the creation of option portfolios indirectly expanding 
the buyers’ product pipelines, diversifying their development risk and increasing the 
probability of finding a future blockbuster product. 
In addition, the chapter discusses the key risk factors of drug development being 
technological risk, uncertain market entry timing, unknown product lifetime, general market 
uncertainty and competition.  These risk factors are also investigated in terms of their 
relevance for the parties involved in a R&D option deal.  It is argued that technological risk, 
the risk of competitive products entering the market and uncertain project timing represent 
private risk factors that can be diversified by entities owning large research portfolios. 
Although selling options on ongoing drug development projects appears to be an attractive 
financing method from a theoretical standpoint the key question remains as to how much 
money can be raised through such a financing concept along the various stages of the drug 
development process.  To answer this question, chapter six presents selected option valuation 
models and their use in the financial assessment of drug development projects representing 
the underlying asset of the R&D option.  The objective of this section is to investigate 
whether these models can be used to determine the correct price of a R&D option.  The four 
main methods used in financial option theory often transferred into drug development 
valuation are tree based valuation methods, risk-neutral option valuation following Black-
Scholes, compound option techniques and simulation approaches.  The investigations in this 
chapter show that existing option valuation models with the exception of simulation 
techniques cannot appropriately be applied one to one to the valuation of a R&D option deal.  
The necessity to establish a subjective valuation approach to approximate the financing 
potential of a R&D option is shown.  Establishing a subjective approach becomes necessary 
because there is no existing liquid market for R&D options.  The price settlement is always 
the result of individual negotiations between the buying and the selling side of the option 
agreement and therefore private, non-diversifiable risk factors have to be considered.  The 
application of risk neutral valuation methods is inappropriate because the involved risk 
factors are not market traded and duplication strategies cannot be applied. 
Chapter seven, which represents with chapter eight the largest part of this study, deals with 
the fundamental question how much money one can expect to raise if a R&D option is sold.  
It is shown that the final price settlement driven by the willingness of the buying side to 
invest in the R&D option depends on its ability to diversify private risk factors and the 
availability of free financial resources.  Since the ability to diversify risk and the availability 
of funds to invest vary between potential buyers it is not possible to determine the one and 
only correct price of a R&D option.  To consider differences between potential buyers the 
expected price of the option and the related total financing potential is quantified as a range, 
which is limited by extreme types of investors.  The upper limit of the financing range is 
determined by fully diversified large investors without financial resource constraints for new 
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investments.  On the lower end of the range the limit is set by a one-project investor without 
any opportunity to diversify private risk and very limited funds to be invested. 
In chapter seven the limits of the financing range are quantified step-by-step for a simplified, 
idealistic environment, which is characterized by a known and constant market potential of a 
new drug under development and by an absence of competitive forces.  The key innovation of 
this approach is the modeling of the technical risk component of a drug development project 
by using a continuous failure risk function.  Another innovation is the modeling of the 
expected project duration as a stochastic process instead of using fixed values.  An 
exponentially distributed project delay function is selected after a log-normally distributed 
project duration approach is discussed and abandoned for modeling project durations. 
Eventually a model to estimate the upper pricing limit of a R&D option is built, which cannot 
be solved numerically.  In this model it is assumed that private risk factors are diversified 
away by a potential buyer and therefore no risk premium is expected as a compensation for 
this type of risk.  In this chapter, a solution to this problem is derived using discrete 
approximation methods.  Based on these results, a second adapted model is built, which 
quantifies the lower pricing limit of a R&D option in an idealistic market environment.  The 
valuation approach developed in this chapter is demonstrated step-by-step based on an 
illustrative example of a drug development project. 
In chapter eight the valuation approach is expanded into a more realistic view by considering 
price relevant input factors, which are neglected in the idealistic market view of chapter 
seven.  Additional factors in the realistic model of the upper pricing limit are potential 
general market trends, unexpected variations in market trends, potential market expansions, 
influences from competitive forces and a general uncertainty in the initial market estimate for 
a new drug under development.  The resulting valuation model is complex and its solution is 
approximated by applying Monte Carlo Simulation techniques.  Similar to the approach of 
the previous chapter, a second model is built that includes private risk premiums that cannot 
be diversified by certain investors to determine a lower pricing limit of the R&D option. 
To demonstrate the approach, the case example is adapted to illustrate steps of the valuation 
approach in the realistic environment.  The resulting option value for the illustrative case is 
higher than the one derived in chapter seven.  One of the reasons for this increasing value is 
the opportunity of a positive market development and a potential underestimation of the 
initial market potential at the point of project valuation.  Since option owners can fully 
participate in potential upsides but do not have to participate in downside developments, 
these upside opportunities drive the value of the R&D option. 
In concluding, it can be said that in a realistic market environment with a wide range of 
potential price influencing factors, selling a R&D option can be a tool to raise financial 
resources.  To reach option prices that ensure interesting pricing levels for the R&D option 
writer, it is preferred to close a R&D option deal with partners able to diversify private risk 
factor involved in the R&D process to a significant extent.  This is especially true during 
early phases of the R&D process while being less significant in relative terms towards the 
end of the expected project duration.  With the expected R&D option pricing range increasing 
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significantly during the research process and the maximum benefit of selling to a diversified 
investor being far into the drug development process, the innovative financing approach 
cannot be expected to solve young biotech companies’ financing problems.  It can be 
considered an alternative financing tool during later stages of the research process because 
there are indications that selling a R&D option is more attractive during advanced 
development stages such as phase II clinical trials or later.  The innovative idea becomes 
attractive at later project stages when alternative financing methods such as venture capital, 
licensing deal or public offerings also become available.  With this in mind the practical 
implementation of selling R&D options on ongoing drug development projects for financing 
purposes depends more on the different characteristics compared to other financing sources 
than on its attractiveness at times when other tools are not available. 
As a by-product of the conducted study the arguments and conclusions can also serve as an 
argumentation base for the consolidation within the pharmaceutical industry.  Large players 
with large research portfolios enabling them to significantly diversify private risk will most 
likely be willing to place the highest bid for a R&D option on an attractive research 
project469.  This on the other hand enables them to build even larger research portfolios of 
attractive and promising projects making them even larger market players with better 
diversification opportunities in the future.  Smaller players on the other hand have difficulties 
in winning bidding contests against these large players and therefore have to strengthen their 
research pipeline with fewer and more resource intensive internal projects. 
In the concluding chapter nine additional investigations are conducted to analyze the 
sensitivity of the developed valuation model in a realistic market environment to changes in 
its input parameters.  Four main findings are derived from this section: 
1. The positive relation between option value and exercise price of a financial call option 
also holds true for the R&D option.  Despite this straightforward conclusion, setting 
the exercise price of the R&D option is a sensitive issue because there is a tradeoff 
between an immediate payment resulting from the option premium to be paid and a 
future payment that can be expected in case the option is exercised.  Additional 
research on setting the best exercise price is recommended because the future 
payment at expiration represents the main incentive for the option writer to continue 
its research activities. 
2. As opposed to European financial call options on a non-dividend paying stock, the 
value of the R&D option does not increase with increasing time to maturity.  The 
opposite is true and the option value decreases as the time to maturity represented by 
the expected project duration increases.  This is caused by the fact that increasing time 
to maturity decreases the effective patent protection period of a new drug.  There are 
three main reasons behind this difference to financial options: 
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• The time value of money decreases the present value of future cash flows, the 
more they are estimated to occur in the future. 
• The longer the time to maturity the shorter the time a product can be sold in the 
market under patent protection and therefore the smaller the total market potential. 
• The non-exclusivity of real options allows competitors during the time to maturity 
to enter the market with a substitute product, reducing the remaining market share 
for the product under investigation. 
3. While increases in uncertainty expressed by the volatility of the underlying stock 
increase the value of financial options this is not necessarily true for the value of the 
R&D option.  Here it depends which uncertainty parameter is adjusted.  While 
increasing risk of competitive market entry reduces its value, additional uncertainty in 
the initial market potential or potential project expansions increase the pricing range 
of the R&D option. 
4. Changes in interest rates have a different impact on the pricing range of the R&D 
option than they have on a simple call option.  Hull (2006, p. 362) shows that as 
interest rates increase so does the value of the call option.  With interest rate increases 
reducing the present value of future cash flows and growth rates for drug development 
projects not necessarily developing as described at Hull (2006), the R&D option value 
decreases as interest rates increase. 
Table 10.1 summarizes the findings from the sensitivity analysis in comparison to the 
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Expand Market Increase 
Time to 
Maturity Increase Time to Maturity Decrease 
Price of 
Underlying Increase 
Expected Level of 
Initial Market Potential Increase 
Risk-free 
Interest Increase Discount Rate Decrease 
Table 10.1: R&D option price influencing factors in a realistic environment 
                                                                                                                                                       
469 They would also be willing to place the highest bid if the project were directly for sale without an 
option agreement.  The direct project sale is equivalent to an option deal with exercise price X=0. 
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The primary contributions of this study are manifold.  First of all an innovative idea is 
introduced on how young biotechnology companies can theoretically use the sale of option 
rights on ongoing drug development projects for corporate financing purposes.  At the same 
time the idea represents a way how small companies can, over the sales price of the R&D 
option, benefit from risk diversification opportunities of large pharmaceutical companies. 
The study discusses how misleading a simple one to one application of existing financial 
option valuation models can be if applied to complex real option situations as the specific 
case of the R&D option or to the valuation of drug development projects as real options in 
general.  In a real-life environment the value of these options sometimes behaves 
significantly different than standard financial options.  The most obvious example 
demonstrated in this study is that an increasing time to maturity decreases the value of the 
R&D option instead of increasing it as one would expect from financial option theory.  This 
is an important finding not extensively discussed in scientific literature.  In addition, the 
finding should be mentioned that not every type of uncertainty increases the value of a R&D 
option.  Certain one-sided risk factors such as technical failure risk or competitive forces can 
also significantly decrease its value.  This is a factor sometimes neglected in studies on real 
options because real options are often treated as exclusive options, which some of them are 
not.  Including competitive forces as a stochastic process in the option valuation model is a 
new approach470 that allows the subjective consideration of a competitive threat on an 
individual project. 
The study also represents the first approach where the technical risk involved in the 
biotechnological and pharmaceutical drug development process is modeled using a 
continuous time function for potential project failure.  Most other studies on the valuation of 
pharmaceutical research as real options are based on the idea of discrete risk jumps at 
predefined decision points.  An additional significant contribution of this study relates to the 
uncertain time to maturity of the discussed R&D option.  No other sources are known to the 
author471 that include a stochastic model for the uncertain project lifetime into the valuation 
model of a drug development project as done in the valuation model of this study. 
Finally the study represents a valuation approach with a large number of input parameters to 
assess the value of a real option.  Despite the fact that most of these parameters are subjective 
by nature and bear the risk of over- or underestimation, it is the first model that allows the 
explicit consideration of all key value drivers of a drug development project.  Although the 
model is quite complex, does not generate the one correct expected sales price for a R&D 
option and is not necessarily superior to other valuation models with fewer input factors, it 
forces the evaluating entities to investigate and think about all required input parameters.  
                                                 
470 Competition in general and also in relation to real options has been discussed extensively.  
Examples include Grossman and Shapiro (1987) and Weeds (2002). 
471 In an older study by Fischer, Kay M. (1996, .p 247), the problem of uncertain time to maturity of 
most real options is still considered an unsolved problem. 
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These parameters can easily be neglected when simply and incorrectly applying a closed-
form valuation equation with few parameters from financial option theory.  It is therefore not 
only the result of the valuation model that generates valuable information for the evaluating 
entity, but also the way until the model is set up and all input parameters are defined and 
agreed upon.  The process of gathering the required input data itself creates a very 
comprehensive picture of the existing business situation and the value of a drug candidate 
under development and the option to be written on it.  This knowledge is highly valuable to 
the practitioner when physically negotiating a R&D option deal. 
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10.2 Outlook and Future Research 
With a study like this, it is unfortunately impossible to cover all relevant aspects of a complex 
topic like the potential sale of R&D options as an innovative financing instrument.  While the 
focus of this study lies on the introduction of the concept, the verification of the practical 
need and the development of a subjective valuation model, there are other important issues 
that require further investigation.  There are three areas of future research that can be 
considered mandatory to reach a final comprehensive assessment of the applicability of the 
introduced financing approach. 
The first area is related to the existing asymmetric information distribution between the writer 
and the potential buyer of a R&D option.  Potential investors in the R&D option face the 
problem that the research conducting company willing to sell the option possesses 
information about the underlying project that are not accessible to them.  With this 
information advantage the research conducting company could potentially try to sell options 
on projects that appear attractive to outsiders but are bound to fail based on internal 
information472.  The funds raised could then be used for other projects that are under full 
control of the research conducting company while the project underlying the option is 
abandoned and the option expires worthless.  This phenomenon is often referred to as adverse 
selection and was first studied by Akerlof (1970).  Spremann (1970) showed for extreme 
cases that asymmetric information and the related adverse selection problems can eventually 
lead to an entire market breakdown.  Within the market stock IPO, asymmetrical information 
between investors on one hand and issuers and underwriters on the other hand lead to the so-
called underpricing, which is required by investors to compensate them for a potential 
information asymmetry.473 
The existence of this phenomenon might have a significant impact on the potential 
implementation of the R&D option concept.  In this context of asymmetric information it also 
needs to be investigated to which extent the prospect of receiving an exercise payment is a 
sufficient incentive for the research conducting company to pursue and complete the work on 
the ongoing project the option is sold on.  How the exercise price should be selected to satisfy 
the interests of both parties involved in a R&D option deal appears to be the central question.  
On the one hand, the selling party can raise more funds short-term by setting a very low 
exercise price for the negotiating counterpart interested in a higher exercise payment to give 
the research conducting company the necessary incentive to continue and complete the R&D 
process and reduce the upfront investment.  Setting the exercise price too high might cause 
another problem depending on the seller’s corporate maturity.  Assuming a project is 
completed and final drug approval is granted but the exercise price is set unrealistically high, 
                                                 
472 This phenomenon is covered in a general investment environment by Myers and Majluf (1984) or 
Wohlschieß (1996, p. 10). 
473 Discussions on underpricing and adverse selection in IPOs can be found at Ritter (1984), Ritter 
(1991) or Michaely and Shaw (1994). 
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the option owner is not going to exercise his right and the option expires unexercised.  In this 
situation the seller still owns all rights on the product but might not have the capability to 
market the product and manufacture it to an extent necessary to serve the market.  Especially 
for very young companies with limited capabilities in later stages of the pharmaceutical value 
chain it appears desirable to set the exercise price in a way that execution of the option right 
can be expected if the research and development process is successfully completed.  These 
issues around asymmetric information and setting an optimal exercise price should be 
discussed in an additional study. 
The second area of future research with an influence on the attractiveness of a R&D option 
deal as a financing instrument is more accounting related.  It should be investigated how a 
R&D option deal affects a company’s reporting instruments.  The manner in which financing 
deals affect balance sheet and profit and loss statements is a point that deserves additional 
considerations since these are important tools for companies to communicate with their 
environment as well as with existing and potential investors.  The signaling effect from 
balance sheet and profit and loss statement changes can be expected to be more significant 
for the smaller company selling the option than for a larger one expected to act as the buyer 
for this type of option. 
The third and last major area that deserves attention is less economic but more legal by 
nature.  Here it should be investigated how the physical R&D option contract should be 
structured to give all parties involved in a deal the maximum amount of security.  As an 
example of an issue that should definitely be discussed in this context, one could state the 
potential abandoning of project activities.  It should be defined when and under which 
circumstances the research conducting company has the right to declare a project as having 
failed and when it has the right to abandon it before the point of final drug approval and 
therefore before the maturity date of the option is reached.  Another important legal issue is 
the question if and under which circumstances the option is tradable for the option buyer.  
There might be a situation where the buyer wants the option right to be tradable and therefore 
transferable to other market players whereas this might not be in the interest of the research 
conducting company.  Issues like these could be covered in a comprehensive legal discussion 
on R&D options. 
In addition to these necessary areas of future research another study could be initiated in 
direct succession to the presented study.  For the purpose of this study an illustrative case 
example is defined to demonstrate the developed valuation approach.  An additional study 
could expand this view and try to implement the approach on real-life cases.  Here it would 
be beneficial to determine whether the absence of objectively measurable input parameters 
represents a critical problem for the implementation of the model.  This would then be similar 
to the critique Copeland and Tufano (2004, p. 92) express for the application of financial 
option models on real-life problems. 
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PART IV: Appendices 
11 App. A: Deriving a Risk Function from Standardized Failure Risk 
In chapter 7.3.3 the risk of failure during a standard drug development project was defined to 
follow the function  (7.9) with tS being the time after a project was initiated and TAS being the 
total development time from project initiation until final drug approval. 
 (7.9) 
For the purpose of this study the main reference point in time is not the time a development 
project is initiated but rather the time a company files for patent protection for a new drug.  
This point in time is defined as the first time it is possible to sell an option on the R&D option 
because at that time an intangible asset is created.  For standardization purposes it is also 
defined in chapter 5.3.2 that the time patent protection is granted is equivalent to the point 
where laboratory research ends and the stage of pre-clinical trials is entered. 
Instead of using the failure risk function  (7.9), the equation is adapted to a new reference 
point t representing the time of patent application.  In this scenario TS represents the time 
between the start of the project and patent application and TA represents the time between 
patent application and drug approval. This implies that the duration TAS of a development 
project can be broken down into the two time periods TS and TA expressed by (11.1). 
(11.1) 
Referencing time to t instead of tS implies that t is simply a shift by the duration TS of the first 
project phase as expressed by (11.2). 
(11.2) 
With the new reference point,  (7.9) can be transformed into a new function (11.3) 
representing the technical risk after patent application denoted as TR(t). 
(11.3) 
With the known figures for the standard pharmaceutical development process from Table 2.1, 
the risk of technical failure of the average project at time t after patent application can be 


































































Equation (11.4) only holds true for the average drug development project but does not yet 
fulfill the requirement from chapter 7.3.3.1 that the standardized technical risk function has to 
be dependent an expected time of final drug approval E(TA), which can vary depending on 
the type of project investigated.  When tailoring the standard risk function to any project with 
an expected time of approval E(TA) it is known that the new standardized technical risk 





It is assumed above that the risk pattern of any new project investigated is independent from 
its actual time to patent application.  E(TS) is introduced as the calculatory time between the 
real start of the project and the time of patent application.  Keeping the two conditions 
described above in mind, E(TS) needs to be defined as (11.7) for the new function to follow 
the standard risk pattern. 
(11.7) 
Equation (11.4) can now be rewritten to fit any development project.  This adapted technical 
risk function is expressed by (11.8). 
(11.8) 
Substituting E(TS) with (11.7) finally leads to equation (11.9) representing the technical 
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12 App. B: Comparison of One- and Two-Exponent Failure Risk 
In chapter 7.3.3 a one exponent formula is used to describe standard failure risk for a drug 
development project.  The equation is of form (7.6) with tS∈DtS, DtS=[0;TAS] and *+∈Rγ . 
(7.6) 
In this equation the single exponent *+∈Rγ  alters the function as visualized in Figure 12.1 for 












0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Fac. 0.5 Fac. 0.6 Fac. 0.7 Fac. 0.8 Fac. 0.9 Fac. 0.10 Fac. 0.11  
Figure 12.1: Visualization of various one exponent failure risk functions 
Alternatively to the single exponent failure risk function it is tested if an alternative two 
exponent function of the form (12.1) can more accurately model the expected development of 
failure risk during a project.  Equation (12.1) with tS∈DtS, DtS=[0;TAS], *+∈Rλ  and 
*
+∈Rγ  
includes a second exponent to increase modeling flexibility by altering the argument of the 
cosine function. 
(12.1) 
To visualize the impact of the second exponent λ, Figure 12.2 shows various two exponent 





































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Fac. 0.7 Fac. 0.8 Fac. 0.9 Factor 1.0 Fac. 1.1 Fac. 1.2 Fac. 1.3  
Figure 12.2: Visualization of various two exponent failure risk functions 
To check the modeling capabilities of the two component failure risk function (12.1) a 
relative least squared error check is performed.  At this check the two parameters λ and γ are 
selected in a way that minimizes the following relative error function Q*(λ;γ).  Similar to 
(7.8), )( SitFR  represent the actual failure rates listed in Table 5.1 and displayed in Figure 7.6. 
(12.2) 
The relationship between λ, γ and Q*(λ;γ) is displayed in Figure 12.3 with λ∈[0.98;1.17] and 




































































































































Figure 12.3: Relative error function for two exponent failure risk approximation 
A direct comparison of MIN[Q*(λ;γ)] with MIN[Q(γ)] reveals a slight advantage of the two 
exponent failure risk approximation function over the one exponent failure risk 
approximation function with Q*(1.12;0.87)=0.23<Q(0.79)=0.26. 
Figure 12.4 shows the direct comparison of the path of the one exponent failure risk 












0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
CMR VFA Bain & Company Two Exp. One Exp.  
Figure 12.4: Comparison of optimized one and two exponent failure risk function 
Because of the relatively small advantage of the two exponent failure risk approximation 
function and to reduce modeling complexity throughout this study, the one exponent 
approximation function is used. 
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13 App. C: Readjustment of Time Dependant Technical Risk 
In chapter 7.3.3.1, a formula is derived expressing the probability that a project cannot 
successfully be completed at a certain point in time t.  This technical risk function is denoted 
as TR(t) with t representing the time after the end of the base development phase of a project. 
As time progresses, a real-life project might not exactly follow the standardized path pre-
defined by TR(t) and it might become necessary to adjust the technical risk to reflect the 
individual characteristics of the progress of a specific project.  There are three effects that can 
take place during the course of a project that might require different adjustments to the 
technical risk formula: 
Only the expected time of project completion E(TA) changes but otherwise the project 
progress behaves as it does in a “normal” project.  The project progress shows irregularities 
because a project phase can either be completed faster than expected or it is delayed 
compared to the standard timing defined in Table 2.1 but the research conducting company 
still considers the end of the project as realistic. 
A combination of case 1 and 2 where irregularities in project progress also require the 
expected completion date E(TA) of a project to be changed. 
All three cases require adjustments to the technical risk formula (7.10) but they are different 
in terms of adjustment complexity. 
(7.10) 
Adjustments to this formula can become necessary for different reasons and with different 
expectations about the future progress of the drug development project.  During this section 
the three different cases introduced above are described, each with a different correlation to 
the initial project expectations. 
Case 1: 
If, at some stage during the course of a “normal” project, it becomes clear that the initial 
assumption E(TA) for the completion of the project cannot be held, a simple adjustment to the 
formula has to be carried out.  If the project is still expected to be completed in a normal way 
and with normal progress, the shape of the curve for TR(t) is not changed but rather stretched 
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Such a new situation only requires the applied parameter E(TA) to be adjusted without any 
other changes to the formula for TR(t).  Figure 13.1 shows an illustrative example of an 
adjustment of E(TA) during the course of a project.  In this example the initial expectation 
E1(TA)=11 is adapted at t=3 and remains either unchanged or follows one of the four 












0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Unchanged 2 Years faster 1 Years faster 1 Years slower 2 Years slower  
Figure 13.1: Technical risk adjustment for changes in project timing E(TA) 
Case 2: 
The situation becomes different if, at some time during the course of the project, it becomes 
clear that the progress is either lagging behind initial expectations or is further advance than 
expected.  At the same time, the expected date for the completion of the project is expected to 
remain unchanged.  Such a situation can arise if more resources are allocated to a project that 
progresses slower than expected to make up for a delay that already took place.  To model 
such a behavior, changes have to be made to the basic function (7.10) modeling the technical 
risk of a project. 
If the new information requiring the adjustment of the formula arrives at t=tup and the project 
is off schedule by a delay factor d, (7.10) can be rewritten as (13.1) for all t>tup. 
(13.1) 
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For all t>tup, Figure 13.2 illustrates the behavior of the adjusted function (13.1) compared to 
the initial technical risk function (7.10).  Illustrated are two adjustments made at tup=4.  In the 
first adjustment the project delay accounts for one year (d1=1) at tup=4 with an unchanged 
expected project termination date.  In the second adjustment shown, the project is not delayed 
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Figure 13.2: Technical risk adjustment - interim risk adjustments only 
Case 3: 
The remaining case described is a combination of a project delay474 during the course of a 
project with a related adjustment in the expected project termination date E(TA).  This type of 
situation can also be modeled using equation (13.1) for all t>tup.  Figure 13.3 illustrates two 
adjusted technical risk functions with an adjustment in tup=4 compared to the initial case 
following (7.10) with E(TA)=11.  In the displayed cases the described project is either 
delayed by one year at tup (adjustment 3) or one year ahead of schedule (adjustment 4).  
Despite the different project progress at tup, both projects are expected to be completed two 
years ahead of schedule at E(TA)=9. 
                                                 
474 Project “delay“ can also be an “advance”, which is expressed by a negative delay factor d. 
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Figure 13.3: Technical risk adjustment - advanced project termination 
As a last example Figure 13.4 shows two very similar adjustments as the one in Figure 13.3 
with the only difference that the project is not expected to be completed ahead of schedule 
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Figure 13.4: Technical risk adjustment - delayed project termination 
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